11-01c+Oatley+et+al+2006+Appraisal - 11 'SUOg3E a ~ n p o...

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Unformatted text preview: 11 'SUOg3E a ~ n p o ~ut! sapsnur ayl ~ J O M01 saqn) ayl o ~ t qd palaqq) pd ( q ouasaJ aql WOJJ sp!np @I!A la1 01 s a ~ l uuado 01 alqt! SEA e~ - suogoura Lq p a~our e a ~ D W M Inos aql ' auraq~s ,samDsaa q s s .azuzuoq,l ap ?jzadj yooq s ,saue~saa OJJ umSe!a 0-L a~nttii W 1vs?v~dda. u o~jv.uaa vdnjlnD ua 1 pq~xddt? S q d p t u s $03 s p o t p a n a a u put? y3xeasaa p qvxddt? 30 sanb!q.r~ ipoo8 aqj uvqj da8uo~js vq aqj s~ p PW pua poo8Jo s~as.aaddda .zjazuojnv 3 suo?j.aulJap pua puno~8q3aql a3pojs!~ u opoura put! p s p x d d v .SSaJd &!sJ~ /b qOOqPuvH ' ('~Ps)qln Jaylo pm sueurnq 30 s :s! kuro~errt! q o. w puv uazunq Jo suo.ajvpz :aDuapsoJnar w- ~~ . Y -ff&&9tti c $A%mhw In 1961, a patient with epilepsy - a kind of electrical storm in the brain had an operation to separate the left side of the cortex from the rig hence to stop the spread of epileptic disturbances since no other tre had been effective. This procedure is called a split b rain operation, in it the corpus callosum, a large bundle of nerve fibers that connects left and right sides of the cortex, is severed (Gazzaniga, 1985), A num of such operations have been performed, and they do reduce or elimii certain kinds of epileptic disturbance. Despite the left and right cortices being no longer in communication, the patient's IQ, personality, language, and ability to engage in meaningful interactions are not diminished. Twenty years after the first split brain operation Roger Sperry was awarded a Nobel Prize for his research with these patients, which showed in a striking new way the different functions of left and right hemispheres. The experiments depended on the fact that if a picture or text is presented to the right side of the visual field, it is processed by the left hemisphere. When anything is shown in the left visual field, it is processed by the right hemisphere. But with the split brain the two hemispheres do not communicate, and each remains ignorant of what the other has seen. Research indicates that the right hemisphere responds more readily to the emotional content of stimuli (Borod, 1992), whereas the left is more ready to interpret experience in terms of language (Gazzaniga, Ivry, & Mangun, 2002). Here is an example from Michael Gazzaniga (1988) who worked with Sperry. He showed a frightening film about fire safety to the left visual field of a woman split-brain patient. Because the images were not accessible to the "interpretive center" in the left hemisphere of her brain, she was not conscious of having seen the film. Gazzaniga then interviewed the patient, as follows. M.G. (Michael Gazzaniga): What did you see? V.P. (Patient): I don't really know what I saw. I think just a white flash. M.G.: Were there people in it? V.P.: I don't think so. Maybe just some trees, red trees like in the fall. M.G.: Did it make you feel any emotion? V.P.: I don't really know why but I'm kind of scared. I feel jumpy. I think i maybe I don't like this room, or maybe it's you. You're getting me nervous. The patient seems to feel fear. Her right hemisphere has processed the erne tional content of the Nm about fire safety, triggering anxiety and agitation. She takes part in the interview by using her linguistically competent left hemisphere; with it she does not consciously know why she feels as she does, presumably because the fearful stimulus has been processed only in the right cortex, and been communicated to the unsplit subcortical regions which are essential to emotional experience. When asked by Gazzaniga to explain her feelings, the patient starts working on the problem: She draws : upon her anxious E k themisphere, an f &el nervous. I this chapter w n c bcious, and automa i the opening pic1 n l'bomme. I n this c is potentially cons( tions. We will call Appraisal and In the past three question William J emotion-specificfi central nervous sy and emotions? Thc tions, they must b goals. Historical back' 15 1 As w e explained i tion t o an individu followed by philo: idea of evaluation : of emotions could other phi lo sop he^ sophy, which haw may put it like thi One of the most i by Chrysippus wlof emotions, whi mental, and whict o ne cannot avoid But since the s ea philosophers said such as giving in in Christian think The idea of first primary a nd sec this chapter. Aristotelian an J. A. Gasson (195 troduced the idea e storm in the brain x from the right, and ce no other treatment brain operation, and ers that connects the iga, 1985), A n umber o reduce or eliminate eft and right cortices personality, language, are not diminished. r Sperry was awarded ich showed in a strikhemispheres. ~icture r text is preo ssed by the left hemiId, it is processed by hemispheres do not ler has seen. Research ldily to the emotional more ready to intery, & Mangun, 2002). 3) who worked with to the left visual field ere not accessible to :r brain, she was not :rviewed t he patient, upon her anxious feelings together with the knowledge of her narratizing left hemisphere, and offers a story about how Gazzaniga was making her feel nervous. In this chapter we discuss these two kinds of process. The first is unconscious, and automatic. It is something like the reflex, which is illustrated in the opening picture for this chapter, from Descartes's book T rait6 de l'bomme. In this chapter we will call it primary appraisal. The second is potentially conscious, and thought-like, and it gives rise to specific emotions. We will call it secondary appraisal. Appraisal and emotion In the past three chapters we have devoted attention to answering the question William James posed: "What is an emotion?" We have examined emotion-specific facial expressions, vocal cues, autonomic responses, and central nervous system activity. But what is it that gives rise to our moods and emotions? The consensus in the field is that for events to prompt emotions, they must be evaluated, or appraised, in relation to the individual's goals. Historical background and de$nitions As we explained in chapter 1, t he concept of evaluation of events in rela- k just a white flash. :s like in the fall. I feel jumpy. I think getting me nervous. s processed the emo- nxiety and agitation. cally competent left rhy she feels as she :n processed only in t subcortical regions ked by Gazzaniga to problem: She draws tion to an individual's purposes goes back 2,400 years, to Aristotle. He was followed by philosophers such as Epicurus and Chrysippus who took the idea of evaluation and applied it to the question of how the damaging effects of emotions could be avoided in the course of living a good life. These and other philosophers in the schools of Epicurean and Stoic ethical