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Unformatted text preview: Schooling, language and the policy-making power of state bureaucrats in Ukraine ALEXANDRA HRYCAK, Reed College, 16Ap72'12004 Submim'on to Reboundz'ng I dentz'z‘z'es, edited é}: Dorizz'm'gue Aral and Blair Ruble Ukraine inherited complex and potentially deeply divisive language Problems from the Soviet Union: Soviet policy reinforced the dominance of Russian in most domains, but also institutionalized powerful links to Ukrainian as a symbol of personal as well as territorial identity. A persistent tension between the normative claims and the complicated realities of national identity plagues Ukrainian revival efforts in schools, particularly in large cities Ganmaat 2000; Laitin 1998; Wanner 1998). Use of Russian remains extensive in many elite domains, particularly in higher education, science, business and the media. Russian is still spoken almost universally by young people in urban streets, workplaces, and shops (Arel 2002; Casanova 1998; Wilson 2000). Only among young Western Ukrainians—who. were not ruled historically by the Russian empire—is Russian not widely used. Further complicating this situation, Russian-language advocates and influential politicians and political parties have argued repeatedly that Russian should be declared Ukraine's second official language and that no efforts to extend the Ukrainian language’s scope should be made in Russian- speaking areas. Public opinion polls show that at least some ethnic Ukrainians seem to express support for such positions in areas where ethnic Russians constitute a sizeable minority (Aral and Kbmelko 1996; Fournier 2002; Laitin 1998). Political actors respond to elections and other moments of political opportunity with dichotomous policy preferences, with Western Ukrainians fundamentally opposed to Eastern Ukrainian politicians on ethnolinguistic issues. Ukraine's ethnolinguistic divisions and polarization among political actors over language policies were the subject of concem among some observers who speculated that the-country's conflicts over national identity could create openings‘for dangerous, militant forms of nationalism 1998: pp. 178-80, 185—87, 341 -3). To date, however, new moderate language policies have been implemented in a gradual, peaceful and decentralized manner that has not resulted in heightened protest over ethnolinguistic issues. Following the policy guidelines of the Ministry of Education, schools have begun to reintroduce Ukrainian on a wide scale, often at school entry. This policy of focusing revival efforts on future generations, which I will argue is likely in the long run to have a dramatic impact and raise Ukrainian language proficiency in Russifted areas, has met with small—scale grumbling and foot-dragging but surprisingly little organized nationwide resistance. Why has this Russified country and its polarized political elite accepted school reforms that a mere ten years ago Were associated with Rukh, a movement whose nationalism excited widespread suspicion among many Easterners and whose political fortunes have waned in recent years? Schools are not adopting Ukrainian because of widespread grassroots support. Indeed a 1999 survey reviewed below suggests that only half of ethnic Ukrainians nationwide prefers Ukrainian as their child's language of schooling. Nor is schooling refonn driven by the policy preferences of the political leaders and parties that have tended to dominate elections to parliament and the presidency for most of the country's first decade of independence. Instead, schooling policy has been made and implemented by state bureaucrats in the long subordinate field of education. This paper explains this policy puzzle by placing the quiet victory of Ukraine's bureaucratically implemented national revival within a broader historical institutionalist account of nation-building educators' use of state organizations to implement a model of national development that stresses native language literacy. Understanding the institutional context within which this policy took shape and was implemented necessitates a close examination of historical events that have fostered political and ideological commitments to native language schooling, particularly among educators. Many accounts of Soviet and post-Soviet national mobilization have focused primarily on the present day electoral process as the main source of policy inputs and assumed that states faced with conflicting ethnolinguistic policy preferences are likely to respond to this crisis by adopting only those positions that are favored by those who are currently politically dominant. Such approaches overestimate the likelihood that a legitimacy crisis (here, a crisis concerning a state's identity) will contribute to state capture by the positions offered by political actors that dominate electoral campaigns and parliamentary debates. By contrast, historical institutionalist accounts argue that‘presentday - legitimacy crises can create openings that empower well—positioned, but normally weak state bureaucracies to ignore the policies preferred by other political actors and instead adopt alternative policies that conform to theirtown accepted models or blueprints for national development. This is twhat I argue has been