132+Metaethical+Views+f09[1]

132+Metaethical+Views+f09[1] - Metaethical Views...

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Metaethical Views Ontology Epistemology Semantics Cognitivism: Moral Realism (Plato, Kant, Ross Shafer- Landau) There are moral facts and they are not reducible to natural facts, though “the non-moral features of a situation fix its moral status”. (SL, MR 77) (nonnaturalism, supervenience) Recollection of Forms (Plato) Transcendental deduction (Kant) Directly apprehended (Ross) Discoverable a priori (S-L) “A is morally wrong” means “It is true that A is morally wrong”. (Correspondence theory of truth.) Kant: “A is morally wrong” means “A is incompatible with the categorical imperative”. Moral Realism - Ideal Observer (Smith) Moral facts are reducible to facts about what we would desire, if we were in idealized conditions of reflection: well- informed, cool, calm and collected. Thought experiment, ordinary ways of knowing. “A is morally wrong” means “A is incompatible with the moral reasons we would have in ideal condition of reflection”. Moral Realism
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This note was uploaded on 09/08/2010 for the course PHIL 292 at San Jose State University .

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132+Metaethical+Views+f09[1] - Metaethical Views...

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