philosophy, which have had a huge influence on Western thought, were - if one may put it like this - t he first thoroughgoing Western emotion researchers. One of the most interesting analyses to emerge from this work was made by Chrysippus who distinguished between what he called first movements of emotions, which are automatic, and second movements which are mental, and which involve judgment and decision. Chrysippus thought that one cannot avoid the first movements, they are made simply by the body. B t since the second movements involve thought, they are more, as these u philosophers said, "up to us.'' The second movements of bad emotions such as giving in to angry revenge, or to greedy selfishness, later became in Christian thinking t he seven deadly sins (Oatley, 2004c; Sorabji, 2000). The idea of first and second movements maps exactly onto the idea of primary and secondary appraisals, which provides the framework for this chapter. Aristotelian and Stoic ideas were discussed by Magda Arnold and J. A. Gasson (1954; their analyses are described in chapter 1). They reintroduced the idea of emotion as evaluation, known as appraisal in modern psychology, where it has become a central concept for understanding emotions. An important figure in its development was Richard Lazarus, who spent the early part of his career studying stress, a condition in which personal challenges exceed the individual's capacities and resources (see, e.g., Lazarus, 1991). Stress produces vigilant attention and heightened activity in the sympathetic branch of the autonomic nervous system. In the short term, it is an adaptive process, helping people respond to threats, dangers, and likely punishments with quick, energetic efficiency. In the long term, chronic stress produced by enduring sources of tension such as pressures at work, turbulent periods during marriages, or financial problems that deprive one of basic necessities, is dangerous. Chronic stress can lead to heart disease, cancer, and even cell death in the hippocampus and memory loss (Sapolsky, 1994). Social threats, for example in being the target of prejudice or discrimination, can lead to health problems as well (Blascovich & Mendes, 2000; Blascovich et al., 2001). The concept of stress is intuitively appealing and has been the focus of hundreds of studies. Yet Lazarus raised a problem: there seem to be many different kinds of stress. The stress associated with humiliation is different from the stress associated with losing a spouse to death or dealing with a life-threatening disease like cancer, or even the stress of positive events like starting a new career or having a child. How is one to account for this? Lazarus's answer was the emotions. Each different kind of stress promotes a particular kind of emotion, by means of a specific appraisal processes. Here is how Lazarus defines an appraisal approach to emotion: This approach to emotion contains two basic themes: First, emotion is a response to evaluative judgments or meaning; second, these judgments are about ongoing relationships with the environment, namely how one is doing in the agenda of living and whether the encounter o the environment is one f of harm or benefit. What is critical in this definition, first of all, is evaluation. Agreeing with Aristotle, and with Arnold and Gasson, Lazarus proposed that appraisals involve judgments of how good or bad an event is. A second theme is that appraisals concern the individual's goals and aspirations, and how he or she is interacting with the environment. Emotions, then, have a critical place in psychology: they refer both to events in the world and to the person's concerns. They relate the outer world and the inner self. A related approach has been offered by Stein, Trabasso, and Lw g ia (1994). They propose that the appraisals that give rise to emotions also involve beliefs, inferences, and plans. These aspects of emotion-related appraisal unfold, in Stein and colleagues' view, as follows: 1 . An event, usually unexpected, is perceived that changes the status of a valued goal. 2. Beliefs are often challenged; this can cause bodily changes and expres sions to occur. 3. Plans are forme modify the goal, : i. These stages are car d o about it, and wh Stein et al. (1994) garten teacher had ji and that after paintb their paint sets horn Stein et al.'s research why. Amy said: "I'm j So do I have to pain1 I didn't think teache much. Why does shc Here we see that P want to paint. The i a belief about what t plans (3). R esearch assistant Amy: I don't want t l d o this. R esearch assistant A m : I'll take the pa I have to do this. l k o w eeks later the worried about the p has n ot told the teac Stein et al. (1994) they use, which dep how t he event is p, Is remembered. Thi The same event migl Notice that the pro< or thought-like proc Automatic appra Into our lives come and meet your roon of comfort and fami strike you as impers What are the appra reactions? t for understanding tichard Lazarus, w ho .dition in which perresources (see, e.g., heightened activity system. In the short I to threats, dangers, :y. In the long term, I such as pressures n lroblems that deprive s can lead to heart us and memory loss :the target of preas well (Blascovich .s been the focus of :e seem to be many niliation is different h or dealing with a positive events like o account for this? of stress promotes ~praisal rocesses. p D emotion: 'irst, emotion is a :se judgments are how one is doing nvironment is one 3. Plans are formed about what to do about the event to reinstate or mod* the goal, and the likely results of the plans are considered. These stages are captured in the questions: "What happened? What can I do about it, and what might then happen next?" Stein et al. (1994) give an example of a five-year-old, Amy. Her kindergarten teacher had just told the class that she had a paint set for each child, and that after painting pictures for Parents' Night the children could take their paint sets home. When the children had been given their paint sets, 1 Stein et a1.k research assistant noticed Amy looking apprehensive. She asked why. Amy said: "I'm jittery. I'm not sure why she wants to give me the paints. So do 1 have to paint all of the time at home? I really don't want to do this. I didn't think teachers made you paint at home. I don't like painting that much. Why does she want me to paint at home?" Here we see that Amy has a goal which has been violated (1): she doesn't "n at to paint. The idea of being given something to do at home violates : a belief about what teachers do (2). The conversation continues with Amy's plans (3). Research a ssistant: What will you do, Amy? Amy: I don't want to take the paints home. I want to know why I have to do this. Research a ssistant: Well Amy, what are you