the case with Ukraine's linguistic revival. Below, I will explore some of the reasons why a model of national revival promoted by politically weak writers, scholars and educators has carried more weight in post-independence Ukraine’s schooling policy than the preferences of politically dominant contemporary politicians. I will first examine the historic emergence of the native language policy preference, demonstrating that. intellectuals and educators in the past have responded to political opportunities by organizing civic groups and winning state support for native language education. Next I will examine evidence suggesting that a clear majority of the broader population of this Russified country still does not prefer Ukrainian as the language of schooling. I end by providing finther reasons why this country's divisions created favorable conditions for acceptance of a moderate form of linguistic revival. My argument rests on historical institutionalist theories of state policy (Skocpol 1985; Skocpol 1992). As Skocpol has long argued, state bureaucracies develop their own autonomous policy interests and their own definitions of what they see as the public interest. Their ability to act in pursuit of these policy goals depends on expanding their control over organiZational resources at timm of deep political division among elected officials, politicians, political parties and other powerful political actors. By pursuing alliances with social movements, receptive politicians and groups who share their ideas, state bureaucracies can exploit such political divisions to pursue their own policy interests in defiance of the preferences of powerful political actors (Amenta and Zylan 1991). Similarly, in the case of Ukrainian language revival, public schools and related state administrative structures concerned with education served as important sources of state bureaucratic support for native language schooling policy. In close alliance with the Ukrainian national movement, educational administrators developed an early commitment to native language schooling and institutionalized native language_schooling as an administrative principle first in Galicia in the late nineteenth century and later in the Eastern Ukraine during the first years of Soviet rule. After decades of political subordination to Moscow and to centrist language policies that made Russian the language of higher education and led to the closing of thousands of Ukrainian-language schools, glasnost created a political opportunity for Ukrainian educators and their allies who had been alienated by pro—Russian policies to initiate a return to the native language schooling policy early post-Soviet Ukraine adopted. Ukrainian educators and writers who supported the native language principle, although a tiny minority of Ukraine's population, expanded their pOWer and visibility through their professional unions and through alliances with protest organizations and like-minded party and state officials. Coalitions of educators and civic activists pressured the state to institute a return to the native language principle in schooling, winning important concessions at a time when protests had fatally weakened the Soviet patty elite. While parliament remained deadlocked over issues of state identity, the Minisu:y of Education completed its administrative coup by reinstituting the native language pn'nciple throughout Ukraine's school system. East and West Ukraine in the development of the native language principle Ukrainian educators’ commitment to vernacular Ukrainian schooling dates back to the nineteenth century when Eastern Ukraine was ruled by the Russian empire and Western Ukraine was ruled by the Austrian empire. Even though some local intellectuals argued that Ukrainian was an oral peasant idiom ill—suited to schooling, by the late nineteenth century influential scholars and many educators in both regions of Ukraine rejected such arguments in support of a vernacular linguistic model of nationhood. Political turmoil concerning the status of Poles, Hungaiians and other local ethnic groups set the stage for Ukrainian educators to begin to form their own ideological commitment to vernacularization and develop the civic groups and bureaucratic capacity to implement vernacular .or native language schools. Political conditions in the Austrian empire following the 1848 Spring of Nations encouraged early Ukrainian national activists to begin experimenting with vernacular—based literary standards. The Prosvita (Enlightenment) society, a federation of civic organizations, arose in the 18605 as an urban organization of intellectuals who supported vernamlaiization 1988). After the passage of an 1873 Galician provincial school board act supporting the establishment of a free system of locally funded elementary schools in which instruction would be conducted in the pupil's native language, Western Ukrainian educators in close alliance with Prosvita societies and other like—minded civic organizations such as Ruska Besida developed a rudimentary school system of teachers' seminaiies, Ukrainian—language primary and secondary schools as well as a network of rural reading rooms and schools for adults (Miaso 1991; Tomiak 1991). By 1912, there were over two thousand elementary schools and ten secondary schools