Lecture12_GameTheory2

Lecture12_GameTheory2 - Lecture 12 Game Theory 2 Click to...

Info iconThis preview shows pages 1–8. Sign up to view the full content.

View Full Document Right Arrow Icon
Click to edit Master subtitle style  11/5/10 Lecture 12 Game Theory 2 Econ 121: Industrial Organization UC Berkeley Fall 2010 Prof. Cristian Santesteban
Background image of page 1

Info iconThis preview has intentionally blurred sections. Sign up to view the full version.

View Full DocumentRight Arrow Icon
 11/5/10 Overview Sequential Games (Continued) Stackelberg Revisited Mixed Strategy Equilibria
Background image of page 2
 11/5/10 Sequential Game 1
Background image of page 3

Info iconThis preview has intentionally blurred sections. Sign up to view the full version.

View Full DocumentRight Arrow Icon
 11/5/10 Sequential Game 1 Two Strategies for Player A: {L, R} Four Strategies for Player B: 1. l no matter what player A does 2. r no matter what player A does 3. l if L and r if R 4. r if L and l if R Possible Nash Equilibria: –. (L, 1), (L, 2), (L, 3), (L, 4), (R, 1), (R, 2), (R, 3), (R, 4)
Background image of page 4
 11/5/10 Sequential Game 1 Nash Equilibria: (L, 1), (R, 2), (R, 3) SGP Equilibria: (R, 3) Why isn’t (L, 1) a SGPE? Because l is not Player B’s best response off the equilibrium path. That is, l is not the best response if Player A were to play R.
Background image of page 5

Info iconThis preview has intentionally blurred sections. Sign up to view the full version.

View Full DocumentRight Arrow Icon
 11/5/10 Market Entry Game
Background image of page 6
 11/5/10 Market Entry Game
Background image of page 7

Info iconThis preview has intentionally blurred sections. Sign up to view the full version.

View Full DocumentRight Arrow Icon
Image of page 8
This is the end of the preview. Sign up to access the rest of the document.

This note was uploaded on 11/05/2010 for the course ECON 121 taught by Professor Woroch during the Fall '07 term at Berkeley.

Page1 / 24

Lecture12_GameTheory2 - Lecture 12 Game Theory 2 Click to...

This preview shows document pages 1 - 8. Sign up to view the full document.

View Full Document Right Arrow Icon
Ask a homework question - tutors are online