Unformatted text preview: Nonaligned Movement Nonaligned Movement (NAM), loose association of countries that, during the Cold War, had no
formal commitment to either of the two power blocs in the world, which were led by the United
States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). The group was formed in September
1961 by a conference of 25 heads of state in Belgrade, Yugoslavia. The conference was
organized by leaders of countries that had recently freed themselves from foreign domination
and rejected renewed ties to any big power. Prominent among these leaders were Prime Minister
Jawaharlal Nehru of India and Presidents Sukarno of Indonesia, Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt,
Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Sékou Touré of Guinea, and Josip Broz Tito of Yugoslavia.
The movement has grown to include more than 110 countries, mostly from Africa, Asia, and
Latin America. NAM conferences are held every three years. The group has no formal
administrative body; at each NAM conference the office of chairperson rotates to the head of
state of the host country.
Membership in NAM is distinct from neutrality in that it implies an active participation in
international affairs and judgment of issues on their merits rather than from predetermined
positions. Thus, a large majority of NAM nations opposed the United States during the Vietnam
War (1957-1975) and the USSR after its 1979 invasion of Afghanistan. In practice, however,
many NAM nations leaned heavily toward one power bloc or the other.
The early members of NAM saw themselves as an important buffer between rival military
alliances, decreasing the possibility of a major confrontation. Any pretension of being a “force,”
however, was tempered by the diversity of the nations’ governments, which ranged from leftist
to ultraconservative and from democratic to dictatorial, and by the economic and military
weaknesses that often made them dependent on foreign aid from the big power blocs.
The dissolution of the USSR in 1991 required NAM nations to redefine their role in a world
where intense ideological and military rivalry between two superpowers was no longer a factor.
Today the movement focuses on promoting cooperation between developing countries and on
advocating solutions to global economic and political problems. Warsaw Pact Warsaw Pact (formally the Warsaw Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance),
military alliance of eight European Communist nations, enacted to counter the rearmament of
West Germany, officially called the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), and its admission to
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The treaty was signed in Warsaw, Poland, on
May 14, 1955, by Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia (now the Czech Republic and Slovakia),
East Germany (now part of the united Federal Republic of Germany), Hungary, Poland, Romania, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). The alliance was dominated by
the USSR, which kept strict control over the other countries in the pact.
In 1961 Albania broke off diplomatic relations with the USSR because of ideological differences
and in 1968 withdrew from the pact. From the mid-1950s through the 1980s, two major bodies
carried out the functions of the Warsaw Pact: the Political Consultative Committee and the
Unified Command of Pact Armed Forces, both headquartered in Moscow.
Under the terms of the treaty, the Political Consultative Committee coordinated all activities,
except those purely military, and the Unified Command of Pact Armed Forces had authority over
the troops assigned to it by member states. It was agreed that the supreme commander would be
from the USSR. The Warsaw Pact's only military action was directed against Czechoslovakia, a
member state. (In the autumn of 1956, the USSR took unilateral military action against Hungary,
another Warsaw Pact member state, killing thousands of Hungarians and causing 200,000 to flee
the country.) In August 1968, after the Czech government enacted reforms offensive to the
USSR, forces of the USSR, Poland, Hungary, East Germany, and Bulgaria invaded
Czechoslovakia and forced a return to a Soviet-style system. Romania opposed the invasion and
did not participate, but remained a member.
Although the Warsaw Pact was officially renewed in 1985 for another 20 years, the political
transformation of Eastern Europe at the end of the 1980s profoundly weakened the organization.
The USSR began withdrawing its troops from other Warsaw Pact countries, and East Germany
pulled out to join West Germany as the reunified nation of Germany in October 1990. All joint
military functions ceased at the end of March 1991, and in July leaders of the remaining six
member nations agreed to dissolve the alliance. Persian Gulf War I -INTRODUCTION
Persian Gulf War, conflict beginning in August 1990, when Iraqi forces invaded and occupied
Kuwait. The conflict culminated in fighting in January and February 1991 between Iraq and an
international coalition of forces led by the United States. By the end of the war, the coalition had
driven the Iraqis from Kuwait.
