AEM 2500 Lec III.4 Fisheries Management sv 111210

AEM 2500 Lec III.4 Fisheries Management sv 111210 -...

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Possible Equilibria (Optima?) Open Access, Maximize Fishery Employment?: Eo (1200) No Planner – leads to over fishing. Individuals compare their expected returns (AR) to their expected costs (AC=MC) Maximize Sustainable Yields: EM (850) = < Eo ood Planner Food Planner – Identify maximum on sustainable revenue curve (Total Value Catch) Maximize Net Returns: EE (650) < EM – Economic Planner – Identify point where MR = MC (or equally, slopes of total revenue and total cost are the same)
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Getting to the Optimum Traditional communities, held together by ties of obligation and mutual self interest, can manage a common resource on its own. – Lobster gangs of Maine. • Works locally, but not for open ocean. – Yet fishermen are the last race of hunter-gatherers, out to snatch what they can while they can. “Right now my only incentive is to go out and kill as many fish as I can…I have no incentive to conserve the fishery because any fish I leave is just going to be picked up by the next guy.” - Tierney, “A Tale of Two Fisheries”, NY Times, 2000
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Possible Interventions to Achieve MR = MC (Rational People Think at the Margin) Open-Access Regulations Technology: how fish may be caught (no motor boats, no nylon nets, maximum boat size…). Selective harvest: which fish may be caught (certain species). Timing: when fish may be caught (not in breeding seasons). Location: where fish may be caught (not in breeding areas). imits: how many fish may be caught (max per boat permits) Limits: how many fish may be caught (max per boat, permits). Incentives: tax on effort or catch.
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igure 4- : Figure 4 2: Tax or License to et to Get to Economic Optimum
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Limited Entry Techniques “Property rights enable fishermen to avoid what ecologists call the tragedy of the commons (Poe calls “Tragedy of open access” or following Hardin “Tragedy of Freedom in the Commons”): the destruction of a common resource because it is open to all. Just as the closely tended herds of cattle thrived on the same plains where e Buffalo perished fish stand a better chance of surviving if they
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This note was uploaded on 12/20/2010 for the course AEM 25 at Cornell University (Engineering School).

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AEM 2500 Lec III.4 Fisheries Management sv 111210 -...

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