going to do about this? Amy: I'll take the paints home, but when I get home, I'll ask my Mom why I have to do this. l bo weeks later the research assistant talked casually to Amy. She was still worried about the paints. She said she had used them only once. But she has not told the teacher, fearing that the teacher might be mad at her. Stein et al. (1994) propose that how a person sees an event - the frame they use, which depends on the person's goals and values - will determine h w the event is perceived, what emotions are elicited, and even what o is remembered. This is consistent with Lazarus's treatment of appraisal. T e same event might lead to much different emotions in different people. h Notice that the processes leading to these specific emotions are thoughts or thought-like processes, of the kind we are calling secondary appraisals. ion. Agreeing with sed that appraisals cond theme is that IS, and how h e or lave a critical place nd to the person's If. basso, and Liwag lotions also involve n-related appraisal Automatic appraisals of good and bad Into our lives come events that affect us profoundly. You arrive at college and meet your roommate, who instantly fills you with a reassuring sense of comfort and familiarity. While searching for an apartment to rent, most strike you as impersonal and cold, until you find one that feels like home. What are the appraisal processes that give rise to these fast, immediate, reactions? ages the status of langes and expres- &flMff&u 4 8 ~ As one answer to this question, Robert Zajonc (1980) has proposed that we process stimuli through several different appraisal systems. One system provides an immediate, unconscious evaluation of whether the stimulus is good or bad (LeDoux, 1993; Mischel & Shoda, 1995). This system gives rise to what we are calling primary appraisals, automatic emotional reactions to events and objects in the environment, which motivate rapid approach or avoidance responses. These primary appraisals correspond to what Chrysippus (discussed above) called the first movements of emotions. As you have learned in chapter 6 , t he system that makes these appraisals probably involves the amygdala. This first appraisal system appears to give rise to our core feelings of positivity or negativity (Russell, 2003). Other systems - which we are calling secondary, and which Chrysippus called second movements - provide more deliberate, conscious, complex assess ments in terms of such matters as what caused the event and what to do about it. To study the automatic evaluations, Sheila Murphy and Robert Zajonc (1993) presented participants with photos of people smiling or displaying facial anger. In a "suboptimal" subliminal condition, participants viewed these photos for four milliseconds. Subsequent recognition tests revealed that these participants had no idea whether they had seen a happy or angry face, establishing that the faces had indeed been processed unconsciously, In an "optimal" condition participants viewed the same faces for one second, and were clearly aware of which faces they had viewed. After viewing the faces, all participants then viewed Chinese ideographs and rated h ow much they liked those ideographs. To the extent that there is a separate appraisal system that unconsciously evaluates the affective meaning of stimuli, one would expect the sub optimally presented faces to influence participants' ratings of the Chinese ideographs. The initial positive or negative feelings induced by the photos of the faces should color participants' evaluations of the ideographs. This is exactly what Murphy and Zajonc found. As you can see in figure 7.1, for t he suboptimally presented faces, smiling faces led participants to express greater liking for the Chinese ideographs that followed them, and angry faces to prompt less liking for the ideographs that followed them, even though participants could not tell the experimenter what faces they had seen. No such priming effects emerged with the optimally presented faces. When we are consciously aware of emotionally charged stimuli, they are less likely to sway our judgments of other stimuli (Clore, Gasper, & Garvin, 2001; G a s p & Clore, 2000). Is there evidence that automatic appraisals generate emotional experience as well as affecting preferences? As you will recall from chapter 1, this notion, that how our unconscious perceives the environment triggers powerful, and often inexplicable emotional reactions, was a cornerstone of Freud's analysis of emotional conflict. Ulf Dimberg and Arne ohman (1%) suggest that there are such effects. They first presented participants with photos of a smiling face or an angry face for extremely brief periods of JZ 9 $4 0 % E3 8 2 4 8 0 0 Subli Figure 7.1 Unconsc be produced unconsc participants with slid, (subliminal) or optim how much they liked more after they have suggesting that that s When presented witk the smile did not lea( positively (Source: MI time. These photos by o ther photos th t he original face. A angry o r happy fac' did influence the I smile or to furrow t arousal associated T optimally presented Dimberg, Thunberg i jhman and Soares ( phobias below thei galvanic skin respol T hese studies sul automatic, fast, and feeling of good or 1 more specific apprai and negative emotic p otent: negative or - 62kyih 7 a$+kz(;d, 7-&, I I d ) has proposed that ystems. One system mh r the stimulus is te . This system gives ttic emotional reacich motivate rapid lisals correspond to : mats of emotions. res these appraisals :em appears to give ~ssell, 003). Other 2 I Chrysippus called us, complex a ssess :nt and what to do and Robert Zajonc niling or displaying ipants viewed these tests revealed that I a happy or angry jsed unconsciously. m e faces for one viewed. After viewtographs and rated that unconsciously d expect the subngs of the Chinese iced by the photos le ideographs. This : in figure 7.1, for e icipants to express 3 them, and angry them, even though they had seen. No ented faces. When they are less likely arvin, 200 1; Gasper emotional experi- I IAnger face I Subliminal Above awareness Figure 7.1 Unconscious appraisal. To explore whether evaluations can b produced unconsciously, Shelia Murphy and Robert Zajonc presented e participants with slides of a smiling face or an angry face, either at suboptimal (subliminal) or optimal (above awareness) levels, and then had participants rate how much they liked Chinese ideographs. People liked the Chinese ideographs more after they have first been presented with a subliminally presented smile, suggesting that that smile had activated positive feeling at an unconscious level. When presented with a smiling face long enough to be consciously aware of it, the smile did not lead participants to evaluate the Chinese ideographs