383I Roth - Government by Consensus: Voting Rules and...

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Government by Consensus: Voting Rules and Social Choice Economics 383I, Binghamton University, Fall 2009 Instructor: M. Garrett Roth E-mail: mroth1@binghamton.edu Office Hour: Tuesday, 1:15 – 2:15 (preliminary), Location TBD Lecture Schedule: TR 11:40 – 1:05 PM, Science 2, Room 143 Prerequisite: Grade of C or better in ECON 160. Required Texts: 1) Buchanan and Tullock. The Calculus of Consent . University of Michigan Press. 1962. -- Available FREE online: http://www.econlib.org/library/Buchanan/buchCv3Cover.html 2) Saari, Donald. Decisions and Elections: Explaining the Unexpected . Cambridge University Press, 2001. **Additional brief readings will be made available via blackboard or a course webpage.** Description: The purpose of this course is to provide an overview of collective decision-making through the lens of economics and political science. We begin with simple efficiency considerations in both exchange and production economies. Such raw efficiency concerns can be balanced with equity considerations via the use of social welfare functions. A multiplicity of criticisms regarding the social welfare approach necessitates the alternative, democratic method of voting. When considering the democratic process, we start with broad questions of the appropriate scope and methodology for public decision making as addressed by Buchanan and Tullock in The Calculus of Consent . Their basic cost-benefit approach generates a framework by which to analyze questions of logrolling, coalition formation, and legislative make-up. As counterpoint to Buchanan and Tullock, we briefly discuss anarchist critiques of the
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This note was uploaded on 09/18/2010 for the course ECON 383I taught by Professor Roth during the Spring '09 term at Binghamton University.

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383I Roth - Government by Consensus: Voting Rules and...

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