practice%20final%202%20solutions-1

# practice%20final%202%20solutions-1 - Economics 100C Spring...

This preview shows pages 1–3. Sign up to view the full content.

1 Economics 100C Spring 2009 Section A00 Final Exam Solutions QUESTION 1: 16 points QUESTION 2: 20 points QUESTION 3: 26 points QUESTION 4: 20 points TOTAL: 120 points QUESTION 5: 20 points QUESTION 6: 18 points 1. Consider the following two-player static game: Player 2 X Y Z Player 1 A 3,5 4,6 6,5 B 2,3 3,7 7,8 C 4,3 2,1 9,2 a) Does either player have a dominant strategy? Briefly explain your answer. A dominant strategy in this static game is an action that yields a payoff that is at least as great as any other action, regardless of which action the other player chooses. Neither player has a dominant strategy in this example. Player 1 does best by choosing A if player 2 chooses Y, but does best by choosing C otherwise. Each one of player 2’s three actions is a best response to one of player 1’s three actions. b) Which pairs of strategies represent Nash equilibria of the static game? The Nash equilibria are the strategy pairs such that each player is choosing an action that is a best response to the other’s action. These are stable outcomes in that neither player would have an incentive to deviate from the equilibrium play if he/she were to learn what the other player was planning to do. In the above game, there are two Nash equilibria: (Player 1: A; Player 2: Y) and (Player 1: C; Player 2: X). c) Draw the game tree associated with the sequential version of the game where player 1 moves first and player 2 follows. Which pairs of strategies represent subgame perfect Nash equilibria of the sequential game? A subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) is a pair of strategies such that each player is choosing a best response at ever possible node in the game, regardless of whether that node is reached or not during the course of play. This equilibrium concept is a refinement of the Nash equilibrium concept and rules out noncredible threats. The unique SPNE

This preview has intentionally blurred sections. Sign up to view the full version.

View Full Document
associated with this game is (Player 1: B; Player 2: Y if A, Z if B, X if C). The payoffs are (7,8). 2. There are only two firms producing fire extinguishers, a good that is homogenous due to government regulations that require fire department approval before fire extinguishers can be sold. The cost of production for firm 1 is given by , and the cost for firm 2 is given by . Inverse demand for fire extinguishers is given by , where is the market price and is the market quantity. a) In attempting to maximize their profits, the two firms form a cartel. What quantity will each firm produce? The cartel will choose the quantities for each firm in order to maximize joint profits: So, both firms will produce 5 extinguishers, for a market quantity of 10. Note that the marginal costs of production for the two firms are the same (and equal to the joint marginal revenue). A
This is the end of the preview. Sign up to access the rest of the document.

## This note was uploaded on 10/21/2010 for the course ECON 1530 taught by Professor Ohly during the Spring '10 term at Dartmouth.

### Page1 / 10

practice%20final%202%20solutions-1 - Economics 100C Spring...

This preview shows document pages 1 - 3. Sign up to view the full document.

View Full Document
Ask a homework question - tutors are online