more positively (Source: Murphy & Zajonc, 1993). I , ' I 11l from chapter 1, vironment triggers was a cornerstone m e ohman (19%) I participants with ly brief periods of time. These photos were then masked, that is to say immediately followed, by other photos that prevented the possibility of consciously perceiving the original face. Again, participants were not aware of having seen the angry or happy face, but these suboptimally presented facial expressions did influence the individual's emotions; they prompted participants to smile or to furrow their brow and show lowered or elevated physiological arousal associated with threat or danger, depending on whether the suboptimally presented face had been respectively smiling or angry (see also Dimberg, Thunberg, & Elmehed, 2000; Whalen e t al., 1998). In other work, ijhman and Soares (1994) presented photos of snakes to people with snake phobias below their awareness, and found that these photos generated a galvanic skin response and negative emotion. These studies suggest that there is a primary appraisal process that is automatic, fast, and primitive in the sense that it gives rise to an immediate feeling of good or bad, or positivity or negativity. Before we turn to the more specific appraisal processes that gives rise to different kinds of positive and negative emotions, let's digress a bit, and ask which might be more potent: negative or positive evaluations? Is the bad stronger than the good? The research on automatic appraisals of the good and bad qualities of the stimulus raises an intriguing question: Are our initial positive and negative evaluations of stimuli comparable?Or is one stronger and more potent than the other? Reviews by Shelley Taylor (1991), John Cacioppo and Wendy Gardner (1999), Roy Baumeister and his colleagues (Baumeister et al., 2001), and Paul Rozin and Edward Royzman (2001) offered a conclusive, and perhaps unsettling answer: our negative evaluations appear to be more potent than our positive evaluations. The bad is stronger than the good. It would make evolutionary sense for the individual to be more responsive to pain than to pleasure, to danger rather than to safety. Without such a bias, the chances of survival would seem to be diminished. This would suggest, more generally, that our negative emotions might seem more intense, or more readily elicited, and harder to regulate. Numerous studies lead to the conclusion that the bad is stronger than the good. Negative stimuli, such as startling, frightening sounds or disgusting smells, trigger more rapid, stronger physiological responses than positive stimuli, such as pleasing sounds or delicious tastes. In various experiments, the loss of $10 is experienced as more painful than the pleasure one experiences in gaining $10. Negative trauma, such as the death of a loved one or sexual abuse, can change the individual for a lifetime. It is hard to think of analogous positive life events that alter life in such profound and enduring ways. Or consider Paul Rozin's ideas about contamination, the process by which one disgusting object endows another object with its vile essence through simple contact (Rozin & Fallon, 1987). Brief contact with a cockroach will spoil a delicious meal (the negative stimulus contaminates the positive stimulus). The inverse - making a pile of cockroaches delicious by touching it with your favorite food, say chocolate - is unimaginable (Rozin & Royzman, 2001). To address whether negative evaluations are more potent than positive evaluations, Tiffany Ito, John Cacioppo, and their colleagues presented participants with positively toned or valenced pictures - for example, photographs of pizza or chocolate ice cream - and negatively valenced slides - for example, photographs of a mutilated face or of a dead cat (Ito et al., 1998). They recorded participants' electrocortical activity on the scalp, focusing on one region of brain activity that is associated with evaluative responses. Ito and colleagues discovered a clear negativity bias in evaluation: the negative stimuli generated greater brain activity than the positive or neutral slides. It seems, alas, that the bad is indeed stronger than the good. assessments (Feldm; are likely to form a (Russell, 2003). A1 mental properties o exhilarating walk in in many people's e more is needed to a particular, what is n processes that elicil love. Enquiry into t to more sophisticate tended to be in tw izes that unique apy approaches, whicl to different emotio: Discrete approac Appraisal theories and distinct emotions Thus far we have seen that people respond with unconscious or automatic evaluations of events, evaluations that are centered on simple good-bad In his theory of disc two stages to the 2 appraisal stage, wh the event in terms whether the event is elicited; if not, ongoing events in 1 incongruent with t events, and goal in( individual appraise goals, or issues for to be kind to othel issues of the self an that are central to or charity work. E societies should b l triggered by event other people's goa An approach to and Johnson-Laird ponents, as we ha1 in relation to goal: the automatic and patient discussed a matic process is i~ anger, fear, and di these basic emotior to deal with a reci d bad qualities of the positive and negative and more potent than 2acioppo and Wendy lumeister et al., 2001), 1 conclusive, and per:ar to be more potent m the good. It would re responsive to pain hout such a bias, the i would suggest, more ore intense, or more bad is stronger than : ounds or disgusting s iponses than positive various experiments, an the pleasure one the death of a loved lifetime. It is hard to n such profound and t contamination, t he er object with its vile 7). Brief contact with timulus contaminates 'ockroaches delicious unimaginable (Rozin 8 assessments (Feldman-Barrett & Russell, 1999). These automatic evaluations are likely to form a central core to our experience of moods and emotions (Russell, 2003). Although goodness and badness are no doubt f i~ndamental properties of our reactions to objects, such things as ice cream, an exhilarating walk in the woods, and an enjoyable novel are all equally good in many people's eyes, yet these experiences differ in many ways. Much more is needed to account for the complexity of emotional experience. In particular, what is needed is a more precise theory of the specific appraisal processes that elicit different emotions, such as anger, guilt, gratitude, and love. Enquiry into this area takes us beyond automatic primary appraisals to more sophisticated secondary appraisals. Modern research on appraisal has tended to be in two families: that of discrete approaches that emphasizes that unique appraisals give rise to different emotions; and d imensional approaches, which focus