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PHIL104PB_ARTICLE_OFNATURAL%5b1%5d

PHIL104PB_ARTICLE_OFNATURAL%5b1%5d - THE UNIVERSITY OF...

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Unformatted text preview: THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO The Great Books is pubuéshgd mail: the ediinrial advice of thefacuities (yr The Umbngy of Chicago N0 purl of [his mark may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any 'mcnns, elcclmnic ur mechanical, including pholowpying, mum-ding. or by any inlm‘umriou storage and retrieval system, wilhuul permission in writing from the publisher © I952 BY ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, INC‘ TWENTY-FOURTH PRINTING, 1982 COPYRIGHT UNDER INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT UNION ALL RIGHTS RESERVED UNDER PAN AMERICAN AND UNIVERSAL COPYRIGHT CONVENTIONS BY ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, INC. Library of Cnmrrpcs “Man bu at ,' Card Number 55—10321 rm W ‘7' b .. International Standard Bank Number 0fi85229—I63—9 :me‘w—n GENERAL CONTENTS w. Lu'cretiuS' On the Natur- Of “bin Translated by H A f MUNRO The Discourses of Epictetus, Page 105 Translnted by GEORGE LONG The Meditations of Marcus Aurelius, Page 253 Translated by GEORGE LONG "H THE DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS a EPICTETUS was born sometime in the reign of Nero and lived through the greater part, if not all, of the reign of Hadrian. He was a native of Phrygia, and his language was Greelé His original name is unknown The name Epictetus (“acquired”) refers to his servitude; as a boy he was a slave in Rome of Epaphroditus, a freedrnan and courtier of Nero While still a slave, Epictetus attended the lectures of the Stoic philosopher, Musonius Rufus, who, he records, “spoke in such tashion, that each of us as he sat there thought he was himself accused” The slave apparently came to appreciate Musonius’ teaching that “the gifted soul is all the more inclined towards its natural object, the more you try to beat it off.” According to 'Celsus, as quoted by Origen, Epictetus was permanently lamed by his mas— ter. ”When his master was twisting his leg,” it is said, NEpictetus only smiled and noted calmly, ‘You will break it,’ and when it was broken, ‘I told you so.’ ” Sometime before the year 89, Epictetus ob- tained his freedom and became a teacher of philosophy in Rome But along with other philosophers suspected of republicanism he was eXpelled from Rome and Italy by Domi- IOI BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE EPICTETUS, c an 6o——r 13,8 tian around the year go. Epictetus withdrew to northern Greece, to the city of Nicopolis, which had been founded by Augustus to cele- brate the victory of Actium. There he spent the rest of his long life, expounding Stoic doc-- trine He lived in poverty, having only, as he said, earth, sky, and a cloak. Epictetus wrote nothing, but he acquired renown as a teacher. “When he was speaking, his hearers,” We learn from one of them, “were forced to feel just what he would have them feel ” Their reverence for him is attested by Lucian’s story that after his death an ad- mirer paid three thousand drachrnas for an earthenware lamp he had used. Among his pupils, who came from all parts of the Empire, was a certain Flavius Arrian, later consul under Hadrian and the historian of Alexander. Arrian took careful notes of the lectures and teaching of Epictetus and pub-- lished them in the eight books of the Dir— courres, of which the first four have survived Arrian says in his preface that the Discourse: are "in the very language Epictetus-used, so far as possible,” and preserve "the directness of his speech.” Arrian also compiled out of his lecture notes ‘a compendium of the main tenets of Epictetu's, the Encheiridimz, or Manual. «til ..m..nmmwmmm.w.w—..m-q— .w............._......._..._.._.___ i .r 2-. lawn“. i E Wmmmmfllmmmmmr-m- A CONTENTS B‘soompmcnr. Nose, p 101 BOOK I I‘ O,“ the things which are in‘ our Pow— er, and not in our Power II How a may: on every occasion can maintain his proper character III How a man should proceed from the principle of God being the father of'ail men to the rest IV Of progress or improvement V Against the academics VI Of providence VII Of the use of sophistical arguments, and hypothetical, and the like VIII That the faculties are not safe tothe unimtrueted IX How from the fact that we are akin to God a man mag/[proceed to the consequences X Against those who eagerly seeh pre: 4 Jferment at Rome," XI Of natural afl'ection' XII Of contentment XIII How everything may he done accept- ahly to the Gods XIV That the deity oversees all things XV I’Vhat philosophy promises XVI of prooidence XVII That the logical art is necessary XVIII That we ought not to be angry with the errors of others XIX How we should hehaue to tyrants XX Ahoutreason, how it contemplates ' ’ itself XXI Against those who wish to he ad— mired XXII Of precognitions XXIII Against Epicurus . XXIV How we should struggle with cir» cumstances XXV On the some XXVI I'Vhat is the