11Nash Equilibrium - Existence I

11Nash Equilibrium - Existence I - Nash Equilibrium...

Info iconThis preview shows page 1. Sign up to view the full content.

View Full Document Right Arrow Icon
Nash Equilibrium: Existence Let G = ( N ; S 1 ,...,S n ; u 1 ,...,u n ) be a strategic form game with N = { 1 ,...,n } . Theorem G has a Nash Equilibrium if, for every i N , (a) S i is a nonempty, compact, convex subset of R m for some integer m ; (b) u i is quasiconcave on S i for every s - i S - i and is continuous on S . Suppose that G is a finite game (each S i is finite). I denote its mixed extension by Δ G = S 1 ,..., Δ S n ; u 1 ,...,u n ), where for each i N , Δ S i is the set of probability distributions over S i , and u i is a vN-M utility. I denote a typical element of Δ S i by σ i ; the probability that player i plays ’pure’ strategy b s i S i by σ i ( b s i ); a mixed strategy profile by σ = ( σ 1 ,...,σ n ), where σ i Δ S i for all i N ; and the set of feasible mixed strategy profiles for Δ G by Δ S . Note that the expected utility for player i when profile σ is played is given by U i ( σ ) = X s S u i ( s ) σ 1 ( s 1 ) σ
Background image of page 1
This is the end of the preview. Sign up to access the rest of the document.

This note was uploaded on 11/19/2010 for the course ECON 202 taught by Professor Schlee during the Spring '10 term at ASU.

Ask a homework question - tutors are online