on the many components of appraisals that relate to different emotions. Discrete approaches to appraisal in his theory of discrete emotions, Richard Lazarus proposed that there are two stages to the appraisal process (1991). In his version of the primary appraisal stage, which we represent in figure 7.2, the individual appraises the event in terms of its relevance to goals. First, the individual evaluates whether the event is relevant to personal goals or not. If so, an emotion is elicited; if not, no emotion ensues. Then the individual appraises ongoing events in terms of the extent to which the event is congruent or incongruent with the person's goals. Goal congruent events elicit positive events, and goal incongruent events produce negative emotions. Finally, the ises the event in terms of its relevance to more specific r the ego. Events can concern moral values, for example Oo be kind to others or to honor the golden rule. Events might bear upon self and identity, for example whether one is excelling in areas tral to self-definition, such as academics, artistic performance, nts can pertain to important ideas, for example that uld be fair and just. And in light of how much elnotion is red by events that happen to other people, events might implicate people's goals, and their well-being. h to discrete emotions related to Lazarus's is that of Oatley ird (1987, 1996). They postulate appraisals with two comhave been discussing. First there is an appraisal of an event to goals that is automatic and unconscious. It corresponds to tic and nonverbal process mentioned in relation to Gazzaniga's d at the beginning of the chapter. In this account the autoprocess is in terms of basic emotions (such as happiness, sadness, fear, and disgust). According to Oatley and Johnson-Laird, each of basic emotions has the function of setting the brain into a mode adapted a1 with a recurring situation (respectively: progress with a goal, loss, negatively valenced nscious or automatiq on simple good-bad Goal relevance emotion Goal congruence I positive emotions I \ I EVENT negative emotions damaging self-esteem/ anger Table 7.1 Core rel; Anger Anxiety Fright Guilt Shame Sadness no emotion Envy Jealousy Disgust Happiness Pride 1\ enhancing self-esteem threat I\ Relief Hope Love I pride mutual affection I love t o self lo" sadness \ Compassion A den Facinj Facing Havin Havin Havin Wanti Resen Takin, Makir Enhar objec group A dist b ette~ Fed Desiri recipl Being I F igure 7.2 Decision tree of primary appraisals based on three features (goal relevance, goal congruence, and ego involvement), plus the kinds of emotions that can occur with these appraisals, derived from Lazarus (1991). Further differentiation among emotions occurs in secondary appraisals. frustration by another, threat, and toxicity). Notice that in this account the primary appraisal is not just of positive or negative, but of a small number of basic emotions. Remember Gazzaniga's patient did not say she experienced something negative: she said she felt "kind of scared." Each mode is a state of readiness (cf. Frijda, 1986) with a distinct phenomenological tone, but no necessary verbal meaning. The effect is a bit like having several kinds of bell or alarm in your house, say a door bell, a telephone bell, a smoke detector, a burglar alarm. If one goes off you are alerted to something potentially important of a particular kind, and your readiness changes accordingly, but initially you do not know what the event was that caused the bell or alarm to sound. For that you need to investigate. Similarly, an emotion starts, but its verbal meaning is supplied by a secondary process that occurs more in awareness, in which you make a mental model of the event, what caused it, and how to act in relation to it. In the secondary appraisal stage as proposed by Lazarus, the individual considers a causal attribution for the event, how to respond to the event, and future consequences of different courses of action. The result of these processes is what Lazarus calls the core relational theme of the emotion. The core-relationa table 7.1 we prese You can think a different classes o core relational the. people respond rn transgressions (gu: sion), for example, and cooperative gr themes as the lang and issues that or$ Dimensional a 1 Can you think of ; discrete emotions they fail to addres! readily follow fron Phoebe Ellsworl t o think about em has come to be ca between emotion! Lazarus, highlight fGAq*, Table 7.1 Core relational themes of different emotions Anger Anxiety Fright Guilt A demeaning offense against me and mine 7& $ $ h m . ( i I 4 w, , &P& d+K n oemotion I Shame Sadness notions I Eovy Jealousy Disgust Happiness Pride threat to self Relief Hope Lv oe 4 'adness loss t o self \ Compassion Facing uncertain, existential threat Facing an immediate, concrete, and overwhelming physical danger Having transgressed a moral imperative Having failed to live up to an ego-ideal Having experienced an irrevocable loss Wanting what someone else has Resenting a third party for loss or threat to another's affection Taking in or being too close to an indigestible object or idea Making reasonable progress toward the realization of a goal Enhancement of one's ego-identity by taking credit for a valued object or achievement, either our own or that of someone or group with whom we identlfy A distressing goal-incongruent condition that has changed for the better or gone away Fearing the worst but yearning for better Desiring or participating in affection, usually but not necessarily reciprocated Being moved by another's suffering and wanting to help Source:Adapted from Lazarus (1991) hree features (goal : kinds of emotions 11991). Further als. in this account the ~tof a small number not say she e xperi:ared." Each mode is : phenomenological is a bit like having Ir bell, a telephone f you are alerted to and your readiness vhat t he event was need to investigate. >liedby a secondary ake a mental model n to it. arus, t he individual spond t o the event, The result of these me of the emotion. t The core-relational theme is the essential meaning for each emotion. In table 7.1 w e present Lazarus's analysis of several emotions. You can think about these core relational themes as summaries of the different classes of events that elicit emotion. In evolutionary terms, the core relational themes map onto the problems and opportunities to which people respond with emotions, the slights (anger), dangers (fear), moral transgressions (guilt), losses (sadness), and sufferings of others (compassion), for example, that have been critical to h uman survival, reproduction, and cooperative group living. You can also think about these core relational themes as t he language of o ur emotional experience: they capture the