applied cryptography - protocols, algorithms, and source code in c

3 attach logical formulas to the statements

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Unformatted text preview: m developed by the U.S. military, called the Interrogator. The third approach is by far the most popular, and was pioneered by Michael Burrows, Martin Abadi, and Roger Needham. They developed a formal logic model for the analysis of knowledge and belief, called BAN logic [283,284]. BAN logic is the most widely used logic for analyzing authentication protocols. It assumes that authentication is a function of integrity and freshness, and uses logical rules to trace both of those attributes through the protocol. Although many variants and extensions have been proposed, most protocol designers still refer back to the original work. BAN logic doesn’t provide a proof of security; it can only reason about authentication. It has a simple, straightforward logic that is easy to apply and still useful for detecting flaws. Some of the statements in BAN logic include: Alice believes X. (Alice acts as though X is true.) Alice sees X. (Someone has sent a message containing X to Alice, who can read and repeat X—possibly after decrypting it.) Alice said X. (At some time, Alice sent a message that includes the statement X. It is not known how long ago the message was sent or even that it was sent during the current run of the protocol. It is known that Alice believed X when she said it.) X is fresh. (X has not been sent in a message at any time before the current run of the protocol.) And so on. BAN logic also provides rules for reasoning about belief in a protocol. These rules can then be applied to the logical statements about the protocol to prove things or answer questions about the protocol. For example, one rule is the message-meaning rule: IF Alice believes that Alice and Bob share a secret key, K, and Alice sees X, encrypted under K, and Alice did not encrypt X under K, THEN Alice believes that Bob once said X. Another rule is the nonce-verification rule: IF Alice believes that X could have been uttered only recently and that Bob once said X, THEN Alice believes that Bob believes X. There are four steps in BAN analysis: (1) Convert the protocol into idealized form, using the statements previously...
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This note was uploaded on 10/18/2010 for the course MATH CS 301 taught by Professor Aliulger during the Fall '10 term at Koç University.

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