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Unformatted text preview: • Tendency to Engage in Conflict Even When Mutual Cooperation is Preferred • Threats Backfire • DC > CC > DD > CD • Increase the gains/value of CC (cooperation) • Decrease the costs of CD (sucker’s payoff) • Decrease the gains of DC (exploitation) • Decrease the gains/increase the costs of DD (conflict) The Security Dilemma • Self ‐ Help Leads to Less Security Via Action/Reaction • Worst Case Scenarios • Arms Races • Ex. Strategic Defense Initiative 9/20/2010 3 Chicken • Similar game to Prisoner’s Dilemma • Important Difference : Mutual Conflict is Worse than Sucker’s Payoff (CD>DD) • No Dominant Strategy ‐‐ A Game of Bluff and Threats • Making Credible Commitments Bargaining • Power Again • Coercion • Alternatives • Agenda ‐ Setting...
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- Fall '07
- Game Theory, Strategic Defense Initiative, Dilemma · Chicken