themes and issues that organize our emotional experience. i Dimensional approaches to appraisal Can you think of any aspects of emotional experience that approaches to discrete emotions do not adequately explain? Are there specific emotions they fail to address? Are there properties of your emotional life that do not readily follow from the approach of discrete emotions? Phoebe Ellsworth (e.g., 1991) has highlighted two reasons why w e need to think about emotion-related appraisal from another perspective, which has come to be called dimensional. The first has to do with the similarities between emotions. Approaches to emotions as discrete, such as those of Lazarus, highlight the differences between emotions in terms of their P m Y f & u~ & & & eliciting appraisals. The kinds of events that produce anger no doubt differ from those that produce fear, or sadness, or shame. Yet many emotions are similar in fundamental ways. Anger and fear, for example, at their core feel similar: they feel unpleasant and arousing. The same could be said, for example, about gratitude and love, which both feel quite pleasant and are marked by a feeling of devotion for others. An appraisal theory, Ellsworth contends, needs to account for the interesting similarities across emotions, as well as their differences. A second gap, in approaches to emotions as discrete, according to Ellsworth, is their inability to account for transitions between emotions. Very often in our emotional experience we move from one emotion to another, we shift from anger to guilt quite rapidly, or sadness to hope, or, hopefully not often, love to anger. It is not transparent how Lazarus's discrete model of appraisal would account for these rapid transitions between emotions, which presumably make up such an important part of our daily emotional life. In light of these and other conceptual interests, Phoebe Ellsworth and Craig Smith (1985, 1988) have developed a theory of appraisal that can account for interesting similarities among the emotions, as well as the m n ay differences (for comparable accounts see Frijda, 1986; Ortony, Clore, & Collins, 1988; Roseman, 1984; Scherer, 1988;Weiner, 1986). To arrive at theif theory, Smith and Ellsworth reviewed numerous studies of the semantic content of emotions, like those of Ira Roseman and his colleagues, and from this review derived eight different dimensions of meaning that capture the appraisal processes that lead to various emotions. These dimensions are presented in table 7.2. Think of these dimensions as the basic units o the f meaning ascribed to events in your life. They have to do with how positive or negative the event is, who is responsible for it, whether it is fair, h w o much energy is required, to what extent does the stimulus require intense attention, how certain things seem, and so on. To document the patterns of appraisal associated with the different emotions, Smith and Ellsworth had 16 participants imagine experiencing Table 7.2 Dimensions of appraisal 15 different emoti emotional experien emotion was found For example, intere the desire to attend the perceived nee1 outcomes, togethe1 of events. Hope is a and situational age1 of perceived obstac ant, associated wit1 A second impot certain dimensions emotions. They foul they called "agenc negative emotions: become angry, whc o r fate, we become guilty. Agency was : itive emotions. Thc of pride, but when This importance h t he work of Wei emotions depend events that people 5 and 11 were giv occur. One was thj This is a story abc and h e got all the Graham, 1989, p. 1. Attention: Degree to which you focus on and think about the stimulus 2 . Certainty: Degree to which you are certain about what is going to happen 3. Controlcoping: Extent to which you have control over outcomes in the environment 4 . Pleasantness: Degree that the event is positive or negative 5 . Perceived obstacle: Extent to which the pursuit of your goals is blocked 6 . Responsibility: Extent to which other people, you, and situational factors are responsible for events 7 . Legitimacy: Extent to which the event is fair and deserved or unfair and undeserved 8. Anticipated effort: Extent to which you must expend energy to respond to the event Source: Adapted from Smith & Ellsworth (19851, I If t he children werc (implying that the to say that he wou an easy text (a cat older ones, thouglfound with gurlt: if t he children thou@ an accident, the ol This finding, tha tions, has an impo t o you (perhaps y c which emotion you Attribute the even1 others and you'll fi b e more likely to t nger no doubt differ Yet many emotions :ample, at their core n could be said, for e kite pleasant and are ial theory, Ellsworth ies across emotions, Crete, according to ween emotions. Very emotion to another, hope, or, hopefully s's discrete model of :en emotions, which lily emotional life. oebe Ellsworth and F appraisal that can as well as the many 5; Ortony, Clore, & 6 ).T arrive at their o ~f the semantic con~lleagues, nd from a ng that capture the ese dimensions are e basic units of the ) with how positive :ther it is fair, how llus require intense with the different ~gine xperiencing e 15 different emotions. After this, participants then rated the original emotional experience on the eight dimensions presented in table 7.2. Each emotion was found to be defined by a fairly distinct pattern of appraisal. For example, interest is associated with appraisals of elevated pleasantness, the desire to attend, the sense that situational factors are producing events, the perceived need to expend effort, moderate certainty about future outcomes, together with little sense of perceived obstacle or illegitimacy of events. Hope is associated with appraisals of elevated attention and effort and situational agency, moderate pleasantness, and little certainty or sense of perceived obstacle or illegitimacy. Happiness is the emotion that is pleasant, associated with low effort, high certainty, and high attention. A second important result found by Smith and Ellsworth was that certain dimensions stood out in their ability to differentiate among related emotions. They found that a combination of control and responsibility, which they called "agency," was the critical dimension that differentiated three negative emotions: anger, sadness, and guilt. When we blame others, we become angry, when we attribute similar events to general circumstances or fate, we become sad, when we attribute events to ourselves, we become guilty. Agency was also an important dimension to differentiate certain positive emotions. The same positive event attributed to the self is a source of pride, but when attributed to others is a source of gratitude. This importance of causality in emotion-related appraisal is likewise seen in the work of Weiner