in Galicia in which teaching was conducted in the Ukrainian language, and several university chairs in Ukrainian studies. An estimated twenty percent of the adult population of Galicia belonged to the Prosvita society, which ran nearly three thousand libraries and reading rooms. Over time, this system of native language education had not only promoted strong national consciousness among Western Ukrainians but also attracted the best and brightest young aspiring intellectuals to careers of civic engagement and employment in the growing educational system. , By contrast Russian state officials largely prevented writers and scholars from introducing Ukrainian to schools in Eastern Ukraine until after the’Russian empire collapsed. Although local school administrators and teachers often supported efforts to introduce the Ukrainian language to popular education, the central state opposed them. In 1863, the Russian Minister of Education, Valuev, issued a circular to the office of censorship that prohibited all Ukrainian language publications intended for a broad popular audience. In the circular, Valuev expressed concern that grammars and other publications aimed at spreading literacy in the "Little Russian" language might lead the broader population to view itself as a distinct nationality. In response to later; attempts to publish Ukrainian language books, in 1876 the Russian state issued a second, more repressive edict that prohibited use of the "Little Russian dialect" in all arenas of public life, specifically banning the importation of Ukrainian books from abroad. This edict, known as the Ems ukaz, also ordered the dissolution of organizations that were associated with cultivating loyalty to the Ukrainian language, and led to the dismissal of leading Ukrainian activists who held positions at Kiev university. After 1905, Russian state officials loosened earlier restrictions on the Ukrainian languages. Permission was granted for a few city—based Prosvita societies and a handful of private schools that requested permission to provide instruction in Ukrainian. The collapse of the Russian state in 1917 and a brief, unsuccessful attempt to establish an independent Ukrainian state permitted Eastern and Western Ukrainian educators an opportunity to begin to expand further the reach of the Prosvita society system. By 1921, the society's total membership had grown to 400,000 and branches had arisen in many rural localities in Eastem'Ukraine. . Prosvita's efforts to introduce vernamilar schooling continued after 1920, when Eastern Ukraine became the basis for a Soviet Ukrainian republic under Bolshevik rule, while Western Ukraine was divided among Poland and neighboring countries until it was annexed by the Soviet Union during World War 11. Despite Bolshevik resistance to such activities, Prosvita and similar societies founded hundreds of rural primary schools in Eastern Ukraine and spread support for the institutionalization of native language education among the rural intelligentsia in Eastern Ukraine. Prosvita was dissolved by the Soviet state in 1922, but by then it had helped to pave the way for Soviet Ukrainian national activists to develop a blueprint for a moderate forms of administrative nationalism that encouraged aspin'ng local intellectuals to pursue careers as vernacularizing reformers within public schools and other state educational organizations. Soviet schooling policy Soviet Ukrainian educators and their supporters in the Ukrainian party faced considerable resistance to their intention to use Galician~style bureaucratic methods to declare the Ukrainian language to be the state language and obligate state officials to use it in public education and other state domains. A state legitimacy crisis compelled reluctant Party leaders to concede in 1923 to demands for Ukrainianization, Galician—style state-supported vernamflaiization of schools and other state institutions 2001). During the period of 'nativization’ administrative measures were used to introduce the native language principle throughout the republic. Soviet Ukrainian party leaders publicly denounced the vestigial Russian imperialism implied by earlier Bolshevik promotion of the Russian language and culture. They commanded party members and government officials to learn to speak Ukrainian, show respect for the Ukrainian language and culture, and recruit Ukrainians into the party. Russified party officials and civil servants in cities resented decrees that forced them to use Ukrainian widely in their work. Nativization was far more successful among educators, an occupational stratum that had long attracted supporters of the native language principle. With the assistance of thousands of newly trained rural teachers and instructors, Ukrainian was introduced to a growing school system and to many universities, until a majority of ethnic Ukrainian pupils and students attended Ukrainian-language institutions (Liber 1992). Beginning in 1933, the Ukrainian school system underwent a series of attacks on its autonomy that forced educational administrators to put an end to vernacularizing efforts. Massive purges of supporters of Ukrainianization in the Commissatiat of Education, scholarly institutes and pedagogical institutes reinforced the position of Russian and compelled thousands