II -CAUSES OF THE WAR
The Iraqi-Kuwaiti border had been the focus of tension in the past. Kuwait was nominally part of
the Ottoman Empire from the 18th century until 1899 when it asked for, and received, British
protection in return for autonomy in local affairs. In 1961 Britain granted Kuwait independence,
and Iraq revived an old claim that Kuwait had been governed as part of an Ottoman province in
southern Iraq and was therefore rightfully Iraq’s. Iraq’s claim had little historical basis, however,
and after intense global pressure Iraq recognized Kuwait in 1963. Nonetheless, there were occasional clashes along the Iraqi-Kuwaiti border, and relations between the two countries were
Relations between the two countries improved during the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), when
Kuwait assisted Iraq with loans and diplomatic backing. After the war ended in 1988, the Iraqi
government launched a costly program of reconstruction. By 1990 Iraq had fallen $80 billion in
debt and demanded that Kuwait forgive its share of the debt and help with other payments. At the
same time, Iraq claimed that Kuwait was pumping oil from a field that straddled the IraqiKuwaiti border and was not sharing the revenue. Iraq also accused Kuwait of producing more oil
than allowed under quotas set by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC),
thereby depressing the price of oil, Iraq’s main export.
Iraq’s complaints against Kuwait grew increasingly harsh, but they were mostly about money
and did not suggest that Iraq was about to revive its land claim to Kuwait. When Iraqi forces
began to mobilize near the Kuwaiti border in the summer of 1990, several Arab states tried to
mediate the dispute. Kuwait, seeking to avoid looking like a puppet of outside powers, did not
call on the United States or other non-Arab powers for support. For their part, the U.S. and other
Western governments generally expected that at worst Iraq would seize some border area to
intimidate Kuwait, so they avoided being pulled into the dispute. Arab mediators convinced Iraq
and Kuwait to negotiate their differences in Jiddah, Saudi Arabia, on August 1, 1990, but that
session resulted only in charges and countercharges. A second session was scheduled to take
place in Baghdād, the Iraqi capital, but Iraq invaded Kuwait the next day, leading some observers
to suspect that Iraqi president Saddam Hussein had planned the invasion all along.
III -IRAQ INVADES
The Iraqi attack began shortly after midnight on August 2. About 150,000 Iraqi troops, many of
them veterans of the Iran-Iraq War, easily overwhelmed the unprepared and inexperienced
Kuwaiti forces, which numbered about 20,000. By dawn Iraq had assumed control of Kuwait
city, the capital, and was soon in complete control of the country. Hussein’s political strategy
was less clear than his military strategy. The Iraqis initially posed as liberators, hoping to appeal
to Kuwaiti democrats who opposed the ruling Sabah monarchy. When this claim attracted neither
Kuwaiti nor international support, it was dropped. In place of the Sabahs, most of whom fled
during the invasion, Iraq installed a puppet government.
The United Nations Security Council and the Arab League immediately condemned the Iraqi
invasion. Four days later, the Security Council imposed an economic embargo on Iraq that
prohibited nearly all trade with Iraq. Iraq responded to the sanctions by annexing Kuwait on
August 8, prompting the exiled Sabah family to call for a stronger international response. In
October, Kuwait’s rulers met with their democratic opponents in Jiddah, with the hope of uniting
during the occupation. The Sabah family promised the democrats that if returned to Kuwait, they
would restore constitutional rule and parliament (both of which had been suspended in 1986).
In return, the democrats pledged to support the government in exile. The unified leadership proved useful in winning international support for an eviction of Iraq. Fewer than half of all
Kuwaitis stayed in Kuwait through the occupation; of those who stayed, some formed resistance
organizations but with little effect.
Any armed attempt to roll back the Iraqi invasion depended on Saudi Arabia, which shares a
border with both Iraq and Kuwait. Saudi Arabia had neither the power nor the inclination to fight
Iraq alone; if the Saudi government invited foreign troops into the country to attack Iraq,
however, it risked appearing to be under their influence. Saudi rulers did eventually open the
country to foreign forces, in large part because they were alarmed by Iraq’s aggressive
diplomacy and because U.S. intelligence reports claimed that Iraqi forces were well positioned
for a strike against Saudi Arabia. Other Arab countries, such as Egypt, Syria, and the smaller
states along the Persian Gulf, feared that even if Iraq’s conquests stopped at Kuwait, Iraq could
still intimidate the rest of the region. Western powers supported a rollback of Iraqi forces
because they were afraid Iraq could now dominate international oil supplies. Finally, other
members of the United Nations (UN) did not want to allow one UN member state to eliminate
Beginning a week after the Iraqi takeover of Kuwait and continuing for several months, a large
international force gathered in Saudi Arabia.
