applied cryptography - protocols, algorithms, and source code in c

A previous result showed that the cascade is at least

Info iconThis preview shows page 1. Sign up to view the full content.

View Full Document Right Arrow Icon
This is the end of the preview. Sign up to access the rest of the document.

Unformatted text preview: mask will be used repeatedly to encrypt messages with the same keys. Then, XOR the plaintext message with the mask. Finally, encrypt the XORed plaintext with the algorithm and K2 in ECB mode. This mode has not been analyzed outside the paper in which it was proposed. Clearly it is at least as strong as a single ECB encryption and may be as strong as two passes with the algorithm. Possibly, a cryptanalyst could search for the two keys independently, if several known plaintext files are encrypted with the same key. To thwart analysis of identical blocks in the same positions of different messages, you can add an IV. Unlike an IV in any other mode, here the IV is XORed with every block of the message before ECB encryption. Matt Blaze designed this mode for his UNIX Cryptographic File System (CFS). It is a nice mode because the latency is only one encryption in ECB mode; the mask can be generated once and stored. In CFS, DES is the block algorithm. xDESi In [1644,1645], DES is used as a building block for a series of block algorithms with both larger key sizes and larger block sizes. These constructions do not depend on DES in any way and can be used with any block algorithm. The first, xDES1, is simply a Luby-Rackoff construction with the block cipher as the underlying function (see Section 14.11). The block size is twice the size of the underlying block cipher and the key size is three times the size of the underlying block cipher. In each of 3 rounds, encrypt the right half with the block algorithm and one of the keys, XOR the result with the left half, and swap the two halves. This is faster than conventional triple encryption, since three encryptions encrypt a block twice as large as the underlying algorithm. But there is also a simple meet-in-the-middle attack that finds the key with a table the size of 2k, where k is the key size of the underlying algorithm. Encrypt the right half of a plaintext block with all possible values of K1, XOR the left half of the plaintext, and store these values in a table. Then, encrypt the right half of the ciphertext with all possible values of K3 and look for a match in the table. If you find one, t...
View Full Document

{[ snackBarMessage ]}

Ask a homework question - tutors are online