of Ukrainian Schools and most universities to move away from the native language principle (Krawchenko 1985: 135—138). The Soviet central state imposed a top-down reorganization of the educational administration followed by a transition from a universal policy of native language education to an internally differentiated bilingual system of schooling (Anderson and Silver 1984: 1034—5). Ukraine‘s educational institutions were reorganized and subordinated administratively to the Moscow—based all- Union Commissatiat of Education. A 1938 decree made the Russian language a mandatory subject in all Soviet schools, greatly increased the number of hours of Russian instruction and increased central state support for a territorially differentiated bilingual education system within which ethnic Ukrainians in cities were expected to study Russian. Russian also began to be reintroduced as the language of instruction in post-secondary education. A 1958 law introduced a policy of parental choice in both the language of instruction and the study of other languages. Educators and scholars who continued to believe in the native language principle found their ability to pursue vernaculatizing policies much diminished after the prominent party figures, scholars and administrators who supported Ukrainianization were purged. All Ukrainians now studied Russian as a subject, and Russian literature and curricular materials displaced the Ukrainian curriculum Soviet Ukrainian educators developed. Only in the countryside and in newly annexed Western Ukraine did most ethnic Ukrainians continue to attend Ukrainian language schools. However, most schoolchildren in cities outside Western Ukraine attended either Russian schools or a new type of bilingual school within which Russian was often the primary language of instruction and Ukrainian was studied as a separate subject 1962). By the time glasnost began, there were few schools with instruction in Ukrainian in Eastern Ukraine's cities. Overall, more than half of all schoolchildren in Ukraine were taught in Russian (Arel 1995; 604ff; Kulyk 2002: 11; Solchanyk 2000: 544). Ukrainian was rarely used as a medium of instruction in higher education except in the west, and even there, instructors were pressured to teach scientific and technical subjects in Russian. The almost universal use of Russian in universities and in positions of authority in most workplaces encouraged many parents to send their children to Russian or bilingual Ukrainian—Russian schools. Ukrainian was restticted more and more to rural or Western Ukrainian schools. Policy changes had made schools in which instruction was officially conducted in Ukrainian more reliant on Russian language textbooks and other, materials. Scientific and technical professional publications that had once been published in Ukrainian were increasingly issued only in Russian. Russification was implemented in a way that alienated one stratum of Soviet Ukrainian society more than any other: educational administrators, educators and writers who adhered to the native language principle and viewed Ukrainian as the legitimate language of their historic community. For prominent educators and writers, illustrious mentors, pivotal Ukrainian literary and scholarly works, and the career paths within which they were embedded reinforced their commitment to the native language principle. While some scholars and writers responded to Russification and related pressures on Soviet Ukrainian culture by writing or teaching in Russian or pursuing a career in Moscow, those who were prominent could not. They resented Soviet efforts to displace Ukrainian from education and culture, but for decades they lacked a way to recoup their lost cultural and organizational autonomy—until glasnost presented them with a political opportunity, a watershed moment in history that allowed them to develop the leverage to delegitimate promoters of the Russian language and initiate a return to the native language principle. Recent schooling refonns: Intellectuals and the reintroduction of Ukrainian Once glasnost was introduced, prominent Ukrainian intellectuals were quick to mobilize all resources at their disposal to demand a national revival. They used their access to unions, the media, the party and educational organizations to orchestrate a dramatic outpouring of public sentiment in favor of national revival State-based organizations within which educators worked fimctioned as sources of resources and personnel for establishing independent organizations that placed further pressure on the republic's government to reintroduce Ukrainian to schools and other state organizations and reinstate Ukrainian literature and language as obligatory subjects in all of the republic's schools. Reformers fiirther demanded that the number of schools with Ukrainian as their principal medium of instruction be brought into correspondence with the ethnic composition of the republic. In their effort to reintroduce the native language principle to schooling they were victorious. The language revival movement initially took root among writers, scholars and their students who staged cultural events through which they raised funds and recruited members and the support for the establishment of civic organizations that were independent of the party and the state. Several prominent cultural organizations were founded in Western Ukraine and later spread to Kiev. This 7-.M-Squln‘n.