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Unformatted text preview: R and then (r,y) gives (7,2). (4 points) a. Draw the game tree. b. Show the subgames of the game. c. Find the subgame perfect equilibria (equilibrium) of the game. d. Find the Nash equilibria of the game and compare your answers in parts c and d. Which of the NE are based on non credible threats? 2. Find the SPE of the entry game # 3 (discussed in class) using backward induction approach. (1 point)...
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This note was uploaded on 11/27/2010 for the course ECON Econ 116A taught by Professor Neerjaaggarwal during the Winter '10 term at UC Irvine.
- Winter '10
- Game Theory