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Unformatted text preview: Tendency to Engage in Conflict Even When Mutual Cooperation is Preferred Threats Backfire DC > CC > DD > CD Increase the gains/value of CC (cooperation) Decrease the costs of CD (suckers payoff) Decrease the gains of DC (exploitation) Decrease the gains/increase the costs of DD (conflict) The Security Dilemma Self Help Leads to Less Security Via Action/Reaction Worst Case Scenarios Arms Races Ex. Strategic Defense Initiative 9/20/2010 3 Chicken Similar game to Prisoners Dilemma Important Difference : Mutual Conflict is Worse than Suckers Payoff (CD>DD) No Dominant Strategy A Game of Bluff and Threats Making Credible Commitments Bargaining Power Again Coercion Alternatives Agenda Setting...
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- Fall '07