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Unformatted text preview: Networks: Fall 2010 Homework 2 David Easley and Jon Kleinberg Due in Class September 17, 2010 As noted on the course home page, homework solutions must be submitted by upload to the CMS site, at https://cms.csuglab.cornell.edu/ . This means that you should write these up in an electronic format (Word files, PDF files, and most other formats can be uploaded to CMS). Homework will be due at the start of class on the due date, and the CMS site will stop accepting homework uploads after this point. We cannot accept late homework except for University- approved excuses (which include illness, a family emergency, or travel as part of a University sports team or other University activity). Reading: The questions below are primarily based on the material in Chapters 6 and 8 of the book. (1) (This is Exercise 6 from Chapter 6.) In this question we will consider several two-player games. In each payoff matrix below the rows correspond to player A’s strategies and the columns correspond to player B’s strategies. The first entry in each box is player A’s payoff and the second entry is player B’s payoff. (a) Find all pure (non-randomized) strategy Nash equilibria for the game described by the payoff matrix in Figure 1. Player A Player B L R U 2 , 15 4 , 20 D 6 , 6 10 , 8 Figure 1: The payoff matrix for Question (1a). (b) Find all pure (non-randomized) strategy Nash equilibria for the game described by the payoff matrix in Figure 2. Player A Player B L R U 3 , 5 4 , 3 D 2 , 1 1 , 6 Figure 2: The payoff matrix for Question (1b). (c) Find all Nash equilibria for the game described by the payoff matrix in Figure 3. [Hint: This game has a both pure strategy equilibria and a mixed strategy equilibrium. To find the mixed strategy equilibrium let the probability that player A uses strategy U be p and 1 Player A Player B L R U 1 , 1 4 , 2 D 3 , 3 2 , 2 Figure 3: The payoff matrix for Question (1c). the probability that player B uses strategy L be q . As we learned in our analysis of matching pennies, if a player uses a mixed strategy (one that is not really just some pure strategy played with probability one) then the player must be indifferent between two pure strategies. That is the strategies must have equal expected payoffs. So, for example, if p is not 0 or 1 then it must...
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This note was uploaded on 11/11/2010 for the course ECON 2040 taught by Professor Easley/kleinberg during the Fall '07 term at Cornell.
- Fall '07