law of life . XXVII In how. many ways appearances exist, and. what aids we should provide against them XXVIII That we ought not to he angry with .Waazl wan % ME Him X? the great things among men 105 106 108 108 110 IIO IIZ 113 114 116 116 118 no 120 121 121 122 124 125 I26 127 127 128 129 129 131 132 I33 XXIX On constancy XXX What we ought to have ready in clif— ficult circumstances BOOK II 'I That confidence is not inconsistent with caution II Of Tranquillity III To those who recommend persons to philosophers IV Against a person who had once been detected in adultery ’ V H ow magnanirnity is consistent with Cflrfi VI- Of indiflcrence VII How we ought to use divination VIII What is the nature of the good IX That when we cannot! fulfill that which the character of a man promises, we assume the charac— ter of a philosopher X How we may discover the duties of life from names . XI What the heginning of philosophy is XII Of disputation or discussion XIII On. anxiety XIV To Naso XV Ta or against those who ohstinately persist in what they have deter— mined XVI That. we do not strive to use our opinions ahoat good and coil XVII How we must adapt preconceptions to particular cases XVIII How we should struggle against ap— pearances _ XIX Against those who emhrace philo- sophieal opinions only in words XX Against the Epicureans and Aca- demics . XXI Of inconsistency XXII On friendship XXIII On. the power of speaking XXIV To a person who was one of those ,7 71111159531£0t oalued hyhini XXV That logic is necessary I XXVI What is the property of erré‘or 5' I34 138 138 140 141 142 142 Wr I45 146 147 148 150 151 152 I53 155 156 158 161 162 164 166 167 1'70 172 I74 I74 [04 CONTENTS BOOK III I Of finery in dress II In what a man ought to be exercised who has made proficicncy; and that we neglect the chief things III What is the matter on which a good man should he employed, and in what we ought chiefly to practice ourselves IV Against a person who showed his partisanship in an unseemly way in a theatre V Against those who on account of sickness go away home VI Miscellaneous VII To the administrator of the free cities who was an Epicurean VIII H ow we must exercise ourseloes against appearances IX To a certain rhetorician who was go— ing up to Rome on a suit X In what manner we ought to hear sickness XI Certain miscellaneous matters XII About exercise XIII What iolitude is, and” what kind of person a‘solitary man is XIV Certain miscellaneous“matters XV That we ought to proceed with cir— curnspection to everything XVI That we ought with caution to enter into familiar intercourse with men XVII On providence XVIII That we ought not to he disturbed lay any news " XIX V/hat is the condition of a common hind 0} man and of a philosopher I75 177 178 180 180 181 182 184 184 185 187 187 188 189 190 191 191 192 192 XX That we can derive advantage from all external things 192 XXI Against those who readily come to the profession of sophists 193 XXII About cynisrn 195 XXIII To those who read and discuss for the sake of ostentation 201 XXIV That we ought not to he snooed by a desire of those things which are not in our power 203 XXV To those who fall 015’ from their pur— pose 210 XXVI To those who fear want 110 BOOK IV I About freedom 213 II On familiar intimacy 22,3 III What things we should exchange for other things 3 224 IV To those who are desirous of passing life in tranquility 22.5 V Against the quarrelsomc and fern-- cious 228 VI Against those who lament ooer (Being pitied 23o VII On freedom from fear 232 VIII Against those who hastily rush into the use of the philosophic dress 235 IX To a person who had. been changed to a character of shamelessness 237 X What things we ought to despise, and what things we ought to value 238 XI Ahout purity :40 XII On attention 242 XIII Against or to those who readily tell their own aflairs 244 u, .|.:1n::a'flmwrlsmwnm'v mmum»mm...“Wmmmnm—m-mmmummmwm—s—m fun-W... t :4 4.; pm» 179471 rLI‘me .1 v.7 m. Irrern-K‘n u—mmmtflm.mmnmmm_ 116 EPICTETUS ful parts; We fear, We desire; we flatter those who are able to help us in these matters, and we fear them also. A man asked me to write to Rome about him, a man who, as most people thought, had been unfortunate, for formerly he was a man of rank and rich, but had been stripped of all, and was living here I wrote on his behalf in a submissive manner; but when he hadread the letter; he gave it back to me and said, “I vvished for your help, not your pity' no evil has hap— pened to me ” Thus also .Musonius Rufus,- in order to try me, used to say" “This and this will befall you from your master”; and I replied that these were things which happen in the ordinary course of human affairs “Why, then,” said he, “should I ask him for anything when I can obtain it from you?” For, in fact, what a man has from himself, it is superfluous and foolish to recci ye from another? Shall I, then, who am able to receive from myself greatness of soul and a generous spirit, receive from you land and money or a magisterial office? I hope not: I will not be m ignorant about my own posses— sions