Phi 1: Introduction to Philosophy Fall 2010 Handout 5 I. Defending the identity thesis A. Reasons in favor: i. Background support from neuroscience (or a best on it). ii. Arguments that directly support it. iii. Reasons to reject alternatives. B. Issue for (iii) often involves the principle of ‘Leibniz’s Law’: Identical things share identical properties, and so, if you have different properties, you have different, non-identical things. II. Some of Carruthers’ objections and replies. A. Mental properties (‘Color’ objection II.D) i. Argument: a) Mental states have special properties: A pain is sharp, a visual experience is bright or dark, the after-image I see is green. b) Brain-states do not have these properties. Brain states are not sharp (as pains are), or bright (as experiences are) or green. c) Conclusion: brain states and mental states are not the same things. ii. Response: a) Green is not really a property of mental states/events. Rather, it is just that we have an experience
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