CO_ATSecurityK_Aff

CO_ATSecurityK_Aff - DDI 09CO Lab Kade and Chris Dartmouth...

Info iconThis preview shows pages 1–2. Sign up to view the full content.

View Full Document Right Arrow Icon
DDI 09—CO Lab Dartmouth 2K9 Kade and Chris 1 2AC Security K Their kritik assumes an outdated model of policy making—threats are real and acting is crucial to solve conflict Olav. F. Knudsen , Prof @ Södertörn Univ College, ‘1 [ Security Dialogue 32.3, “Post-Copenhagen Security Studies: Desecuritizing Securitization ,” p. 360] During the Cold War, peace research was struggling to gain the status of so- cial and intellectual respectability then only accorded strategic studies. The concept of securitization has helped to change that. A key aspect of the securi- tization idea is to create awareness of the (allegedly) arbitrary nature of ‘threats’, to stimulate the thought that the foundation of any national security policy is not given by ‘nature’ but chosen by politicians and decisionmakers who have an interest in defining it in just that way. That interest (according to this line of reasoning) is heavily embodied not just in each country’s military establishment, but also in the power and influence flowing from the military’s privileged position with respect to the network of decisionmakers and politi- cians serving that establishment. Hence, ‘securitization’ gave a name to the process, hitherto vaguely perceived, of raising security issues above politics and making them something one would never question. This argument is convincing as far as its description of the military estab- lishment and decisionmakers goes, but its heyday is gone. It was a Cold War phenomenon, and things just aren’t so anymore. In the post-Cold War period, agenda-setting has been much easier to influence than the securitization approach assumes. That change cannot be credited to the concept; the change in security politics was already taking place in defense ministries and parlia- ments before the concept was first launched. Indeed, securitization in my view is more appropriate to the security politics of the Cold War years than to the post-Cold War period. Moreover, I have a problem with the underlying implication that it is unim- portant whether states ‘really’ face dangers from other states or groups. In the Copenhagen school, threats are seen as coming mainly from the actors’ own fears, or from what happens when the fears of individuals turn into paranoid political action. In my view, this emphasis on the subjective is a misleading conception of threat, in that it discounts an independent existence for what- ever is perceived as a threat. Granted, political life is often marked by misper- ceptions, mistakes, pure imaginations, ghosts, or mirages, but such phenom- ena do not occur simultaneously to large numbers of politicians, and hardly most of the time. During the Cold War, threats – in the sense of plausible possibilities of danger – referred to ‘real’ phenomena, and they refer to ‘real’ phenomena now. The objects referred to are often not the same, but that is a different matter. Threats have to be dealt with both in terms of perceptions and in
Background image of page 1

Info iconThis preview has intentionally blurred sections. Sign up to view the full version.

View Full DocumentRight Arrow Icon
Image of page 2
This is the end of the preview. Sign up to access the rest of the document.

Page1 / 11

CO_ATSecurityK_Aff - DDI 09CO Lab Kade and Chris Dartmouth...

This preview shows document pages 1 - 2. Sign up to view the full document.

View Full Document Right Arrow Icon
Ask a homework question - tutors are online