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Unformatted text preview: player 3 the matrix player. Fill in the poll ratings for each player in the matrices below: (b) The payoff for each person is given by the probability of being elected, not by the rating. Suppose that the probability of being elected is 1 if a candidate’s pollrating is the highest, 1/2 if there are two candidates tied for first place, and 1/3 if all three are tied. Based on the pollratings you calculated above, fill in the payoffs for each player in the matrices on the next page. p n 1 n 3 p n 2 n 3 p n 1 n 3 p n 2 n 3 p n 1 n 3 p n 2 n 3 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 p n 1 n 2 (c) Find all the Nash equilibria of this game. p n 1 n 3 p n 2 n 3 p n 1 n 3 p n 2 n 3 p n 1 n 3 p n 2 n 3 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 p n 1 n 2...
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 Summer '07
 Dr.ShomuBanerjee
 Microeconomics, Game Theory, Negative campaigning, Shomu Banerjee, Shomu Banerjee ECON

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