But when a man is cowardly and mean, what else must-be done for him than to write letters as you would about a corpse. ”Please to grant us the body'of a certain person and a sextarius of pdor'blood.” For such ‘a person is, in fact, a carcass and a sextarius of blood, and nothing more. But if he were anything more, he would know that one man is not miserable through the means of another. Cnrurrna 10 Against iz’lose who eagerly reek prefermcnr at Rome Ir we applied ourselves as busily to our own work as the old men at Rome do to those mat« ters about which they are employed, perhaps we also might accomplish something. I am ac- quainted with a man older than myself who is now superintendent of corn at Rome, and I re— member the time when he came here on his way back from exile, and what he said as he relaiéd the events of his former life, and how he declared that with respect to the future after his return he Would look after nothing else -than passing the rest of his life in quiet and tranquillity ”For how little of life,” he said, “remains for me.” I replied, “You will not do it, but as soon as you smell Rome, you will for.=- . get all that you have said; and if admission is , ,_ alloWed even into the imperial palace, you will gladly thrust yourself in and thank God ” “If- you find me, Epictetus,” he answered, “setting even one foot within the palace, think what you please.” Well, what then did he do? Be— fore he entered the city he was met by letters from Cmsar, and as soon as he received them he forgot all, and ever after has added one - piece of business to another I wish that I were now by his side to remind him of what he said when he was passing this way and to tell him how much better a seer I am than he is. Well, then, do I say that man is an animal made for doing nothing?1 Certainly not. But why are we not active? For example, as to my- self, as soon as day comes, in a few words 1 re« mind myself of what I must read over to my pupils; then forthwith I say to myself, “But what is it to me how a certain person shall read? the first thing for me is to sleep .” And indeed what resemblance is. therebetWeenwhat other per50ns do and what We do? if you ob- serve what they do, you will understand And what else do they do all day long than make up accounts,- inquire among themselves, give and take advice about some small quantity of grain, a bit of land, and such kind of profits? Is it then the same thing to receive a petition and to read in it' “I entreat you to permit me to export a small quantity of corn”; and one to this effect "1 entreat you to learn from Chry- sippus what is the administration of the world, and What place in it the rational animal holds, consider also who you are, and what is the nature 'of your good and bad.” Are these things like the other, do they require equal care, and - is it equally base to neglect these and those? Well, then, are we the only persons who are lazy and love sleep? No; but much rather you young men are. For We old men, when we see young men amusing themselves, are eager to play with them; and if i saw you active and zealous, much more should I be eager myself to join you in your serious pursuits. CHAPTER II. Of natural ofl‘ecrion WHEN he was visited by one of the magistrates, . Epictetus inquired of him about several partic- 1Marcus Aurelius, v 1; viii, rg. ulars, and asked if he had children and a wife . The man replied that he had 3 and Epictetus in- quired further, how he felt under the circum- stances- “Miserable,” the man said Then Epic— tetus asked, “In what respect,” for men do not marry and beget children in order to be wretchw ed, but rather to be happy “But I,” the man replied, “am so wretched about my children that lately, when my little daughter was sick and was supposed to be in danger, I could not . endure to stay with her, but I left home till a . person sent me news that she had recovered.” Well then, said Epictetus, do you think that you acted right? "I acted naturally,” the man replied. But convince me of: this that you acted naturally, and I will convince you that every- thing which takes place according to nature takes place rightly. “This is the case,” said the man, “with all or at least most fathers.” I do not deny .that' but the matter about which we are inquiring is whether such behaviour is right; for in respect to this matter We must say that tumours also come for the good of the body, because they do come; and generally we must say that to do wrong is natural, because nearly all or at least most of us do wrong. Do you show me then how ybur behaviour is nab ural. ”I cannot,” he said; “but do you rather show me how it is not according to nature and is not rightly done.” Well, said Epictctus, if We were inquiring about white and black, what criterion should We employ for distinguishing between them? ”The sight,” he said. And if about hot and cold, and hard and soft, what criterion? “The touch,” Well then, since we are inquiring about things which are according to nature, and those which are done rightly or not rightly, what kind of criterion do you