Lecture14_GameTheory4_Econ121_Fall2010

# Lecture14_GameTheory4_Econ121_Fall2010 - Lecture 14 Game...

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Click to edit Master subtitle style  11/5/10 Lecture 14 Game Theory 4 Econ 121: Industrial Organization UC Berkeley Fall 2010 Prof. Cristian Santesteban

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11/5/10 Overview Mixed Strategies Repeated Games Bertrand with Capacity Constraints
11/5/10 Mixed Strategies

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11/5/10 Mixed Strategies
11/5/10 Mixed Strategies

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11/5/10 Mixed Strategies
11/5/10 Mixed Strategies

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11/5/10 Mixed Strategies p q 1 1 0. 5 0. 5
11/5/10 Mixed Strategies In this game, the best response correspondences intersect at exactly one point, p=q=0.5. This is a pair of mutually best responses, a Nash Equilibrium. Given that the striker randomizes p=0.5, the goal keeper is just indifferent whether to jump to the left or to the right. Hence, choosing q=0.5 is optimal. The reasoning for the striker is the

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11/5/10 Repeated Games
11/5/10 Repeated Games Assume two periods Apply backward induction

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Lecture14_GameTheory4_Econ121_Fall2010 - Lecture 14 Game...

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