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Unformatted text preview: Single-Payer Neg Dartmouth 2K9 1 Table of Contents of Epic Success Last printed 0/0/0000 0:00:00 AM 1 Single-Payer Neg Dartmouth 2K9 2 Counter-plan 1NC 1/2 Counter-plan Text: The United States federal government should implement an individual mandate requiring that all United States citizens obtain private health insurance and subsidize the purchase of health insurance for individuals who are unable to afford it. Solves for the uninsured and fixes private market abuses. New England Journal of Medicine, 2009 (Linda J. Blumber, Ph. D, and John Holahan, Ph.D., “The Individual Mandate – An Affordable and Fair Apprach to Achieving Universal Coverage”, July 2, 2009, http://content.nejm.org/cgi/content/full/NEJMp0904729 ) Some of the most prominent shortcomings of the U.S. health insurance market are rooted in the fact that the system is a voluntary one. Outside the state of Massachusetts, which recently instituted broad-based health care reform, no one under the age of 65 years is required to obtain health insurance coverage of any kind. Voluntary insurance markets have led to a system centered on segmenting health risk instead of one whose primary mission is ensuring affordable access to necessary and efficiently provided high-quality medical services. But the past need not be prologue. The orientation of our system and the distorted incentives that it creates can be changed. A vital component of such a change would be bringing all U.S. residents into our health insurance system through an individual mandate. Health insurers engage in many practices that make it difficult for people with health problems to obtain and maintain their coverage; they do so for the express purpose of protecting themselves from the potentially enormous financial consequences of adverse selection. Adverse selection entails the disproportionate enrollment in insurance plans of people with higher-than-average health risk. There is a natural tendency for such selection to occur, because people prefer to pay for coverage only when they think they will need health care services. Insurance pools cannot be stable over time, nor can insurers remain financially viable, if people enroll only when their costs are expected to be high. Consequently, insurers create, and regulators permit, structured barriers against such behavior, including such policies as exclusion periods for coverage of preexisting conditions, benefit riders that permanently exclude particular types of care, higher premium rates or cost-sharing requirements for people with health problems, and outright denials of coverage. If we required that every person obtain at least a minimum package of health insurance benefits — that is, issued a so-called individual mandate — we would eliminate adverse selection, and these barriers would become unnecessary and, in fact, indefensible. Remove them, and being in bad health would no longer prevent people from obtaining adequate coverage . But allow some opportunity for people to remain uninsured, and the...
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This note was uploaded on 12/20/2010 for the course K 101 taught by Professor Staff during the Fall '10 term at UMass Lowell.
- Fall '10