thinkthat We should employ? "I do not know,” he said. And yet not to know the Criterion of colours and smellsLand also of tastes, is perhaps no great harm; but if a man do not know the criterion of good and bad, and of things according to nature and contrary to nature, does this seem to you a small harm? “The greatest harm.” Come tell me, do. all things which seem to some persons to be good and becoming rightly appear such; and at present as to Jews and Syr- ians and Egyptians and Romans, is it possible that the opinions of all of them in respect to food are right? “How is it possible?” he said. well, I suppose it is absolutely necessary that, if the opinions of the Egyptians are right, the opinions of the restmust be wrong: if the opin— ions of the Jews are right, thoseof the rest can-- not be right. “Certainly.” But where there is igriorance, there also there is want of learning and training in things which are necessary He assented to this. You then, said Epictetus, since you know this, for the future will employ your-‘ self seriously about nothing else, and will apply your mind to nothing else than to learn the criterion of thingswhich are according to ma; ture, and by using it also to determine each sev» eral thing. But in the present matter I have so much as this to aid you toward what you wish. Does affection to those of your family appear to you to be according to nature and to be good? “Certainly.” Well, is such affection natural and good, and is a thing consistent with reason not good? “By no means.” Is then that which is consistent with reason in contradiction withE affection? ”I think not.” You are right, for ifE it is otherwise, it is necessary that one of theE contradictions being according to nature, theE other must be contrary to nature. Is it not so? i “It is,” he said. Whatever, then, we shall dis—5 cover to be at the same time affectionate andE also consistent with reason, this We confidently El declare to be right and good. ”Agreed.” Well F- then to leave your sick child and to go away is E not reasonable, and I suppose that you will not E say that it is; but it remains for us to inquire if E it is consistent with affection. “Yes, let us con— E sidcr.” Did you, then, since you had an affec— E tionate disposition to your child, do right when E you ran off and left her; and has the mothe . no affection for the child? “Certainly, she has.” Ought, then, the mother also to have left her, or ought she not? ”She ought not.” And the nurse, does she love her? “She does ” Ought then, she also to have left her? “By no means.’ And the pedagogue, does he not love her? “He does love her.” Ought, then, he also to haVe de- serted her? and Iso should the child have been left alone and without help on account of the great affection of you, the parents, and of those about her, or should she have died in the hands of those who neither loved her not cared for her? “Certainly not.” Now this is unfair and unreasonable, not to allow those who have DISCOURSES, BOOK I 127 ".mwm. "u... “mum..." ".2 smmnzmmmmwi—r t J r i." mmmmmr-iwrflsnwnlmmumm mussels. mm :18 equal affection with yourself to do what you think to be proper for yourself to do because you have affection: It is absurd. Come then, if you- Were sick, would you wish your relations to be so affectionate, and all the rest, children and Wife, as to leave you alone and deserted? “By no means ” And Would you wish to be so loved by your own that through their excessive affection you would always be left alone in sickness? or for this reason would you rather pray, if it Were possible, to be loved by your enemies and deserted by them? But if this is so, it results that your behaviour was not at all an affectionate act. Well then, was it nothing which moved you and induced you to desert your child? and how is that possible? But it might be something of the kind which moved a man at Rome to wrap up his head while a horse was running which he favoured; and when contrary to expectation the horse won, he. required sponges to recover from his fainting fit. What then is the thing which moved? The exact discussion of this does not belong to the present occasion per— haps; but it is enough to be convinced of this, if what the philosophers say is true,- that we must not look for it anywhere without, but in all cases it is one and the same thing which is the cause of our doing or not doing something, of saying or not saying something, of being elated or depressed, of avoiding anything or pursuing' the very thing which is now the cause to me and to you, to you of coining to me and sitting and hearing, and to me of saying what I do say And what is this? Is it any other than our will to do so? “No other.” But if We had willed otherwise, what else should we have been doing than that which we willed to do? This, then, Was the cause of Achilles’ lamentation, not the death of Patroclus; for another man does not behave thus on the death of his companion; but it was because he chose to do so. And to you this was the very cause of you...
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