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Unformatted text preview: andom keys, difficult as they are to remember. X9.17 Key Generation
The ANSI X9.17 standard specifies a method of key generation (see Figure 8.1) [55]. This does not generate easytoremember keys; it is more suitable for generating session keys or pseudorandom numbers within a system. The cryptographic algorithm used to generate keys is tripleDES, but it could just as easily be any algorithm. Let EK(X) be tripleDES encryption of X with key K. This is a special key reserved for secret key generation. V0 is a secret 64bit seed. T is a timestamp. To generate the random key Ri, calculate: Ri = EK(EK(Ti) • Vi) To generate Vi,+1, calculate: Vi+1 = EK(EK(Ti) • Ri) To turn Ri into a DES key, simply adjust every eighth bit for parity. If you need a 64bit key, use it as is. If you need a 128bit key, generate a pair of keys and concatenate them together. DoD Key Generation
The U.S. Department of Defense recommends using DES in OFB mode (see Section 9.8) to generate random keys [1144]. Generate a DES key from system interrupt vectors, system status registers, and system counters. Generate an initialization vector from the system clock, system ID, and date and time. For the plaintext, use an externally generated 64bit quantity: eight characters typed in by a system administrator, for example. Use the output as your key. 8.2 Nonlinear Keyspaces
Imagine that you are a military cryptography organization, building a piece of cryptography equipment for your troops. You want to use a secure algorithm, but you are worried about the equipment falling into enemy hands. The last thing you want is for your enemy to be able to use the equipment to protect their secrets. Figure 8.1 ANSI X9.17 key generation. If you can put your algorithm in a tamperproof module, here’s what you can do. You can require keys of a special and secret form; all other keys will cause the module to encrypt and decrypt using a severely weakened algorithm. You can make it so that the odds of someone, not knowing this special form but accidentally stumbling on a correc...
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 Fall '10
 ALIULGER
 Cryptography

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