«. 1.... l. “H. was the case with the Taras Shevchenko Ukrainian Language Society The ULS grew out of the Native Language Society (T ovarystvo Ridnm Movy), which was established in Lviv in early 1988 and modeled on the earlier Prosvita society Wilson 1997: p. 230i). Aided by networks of Western Ukrainian intellecmals and students, this moderate group helped overcome the Soviet Ukrainian government's campaign to portray the growing national revival movement as dangerous and militant. Through dozens of cultural and artistic events, the group encouraged support for native language revival among Eastern Ukrainian intellectuals, in particular university students and members of the cultural and scholarly elite. By the beginning of 1989, when the ULS held its first official inaugural congress in Kiev, it had received theblessing of crucial allies in the partyand the official cultural establishment. Under the leadership of a well—known poet who was a member of both the Writers' Union and the Communist party, Dmytro Pavlychko, and with the assistance of the Institutes .of Philology and Literature of the Academy of Sciences, the ULS grew to become the largest civic group not under direct state and party control. By mid-1989, its siZe increased fiom an initial membership of 10,000 to an estimated 70,000. By September 1989 the ULS had fonned a coalition with other opposition groups, "The People's Movement in Support of Perestroika," or Rukh. Rukh, which itself represented a total membership of a mere 300,000 at its height, would use its autonomy from the state and party to lead the political fight against the Soviet Ukrainian party leadership. In particular, students, writers and educators who supported the native'language principle and were affiliated with Rukh's moderate leadership were central in organizing the student hunger strikes and demonstrations that finally led the party leadership to step down and persuaded the Ukrainian parliament to support native language revival and later independence. In October 1989 under pressure from massive protests organized by Rukh and led by university " students and influential scholars, Ukraine's Rada passed a constitutional amendment making Ukrainian the official state language ("derzhavna mova") and adopted a law increasing the use of the Ukrainian language in public life. In response to concerns raised by groups representing non— Ukrainians and to increase public support for Ukraine's independence fiom the Soviet Union, the parliament later also passed measures to reassure Russian-speakers. These included a Special Declaration of the Rights of Minorities promising all citizens full rights to speak the Russian language and extending ethnoculmral rights and full use of minority languages wherever any ethnic group lived compactly (Kulyk 2002: 14). The moderate nationalism of Pavlychko and his wing of Rukh succeeded in winning the eventual support of influential allies in the party elite as well as the broader public, which endorsed Ukrainian independence in a referendum following the Soviet Union's collapse. Since independence educational reformers at the helm of the Ivlinisn'y of Education have initiated a rapid return to native language education following the principles educators in alliance with moderates in Rukh championed in 1989 Ganmaat 2000). The Ministy of Education's guidelines clearly state that the proportion of schoolchildren attending Ukrainian-language schools must be brought into conformity with the demographic composition of the local population. The Russian language's dominance in the broader society has ‘made it difficult for educators to play their state- mandated role in Ukrainian language revival. Nonetheless, resistance has not taken an organiZed form. Significantly, reforms in Russified localities have proceeded primarily at school entry and various tangible material incentives have been used to encourage schools to comply with educational reforms. Rather than forcing older pupils who were educated in Russian to switch to Ukrainian—only programs, educators have added more hours of instruction in Ukrainian while permitting such schoolchildren to complete their education in Russian-language groups. Despite periodic pressure from a highly mobilized and vocal pro~Russian language political constituency, post-Soviet Ukraine—which one recent discussion deemed the "unexpected nation" because of its high levels of ethnic, linguistic and regional diversity and low level of national consciousness (Wilson 2000)—has failed to adopt schooling policies that are in line with the pro- ‘ Russian language platform that powerful politicians and parties whose representatives have dominated parliament nmnerically have tended to advance during elections and other times of political opportunity. While conflicts over the Russian language's status have dominated Parliamentary discussions of issues having to do with Ukraine's identity and a pro-Russian language platform has proven to be a useful tool in presidential elections, pro-Russian language policies have not led to changes in the basic logic of schooling policy adopted and implemented by the Ministry of Education. Nor has