Some Contemporary Approaches to Issues in Conceptual Analysis

Some Contemporary Approaches to Issues in Conceptual Analysis

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SOME CONTEMPORARY APPROACHES TO ISSUES IN CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS
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Two Central Issues What kind of contemporary account of analysis can be both useful and successful in a variety of cases. What can conceptual analysis do for us in theoretical investigation? What kind of defense of intuitive justification can be given so as to circumvent some of the problems raised by contemporary experimental research. Given that there is great deal of evidence that calls into question the evidential value of intuition in investigation, how can we rely on it? What defense can be given of intuition?
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Two Contemporary Views Kristie Miller’s account of a framework for concepts, analysis, and resolving debates in conceptual analysis. Eli Chudnoff’s defense of the nature of intuitive justification, based on consideration of perception.
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Miller on Concepts and Evaluating Debates I Miller explores the debate over the correct account of the concept of sexual perversion. At the outset she maintains that the methodology of the debate is the classical analysis and counterexample back and forth. One main worry about this methodology is that it presupposes that our intuitions about cases are not inconsistent themselves.
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Cont. Miller takes concepts to be contentful entities that are the constituents of propositions. A proposition is the meaning of a sentence. Two sentences can express the same proposition. Propositions can be true or false. In addition Miller draws a distinction between concepts and conceptions. A conception is a more determinate specification of a concept. A concept can have a number of competing conceptions. The important point is that two individuals can share the same concept and have different conceptions of it that track their use of it.
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Cont. Inconsistent intuitions can be part of the content of a concept. Inconsistent intuitions cannot be part of a conception of a concept. A revisionary conception of a concept makes determinate and consistent the content of a concept.
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The inconsistent claims in the concept of sexual perversion 1. No act is correctly positively or negatively evaluated in virtue of having the property of naturalness of in virtue of not having that property. 2. An act is sexually perverted if and only if it is an unnatural sexual act. 3. Sexually perverted acts are correctly negatively evaluated in virtue of being sexually perverted.
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Two roles for concepts Miller maintains that concepts have two roles: one is internal to our cognitive economy, and another is external to our cognitive economy. Moreover, some concepts have a social-political
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This note was uploaded on 09/08/2010 for the course PHIL 70C at San Jose State.

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Some Contemporary Approaches to Issues in Conceptual Analysis

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