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Unformatted text preview: what kind of cause it has. D. Why, given causal determinism, is this the relevant notion? Ayer replies by sketching an account of causation: 1. An event of type A causes an event of B if whenever an A event occurs, a B event occurs. Usually, furthermore, there is a general law that implies that this relation holds. 2. The only results of this notion of cause are that causal connections are regular and (usually) explicable. E. Ayer suggests this notion of cause is to weak to generate the incompatibility of free will and causal determinism. He maintains that only the stronger notion, constraint, is incompatible. III. Incompatibilist objections A. Ayers argument appears to imply that we are free to break the laws of physics. B. This appears to show that his notion of causation is too weak....
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This note was uploaded on 11/18/2010 for the course PHILOSOPHY 75011 taught by Professor Glanzberg during the Spring '10 term at UC Davis.
- Spring '10