The United States sent more than 400,000 troops, and more than 200,000 additional troops came
from Saudi Arabia, the United Kingdom, France, Kuwait, Egypt, Syria, Senegal, Niger,
Morocco, Bangladesh, Pakistan, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Oman, and Bahrain. Other
countries contributed ships, air forces, and medical units, including Canada, Italy, Argentina,
Australia, Belgium, Denmark, Greece, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Czechoslovakia, New Zealand,
the Netherlands, Poland, and South Korea. Still other countries made other contributions: Turkey
allowed air bases on its territory to be used by coalition planes, and Japan and Germany gave
financial support. The initial goal of the force was to prevent further Iraqi action, but most
countries were aware the force might ultimately be used to drive Iraq from Kuwait.
The Iraqis tried to deter and split the growing international coalition through several means.
They made it clear that their adversaries would pay heavily if war broke out, and they hinted they
would use chemical weapons and missile attacks on cities, as they had against Iran during the
Iran-Iraq War. Iraq also detained citizens of coalition countries who had been in Kuwait at the
time of the invasion and said they would be held in militarily sensitive areas—in effect using
them as human shields to deter coalition attacks. Iraq eventually released the last of the
foreigners in December 1990 under pressure from several Arab nations. In an effort to weaken
Arab support within the coalition, Iraq tried to link its occupation of Kuwait to the larger ArabIsraeli conflict in the region. The Iraqis argued that since the UN had not forced Israel to leave
Arab territories it occupied during and after the Six-Day War of 1967, it should not force Iraq to
leave Kuwait. The Iraqis further implied they might leave Kuwait if Israel withdrew from the
Occupied Territories. Several Arab countries responded positively to Iraq’s statements; however,
most of these were states such as Jordan and Yemen, which were not part of the coalition. Only
in Morocco and Syria did government support for coalition involvement weaken as a result of Iraq’s initiative.
The coalition’s greatest military concern during the closing months of 1990 was that Iraqi forces
would attack before coalition forces were fully in place, but no such attack took place. The
coalition was also troubled that Iraq might partially withdraw from Kuwait, which could split the
coalition between nations eager to avoid fighting and nations wanting to push for full
withdrawal. The United States in particular feared that signs of progress might lessen the resolve
of some coalition partners and so discouraged attempts to mediate the crisis. Iraq’s
uncompromising stand helped build support among coalition members for the American hard
On November 29, with coalition forces massing in Saudi Arabia and Iraq showing no signs of
retreat, the UN Security Council passed a resolution to allow member states to “use all necessary
means” to force Iraq from Kuwait if Iraq remained in the country after January 15, 1991. The
Iraqis rejected the ultimatum. Soon after the vote, the United States agreed to a direct meeting
between Secretary of State James Baker and Iraq’s foreign minister. The two sides met on
January 9. Neither offered to compromise. The United States underscored the ultimatum, and the
Iraqis refused to comply with it, even threatening to attack Israel. For the United States, the
meeting was its way of showing the conflict could not be resolved through negotiation.
A large minority of the U.S. population opposed military action. Opponents were concerned that
the armed forces would suffer large casualties and argued that the only reason for the invasion
was to guarantee a cheap supply of oil. Many such opponents thought economic sanctions would
eventually force Iraq to leave Kuwait. President George Bush maintained that larger political
principles were involved and that economic sanctions would not work. He also argued that the
UN resolution gave him the authority to use military force. Other Americans believed the
president did not have the constitutional authority to order an attack without a congressional
declaration of war. On January 12, 1991, the U.S. Congress narrowly passed a resolution
authorizing the president to use force, nullifying the domestic debate.
IV -THE COALITION ATTACKS BY AIR
When the UN deadline of January 15 passed without an Iraqi withdrawal, a vast majority of
coalition members joined in the decision to attack Iraq. A few members, such as Morocco,
elected not to take part in the military strikes. In the early morning of January 17, 1991, coalition
forces began a massive air attack on Iraqi targets.