the government's political elite pursued policies that have received the most support of the various ethnolinguistic protest groups and political entrepreneurs that have sought to protect the interests of Russian-speakers in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine. Instead, Ukrainian schooling policy continues to be driven by a native language revival program that in important respects was championed only by state bureaucrats and educators who briefly possessed sufficient political power on their own to pursue autonomous policies during a period when political officials, politicians, and political parties were divided and deadlocked. As a result of their use of administrative resources, Ukraine's future course of linguistic revival is being determined by a quiet revolution of state bureaucrats who are accomplishing through the school system what the ' independence movement was unable to achieve through formal political channels. Considerable local differences have been accepted in the pace and nature of educational reform. Furthermore, the Ministry of Education has used material incentives such as access to scarce items such as textbooks to encourage educators to comply with reforms. The reintroduction of Ukrainian has had its intended effect in Western Ukraine and in many rural and small town schools, where most Ukrainian schoolchildren are now taught in Ukrainian. In oblasts with a Ukrainian population of less than 60 %, reforms have proceeded at a slow pace. The proportion of children in Ukrainian- language schools in Crimea remains well below the target set by education policy—makers Ganmaat 2000). The. weakness of support for Ukraine's state—mandated policies of linguistic revival among the broader public as well as among influential political actors presents a puzzle for arguments that assume that states construct and propagate policies that reflect the preferences of politically dominant politicians and numerically dominant political constituencies that dominate parliament, political parties and the presidency (Wilson 2000; Wilson and Bilous 1993). Historical institutionalist theory argues that the logic of state organizations and hence state policy tends to be dominated by procedures that that have been embodied in organizational populations and are accepted as legitimate by political actors and influential groups. Ukraine's state-builders have avoided further deepening divisions between Western and Eastern Ukraine in large part by tolerating considerable institutionalized decentralization within the political system while quietly accepting-and legitimating— a highly centralized school policy that closely resembles the model of national development adopted by Ukrainian intellectuals during the nineteenth century. Only briefly and incompletely institutionalized throughout present—day Ukraine during the first decade of Soviet Ukrainian rule, the native language principle was championed by a coalition of government bureaucrats and intellectuals who deftly used a series of political opportunities to capture control over the organizational resources and personnel needed to pursue a native language revival that will proceed in Russified areas (that feared draconian nationalist measures) to alter language proficiency slowly and gradually through schooling. Nationality and language in post—independence Ukraine Educators have adopted a native language schooling policy that is likely to make competence in standard Ukrainian an increasingly important skill in the future (Arel 1995; Arel 2002; Wanner 1998). Why hasn't this policy led to more resistance among Russians or more broadly, Russian speakers? While we might expect the highly uncertain social and economic conditions of the transition from Soviet rule to fuel language—based conflicts, they have not done so, nor does it seem likely that they will if current policies of gradual shifi to Ukrainian at school entry remain in place. After discussing Public preferences for Ukrainian- as opposed to Russian—language schooling, I will provide several chief reasons why a pro—vernacrflar policy has nonetheless been accepted. First, it is important to note that the population today remains divided between a substantial number supporting native language education and many who are ambivalent about which language should be used in schools. According to a 1999 survey in which respondents were asked whether they preferred Russian or Ukrainian as their child's medium of instruction, just over half of ethnic Ukrainians preferred Ukrainian, while only a fifth of ethnic Ukrainians preferred Russian schooling and the remaining quarter indicated that they had no opinion (see appendix, table 1). Meanwhile one tenth of ethnic Russians and over a quarter of members of other nationalities were found to prefer Ukrainian and not Russian as a medium of schooling. These data suggest that the native language principle (according to which ethnic Russians attend Russian—language schools, while ethnic Ukrainians attend Ukrainian~language schools) satisfies roughly half of the population. Why is much of the population accepting schooling reforms it does not want? The relatively swift implementation and relatively quiet acceptance of a native language schooling policy that goes largely against the preferences