and Graham (1989). They found that some distinct emotions depend on attributions, the explanations of the causes of events that people give. They describe how children between the ages of 5 and 11 were given vignettes and asked to decide what emotion would occur. One was this: This is a story about a boy named Chris. Chris's teacher gave a spelling test and he got all the words right. Chris received a n "A" on the test. (Weiner & Graham, 1989, p. 407) I the children were told that Chris had studied a l the words the night before f l (implying that the cause of his success was his own action) they tended to say that he would feel pride, but if the cause was that the teacher gave an easy text (a cause external to Chris), then the children, especially the older ones, thought Chris would not feel pride. Comparable results were found with guilt: if an event that caused damage could have been controlled, the children thought the person causing it would feel guilt, but if it was an accident, the older children thought the person would not feel guilt. This finding, that agency or causal attributions differentiate various emotions, has an important implication: the same negative event may happen to you (perhaps you don't do as well on an exam as you had hoped) but which emotion you experience will depend on how you appraise the causes. Attribute the event to yourself and you're likely to feel guilt. Attribute it to others and you'll feel anger. Attribute it to circumstantial factors and you'll be more likely to experience sadness. ~tthe stimulus s going to happen )utcomes in the F goals is blocked ituational factors are :d or unfair and :rgy to respond to h & Ellsworth (1985) <~-fJ-&[email protected] 4 &~?&OP~J Critiques of appraisal research and new methods for studying appraisal Think for a moment about the Smith and Ellsworth study, which is something of a classic in the study of appraisal, or about the studies of Weiner and Graham on attribution and emotion. Are you skeptical about these retrospective, self-report studies? About how they studied appraisal?In the Smith and Ellsworth study, people relived an emotional experience from their past, and then reported on the appraisals that produced the emotion. Is this really a study of appraisal as we have defined it in this chapter? Several critiques have been levied against this kind of retrospective, self-report study of appraisal (e.g., Parkinson & Manstead, 1992; Parkinson, Fischer, & Manstead, 2004). First, the evidence from studies like that of Smith and Ellsworth is not causal. That is, they did not document how appraisals cause emotion; instead, it is more fair to say that their evidence reveals h w o when one thinks about an emotional experience, such appraisal patterns come to mind. Second, there is reason to doubt whether the kinds of conscious assess ments of appraisal that Smith and Ellsworth gathered actually correspond to the more spontaneous, rapid, even unconscious appraisals that produce emotion. Perhaps it is more fair to say that Smith and Ellsworth studied people's theories about the causes of their emotions, rather than the actual causes of emotion. Indeed as Parkinson, Fischer, and Manstead point out, such appraisal seems to be part of the language in which people discuss emotions with their confidants, and in the changing appraisals of such discussions emotions can change. Nonetheless, the appraisal dimensions proposed by Smith and Ellsworth and others have shed important light on how people construct their emotional experiences. There are several other methods for studying appraisal that are less subject to the biases of retrospective, self-report methods. One approach is to rely on diary studies, in which people report on their daily erne tional experiences in diary-like entries. One of the first to do this was Joanna Field (1934), who wanted to see what it was in her life that made her happy. Here are some of her thoughts after falling in love, thinking about the man she would marry. "June 8th. I want us to travel together, exploring, seeing how other people live . . . sleeping at country inns, sailing boats, tramping dusty roads together. . ." (p. 48). Here the thoughts take the form of plans of activities in a shared life of new experiences with the loved one. In anxiety the thoughts are quite different. Here is Joanna Field again. Oughtn't we to ask those people to tea? That's best, say, "Do you ever have time for a cup of tea? Will you come in any day?" Say w e are free all the week, let them choose, will the maid answer the door? will she be too busy? what shall we give them? go into town and buy a cake? will they expect it? Can't afford these extras, but bread and jam won't do, what does one give people for tea . . . ? (p. 114) In this anxious little 1 people who are weal worrying about hog t he person she wan having subjects keel and Duncan (1992) angry argument wit of music. The argum continued for three She said: "I just cot this going too far? l f would end." Memor =-boyfriendw and n (p. 275). A second new a ascertain whether c emotional response. such as uncertainty in individuals' spo relate to measures c study, Bonanno anc six months prior, I These narratives w with their partner, families, and ultimai numerous referenc injustice, an appra These researchers themes and relatec the interview. They I i sions and self-repc injustice correlatec not sadness. i C ultural u ariati, Our preceding dit variation in apprai: abound (e.g., Russ colleagues on c u h ducted interviews they found morally India, they found tl not to elicit much r w hen a child cuts with her husband :udy, which is somele studies of Weiner ceptical about these lied appraisal?In the lal experience from duced the emotion. : in this chapter? ld of retrospective, ad, 1992; Parkinson, lies like that of Smith nent how appraisals vidence reveals how h appraisal patterns o conscious assessf actually correspond raisals that produce i Ellsworth studied ther than the actual llanstead point out, lich people discuss appraisals of such hpraisal dimensions important light on raisal that are less ~ ds. ne approach O )n their daily emodo this was Joanna at made her happy. ring about the man ;exploring, seeing ng boats, tramping :the form of plans e loved one. lama Field again: l o you ever have e are free all the she be too busy? U they expect it? at does one give / 1 /1 t I E / I r 1 I In this anxious little train of thought, Field wonders how to approach some people who are wealthier than she, rehearsing different forms of invitation, worrying about how she would feel if she calls and a maid tells her that the person she wants to see is too busy. Recent uses of the method of having subjects keep emotion diaries have yielded many examples. Oatley and Duncan (1992) report a 