applied cryptography - protocols, algorithms, and source code in c

They developed a formal logic model for the analysis

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Unformatted text preview: (Publisher: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.) Author(s): Bruce Schneier ISBN: 0471128457 Publication Date: 01/01/96 Search this book: Go! Previous Table of Contents Next ----------- There are four basic approaches to the analysis of cryptographic protocols [1045]: 1. Model and verify the protocol using specification languages and verification tools not specifically designed for the analysis of cryptographic protocols. 2. Develop expert systems that a protocol designer can use to develop and investigate different scenarios. 3. Model the requirements of a protocol family using logics for the analysis of knowledge and belief. 4. Develop a formal method based on the algebraic term-rewriting properties of cryptographic systems. A full discussion on these four approaches and the research surrounding them is well beyond the scope of this book. See [1047,1355] for a good introduction to the topic; I am only going to touch on the major contributions to the field. The first approach treats a cryptographic protocol as any other computer program and attempts to prove correctness. Some researchers represent a protocol as a finite-state machine [1449,1565], others use extensions of first-order predicate calculus [822], and still others use specification languages to analyze protocols [1566]. However, proving correctness is not the same as proving security and this approach fails to detect many flawed protocols. Although it was widely studied at first, most of the work in this area has been redirected as the third approach gained popularity. The second approach uses expert systems to determine if a protocol can reach an undesirable state (the leaking of a key, for example). While this approach better identifies flaws, it neither guarantees security nor provides techniques for developing attacks. It is good at determining whether a protocol contains a given flaw, but is unlikely to discover unknown flaws in a protocol. Examples of this approach can be found in [987,1521]; [1092] discusses a rule-based syste...
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