of political elites and much of the public becomes less puzzling if we consider the way Soviet administrative practices shaped die norms and expectations of the broader society within which schools are located and eased popular acceptance of this form of native language revival. First, widespread acceptance of the model of nationhood Ukrainian state- builders have adopted, and the absence of a more legitimate alternative principle, may be one main reason why language has not become a seriously divisive policy issue. Ukrainian state—builders have adopted much the same model of nationality as the one upon which the Soviet cultural and educational establishment staked so much of its legitimacy, one that grounds national identity in an ancestral language and homeland. Nationality thus defined was already solidified among all Soviet Ukrainian citizens both at the individual level (through passport nationality and the "native language" census category), as well as at the macroinstitutional level through their residence in a territory that was identified as the homeland of Ukrainians (Arel 2002; Brubaker 1996). Ancestral language and homeland continue today to be treated as enduring aspects of one’s national identity, just as in the past. What is more, in contrast to a century ago, very few people in positions of authority are willing to question publicly that Ukrainians and Russians are distinct nationalities or that Ukrainian and Russian are distinct languages. Even if daily life under Soviet rule eroded the salience of the model of nationality for many Ukrainians, passport nationality retained legitimacy among many, while the native language principle retained the support of the easily mobilized, well connected group of educators who determined the policies of schools and certain state agencies. A further reason why Russian-speaking Ukrainians do not resist Ukrainian language revival more vigorously is that many feel unambiguously that Ukrainian (not Russian) is their native language while Russian is a language of convenience that is used in the present when necessary. Ukrainians who came of age during the Soviet era were socialized in a way that blurred or complicated the everyday salience of the national identity they inherited from their parents and grandparents. But they became 'Soviet' rather than Russian (Aral 2002; Wanner 1998). Increased use of Russian among Ukrainians was not the outcome of a dramatic personal choice or a deep political conviction that they should reject their nationality. Few urbanites changed their nationality even after advancement opportunities in higher education, the military, the state bureaucracy and many workplaces created powerful incentives to switch to Russian. Ukrainians who felt their own advancement had been blocked because of a lack of fluency in Russian often felt their children should attend Russian—language or bilingual schools (and in many eastern cities, they had no alternative but to do this, as there were so few Ukrainian—language schools). Today, incentives have changed and parents may feel mute comfortable allowing their children to be educated in Ukrainian—even if this is not their first preference. ' Ukrainians who do not speak Ukrainian well may welcome the opportunity for their children to relearn it, particularly now that independence has created advancement opportunities for Ukrainian— speakers. In past decades, as Ukrainian disappeared from public life and various state institutions shifted increasingly to Russian, public use of Ukrainian came to be restricted in large urban centers to farmers' markets where local dialects predominated. As the number of contexts within which they heard and used standard Ukrainian diminished, remaining speakers of Ukrainian began to lose fluency in the standard, relying increasingly on local dialects as well as Russian phonetic features, syntax and vocabulary (Bilaniuk 1997). Some upwardly mobile Ukrainians in urban areas stopped speaking Ukrainian because they lost fluency in the literary standard and did not want to be associated with peasants and uneducated people who spoke dialect. As the result of both class anxiety and their waning knowledge of standard Ukrainian, such individuals who considered themselves Ukrainian by nationality were consequently embarrassed to speak Ukrainian and more likely to speak Russian. This group of Russian—speakers may not find it convenient or natural to relearn Ukrainian, but many of its members are willing to support Ukrainian revival among future generations. Hypemationalists who reject the current—day policy exist, but have failed to generate a substantial public following. Despite early fears of escalating tensions between pro—Russian and anti—Russian extremists, nationalist groups that seek to challenge Ukraine's current language policies have failed to attract widespread popular participation or allegiance and are unlikely to grow stronger as a movement in part because they seem reluctant to cooperate with one another. Various groups and leaders in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine have focused attention on language issues, but each has somewhat different goals from the others and most have a highly localized power base.'There does _ not seem to exist a single set of leaders or groups