20-year-old woman, Abigail, who had had an angry argument with her boyfriend about preferences for different kinds d music. The argument lasted two and a half hours, but intrusive thoughts continued for three days, and kept her from sleeping for three nights. She said: "I just couldn't get through to him." Her thoughts included: "Is this going too far? If it goes too far, it [the relationship with the boyfriend] would end." Memories came to mind: the argument "reminded her of an ex-boyfriend"and made her "wonder if it [the relationship] was worth it" (p. 275). A second new approach is to identlfy appraisals as they occur, and ascertain whether emotion-specific appraisals relate to other measures of emotional response. For example, one might code appraisal-related themes, such as uncertainty or loss, or dimensions, such as responsibility or effort, in individuals' spontaneous speech, and ask whether those appraisals relate to measures of experience, or expression or physiology. In one such study, Bonanno and Keltner (2004) coded the narratives of people who, six months prior, had experienced the death of their romantic partner. These narratives were complex, moving accounts of participants' lives with their partner, how they had met and fallen and love and often raised families, and ultimately how their partner had died. The narratives included numerous references to loss, an appraisal theme related to sadness, and injustice, an appraisal theme at the heart of the experience of anger. These researchers coded spontaneous references to these two appraisal themes and related them to other measures of emotion gathered during the interview. They found that appraisals of loss correlated with facial expressions and self-reports of sadness but not anger, and that appraisals of injustice correlated with facial expressions and self-reports of anger but not sadness. Cultural variation in appraisal Our preceding discussion may have left you wondering about cultural variation in appraisal processes. Examples of cultural variation in appraisal abound (e.g., Russell, 1991). Consider the work of Rick Shweder and his colleagues on culture and moral judgment (Shweder et al., 1997). They conducted interviews to explore people's ideas about the kinds of events that they found morally repugnant, and the source of anger and disgust. In Hindu India, they found that people are angered by several events that would tend not to elicit much emotion in European cultures. These include the following: when a child cuts his hair after the death of his father, when a woman eats with her husband's elder brother, when a husband cooks for his wife or massages her legs, and when upper-caste individuals come into physical contact with lower-caste individuals. Certain studies, however, point to a surprising degree of universality in the elicitors of emotion. Boucher and Brandt (1981) asked young Americans and Malaysians to describe events that made them feel emotions such as fear, disgust, and joy. From this collection of situations, a subset of those generated by Americans and Malaysians were presented to new participants from each culture, who were asked to identify which emotion would be elicited by these situations. Members of both cultures were in agreement in judging which emotions would be elicited by different events and, remarkably, each group was just as accurate in predicting emotions that would be elicited by the situations listed by the other group as for their own. This implied great commonality in the triggers for emotions across very different cultures (see Mesquita & Frijda, 1992). Other researchers have also concluded that the appraisals that elicit emotions are quite similar across cultures as well (Mauro, Sato, & Tucker, 1992; Mesquita & Ellsworth, 2001; Scherer, 1997). How, then, do cultures differ in the events that elicit emotion? Think back to our discussion of individualist, independent cultures and collectivist, interdependent cultures in chapter 3. In light of this framework, one might expect solitary and social experiences to have different meaning for members of individualist and collectivist cultures. Or consider the simple situation of being alone. Middle-class Europeans are likely to appraise being alone in positive terms, and experience contentedness. B contrast, Utku Inuit peo y ple as studied by Briggs (1970), or the people of Ifaluk as studied by Lutz (1988), as well as numerous other interdependent peoples, appraise being alone in terms of isolation, which elicits feelings of sadness (Mesquita & Ellsworth, 2001; Mesquita & Markus, 2004). Being dependent upon others also appears to generate different appraisals and emotions across cultures. For example, among the Awlad'Ali, a nomadic tribe in Egypt, being in the presence of powerful others is the source of shame, or hasham, because such situations are reminders of one's dependence on others (Abu-Lughod, 1986). In contrast, it is reported that the Japanese experience a pleasurable emotion known as amae within relations between people of greater and lesser power (Lebra, 1983). This is a comforting sense of dependence the less powerful person feels vis-;2t vis the more powerful person, which permits the less powerful person to engage in passive or helpless behavior in the satisfying knowledge tha8 it will be accepted. c upon the person d others, we necessar use specific words, ( emotions and conve Emotion words Knowledge of emotion Bermard Rime and his colleagues have found using diary methods that people have a powerful tendency to confide their emotional experience in others (Rime et al., 1991, 1998). They call this social sharing, and it oc even for emotions such as guilt and shame that might not reflect flatter An important compc tion words, or em01 that people use to d four different prope First, applying a intentional object ( (Ben Ze'ev & Oatle mental state of "abo intentional in this s mental state is aboul ence (Ben Ze'ev, 20 a party, you might s l your ongoing experi and guide you to atti flirtatiously at your experiences of a sim words, then, appear tional experiences. Second, many e c m afe concepts that p a l more abstract c ly metaphorically "this of a bomb - to char that "justice is blind" of an abstract proce pendently of their rr In their study of Kiivesces have argue frequently use to de & Johnson, 1980). E swept away by our ( of hope or despair 1 motional child as s often unsuccessfully the urge to cry. Thirc love or envy. W c ea ceptualize our emon feel as if w e are burs as animals, or living 480 ...
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This note was uploaded on 12/03/2010 for the course PSYCH Psy BEh 17 taught by Professor Susancharles during the Fall '10 term at UC Irvine.

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