The air assault had three goals: to attack Iraqi air defenses, to disrupt command and control, and
to weaken ground forces in and around Kuwait. The coalition made swift progress against Iraq’s
air defenses, giving the coalition almost uncontested control of the skies over Iraq and Kuwait.
The second task, disrupting command and control, was larger and more difficult. It required
attacks on the Iraqi electrical system, communications centers, roads and bridges, and other
military and government targets. These targets were often located in civilian areas and were
typically used by both civilians and the military. Although the coalition air forces often used very precise weapons, the attacks caused many civilian casualties and completely disrupted Iraqi
civilian life. The third task, weakening Iraq’s ground forces, was larger still. The coalition used
less sophisticated weaponry to strike Iraqi defensive positions in both Iraq and Kuwait, to
destroy their equipment, and to undermine morale. After five and a half weeks of intense
bombing and more than 100,000 flights by coalition planes, Iraq’s forces were severely
In an attempt to pry the coalition apart, Iraq fired Scud missiles at both Saudi Arabia and Israel,
which especially disrupted Israeli civilian life. Iraq could thus portray its Arab adversaries as
fighting on the side of Israel. The strategy failed to split the coalition, in part because the Israeli
government did not retaliate. Iraq also issued thinly veiled threats that it would use chemical and
biological weapons. The United States hinted in return that such an attack might provoke a
massive response, possibly including the use of nuclear weapons. Iraqi ground forces also
initiated a limited amount of ground fighting, occupying the Saudi border town of Khafji on
January 30 before being driven back.
One month into the air war, the Iraqis began negotiating with the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics (USSR) over a plan to withdraw from Kuwait. Had this initiative come before the start
of the coalition’s attack, it might have split the coalition; now it simply seemed a sign that the
war was weighing heavily on Iraq. The war made diplomacy difficult for Iraq: officials had to
travel overland to Iran and then fly to Moscow to ferry messages back and forth. Sensing victory,
the coalition united behind a demand for Iraq’s unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait.
V -LAND WAR
On February 24 the coalition launched its long-anticipated land offensive.
The bulk of the attack was in southwestern Iraq, where coalition forces first moved north, then
turned east toward the Iraqi port of Al Başrah. This maneuver surrounded Kuwait, encircling the
Iraqi forces there and in southern Iraq, and allowed coalition forces (mainly Arab) to move up
the coast and take Kuwait city. Some Iraqi units resisted, but the coalition offensive advanced
more quickly than anticipated. Thousands of Iraqi troops surrendered. Others deserted. Iraq then
focused its efforts on withdrawing its elite units and sabotaging Kuwaiti infrastructure and
industry. Many oil wells were set on fire, creating huge oil lakes, thick black smoke, and other
environmental damage. Two days after the ground war began, Iraq announced it was leaving
On February 28, with the collapse of Iraqi resistance and the recapture of Kuwait—thereby
fulfilling the coalition’s stated goals—the coalition declared a cease-fire. The land war had lasted
precisely 100 hours. The cease-fire came shortly before coalition forces would have surrounded
Iraqi forces. On March 2the UN Security Council issued a resolution laying down the conditions
for the cease-fire, which were accepted by Iraq in a meeting of military commanders on March 3.
More extensive aims, such as overthrowing the Iraqi government or destroying Iraqi forces, did
not have the support of all coalition members. Most Arab members, for example, believed the
war was fought to restore one Arab country and not to destroy another. The United States also worried that extending the goal would have involved them in endless fighting.
The Iraqis achieved none of their initial goals. Rather than enhancing their economic, military,
and political position, they were economically devastated, militarily defeated, and politically
isolated. Yet because the government and many of the military forces remained intact, the Iraqis
could claim mere survival as a victory. The surviving military forces were used a short time later
to suppress two postwar rebellions: one involving Shia Muslims in southern Iraq and one
involving Kurds in the north.
Almost all of the casualties occurred on the Iraqi side. While estimates during the war had
ranged from 10,000 to 100,000 Iraqis killed, Western military experts now agree that Iraq
sustained between 20,000 and 35,000 casualties. The coalition l...
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