Phi1Handout6 - Phi 1: Introduction to Philosophy Fall 2010...

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Phi 1: Introduction to Philosophy Fall 2010 Handout 6 I. The phenomenal quality of experience. A. For most of our mental states, there is something it is like, some way it feels, to be in them. ‘What it is like’ is referred to as the phenomenal quality , or qualia , of a mental state. B. Phenomenal quality objection to the identity thesis: re-work II.A. (Carruthers II.E.) i. Can brain states have the phenomenal quality of our mental states? a) No: then we have an objection to the identity thesis. b) Carruthers: yes. The phenomenal quality of feeling pain is nothing other than being in the brain state of feeling pain. C. Reformulate the objection. i. Nothing in the physical properties of brain states could account for the phenomenal quality (qualia) of experiences. ii. Therefore, there is more to what it is to be in mental states than the properties of brain states. iii. Conclude: the identity thesis is false. II. Jackson’s knowledge argument for qualia.
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This note was uploaded on 11/18/2010 for the course PHILOSOPHY 75011 taught by Professor Glanzberg during the Spring '10 term at UC Davis.

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