able to attract the allegiance of a broad following or capable of forging a national coalition of groups that focus on language issues. Indeed, polls find a high degree of alienation from politicians and party politics as well as from civic groups that might seek to challenge state policies on language or ethnonational issues (Casanova 1998: 85; Riabchouk 1998: 90-1). Although the current model of nationhood focuses attention on an aspect of identity that at least potentially divides the population along ethnic lines, language issues have not split Ukrainians along ethnic lines in daily life and this undoubtedly helps to decrease potential political friction caused by schooling reforms. Actual language behavior blurs the boundary between Ukrainians and Russians, with the population evenly divided into Ukrainian—speaking Ukrainians, Russian-speaking Ukrainians, and Russian—speaking Russians, three groups of roughly equal size (Khmelko and Wilson 1998: 74). Moderates in Rukh and later the post—independence state media have helped to diffuse grievances by constructing Soviet era atrocities and curtailments on freedom in a way that makes it hard to viewed Ukrainian—speakers and Russian-speakers as two hostile camps. The activities of this moderate group may have helped to legitimate the native language principle that is now being institutionalized through schooling reforms. Moderates within the national movement took great pains to make clear that its Russians and even Russian—speakers as a group were important potential beneficiaries of Ukrainian independence, as both groups would benefit from the end of quasi-colonial rule. Among educators, attitudes toward the particular form native language revival has taken have also been shaped by new cultural and literary works. Over the last decade, Ukraine's cultural establishment has produced an impressive wave of films, memoirs and books sympathetically depicting early writers and scholars who advocated Ukrainianization and documenting the extreme brutality with which Soviet authorities treated this group, which came to be called the 'martyred renaissance' (rosuiliane vidrodzhennia), Ukrainianization and its martyrs have swiftly reentered the school cuniculum and seem to command legitimacy among intellectuals and educators in both Western and Eastern Ukraine. For all of these reasons, the public and educators have accepted a policy of nation-building modeled on a historic policy of Ukrainianization that enjoyed legitimacy among leading intellectuals, rather than adopting policies that corresponded more closely to the preferences of the competing political factions in post-independence Ukraine that failed to come to a consensus on Ukraine's identity as a state. Conclusion Language has not continued to act as a fulcrum for nationwide popular protest in Ukraine. The above examination of Ukraine's first decade of independence examined some of the factors that worked to both legitimate linguistic revival as well as complicated and moderated how post—Soviet states handled difficult Soviet legacies. Ukraine's high levels of ethnic, linguistic and regional diversity permitted state—builders to utilize a decentralized set of institutionalized practices that displace potential macrolinguistic cleavages to the local level (Wilson 2000). Indeed, surprisingly little has changed at the interpersonal level, even while state—builders have initiated schooling policies that will in coming decades likely broaden the use of Ukrainian in daily life even in Eastern Ukraine. Judging from its first decade of linguistic revival, Ukraine will continue for some time to be a linguistically heterogeneous nation, but one that exhibits surprising stability along a course of moderate, administratively-led national revival and not extremist or militant nationalism. In the distant future, it is likely that if all things remain the same, current day schooling policies and broader state efforts to improve the status of Ukrainian will slowly, quietly and imperceptibly encourage a reversal of language shift. Because the process of language shift has been extensive, while language revival has been gradual and decentralized, urban areaswill remain largely bilingual although Ukrainian language proficiency will increase. ' Appendix Table 1 The preferred medium of instruction for my child's school E TW'WMWWT _, iiwfilR_-sé351:;__i """""" lair Twila ;SEW”‘7”“”—l% ”“ “ ““ in" ' ‘ “ "t2? ' “ f‘fi 17146 lRussian ‘ 119 _ I 165 p xii-lard to say ‘ {.10. i N £10 I10 {13* ‘QQEQéTMM—mm “WW—wl'fiflnflmflmi “mt-W :13 iiii m " WW " ” HEW—mfiwmwiilw Source: Kiev International I minute of S oral/210g Omnibm 12mg! fanning 7999) References Amenta, Edwin, and Yvonne Zjlan. 1991. "It Hasbpened Here: Political Opportunity, the New Institutionalism, and the Townsend Movement. "American Sociological Review 56:250-265. Anderson, Barbara/1., and Brian Silver. 1984. "Equaliy, Eficz’engt, and Politics in Soviet Bilingual Education Poligl: 1934-1980. "American Political Science Review 7 8:1019—1039. Anderson, Benedict. 1983. Imagined Communities. Verso. Arel, Dominique. 1993. "qunguage and the Politics of Ethnia'yl: The Case cf Ukraine. " Urhana—Changbaign: Univerts‘iy of I llinois at Urhana—Champazgn. ‘ -. 1995. 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