U.S._Middle_East_Policy_1945_to_Present.pdf - The Iraq War Encyclopedia Thomas R Mockaitis Editor Q ABC-CLIO Santa Barbara California \u2022 Denver

U.S._Middle_East_Policy_1945_to_Present.pdf - The Iraq War...

This preview shows page 1 out of 289 pages.

Unformatted text preview: The Iraq War Encyclopedia Thomas R. Mockaitis, Editor Q ABC-CLIO Santa Barbara, California • Denver, Colorado • Oxford, England 'i To the Newest Members of My Family: Jill Gamer Mockaitis Samantha Gilchrist Mockaitis ;right 2013 hy ABC-CLIO. LLC ights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval m, or transmitted. in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical. )Copying, recording. or otherwise. except for the inclusion of brief quotations in a w. without prior permission in writing from the publisher. ary of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data e Iraq War encyclopedia I Thomas R. Mockaitis. Editor. >ages em :ludes bibliographical references and index. 3N 978-0-313~38062-4ihard copy: alk. paper) -ISBN 978~0-313~38063~1 (ehook) aq War. 2003~2011-Encyclopedias. I. Mockaitis. Thomas R .. 1955~ editor. 1.76.17293 2013 2013008479 7044'303-dc23 l: 978~0~313~38062-4 iN: 978-0-313~38063~1 6 15 1-t 1.1 I 2 3 4 5 book is also available on the World Wide Web as an eBook. for details. -CLIO. LLC ~remona Drive. P.O. Box 1911 1 Barbara, California 93116-1911 book is printed on acid-free paper ,oo 1factured in the United States of America Contents List of Entries, ix Preface, xiii Overview, Causes X\' l~[ the Iraq War, .rix Consequences qfthe Iraq Wm: .rxiii Maps, x.\Tii Entries, I Chronology, 497 Bi!Jiiof(mphy, 503 Contributors. 511 Index, 515 vii List of Entries Abu Ghraib Bombs, Precision-Guided Air Defenses in Iraq, Iraq War Bradley Fighting Vehicle Air-Land Battle Doctrine Bremer, L. Paul, III Allawi, Iyad Brown, James Gordon al-Qaeda in Iraq Bush, George Walker Anbar Awakening Bush Doctrine Ansar al-l slam Central Intelligence Agency Antiaircraft Missiles, Iraqi Chalabi. Ahmed Abd al-Hadi Antitank Weapons Chemical Weapons and Warfare Armored Warfare, Persian Gulf and Iraq Wars Cheney, Richard Bruce ARROWHEAD RIPPEK, Chirac, Jacques Rene Operation Clinton, Hillary Rodham "Axis of Evil" Coalition Provisional Authority Aziz, Tariq Coercive Interrogation B-2 Spirit Containment Policy Baath Party Conway, James Terry Badr Organization Counterinsurgency Baghdad Counterterrorism Strategy, U.S. Baghdad, Battle for Cultural Imperialism, U.S. Basra Defense Intelligence Agency Basra, Battle for Delta Force Biological Weapons and Warfare Blackwater Democratization and the Global War on Terror Blix. Hans DESERT CROSSING, OPLAN BMP-1 Series Infantry Fighting Vehicles Explosive Reactive Armor Bombs. Cluster Fallujah ix I < x 1 List of Entries Fallujah, First Battle of Fallujah, Second Battle of List of Entries Mines and Mine Warfare, Land Rice, Condoleezza Missile Systems. Iraqi Rocket-Propelled Grenades Missiles, Cruise Rumsfeld, Donald Henry Mosul Sadr, Muqtada al- Mosul, Battle of Sadr City, Battle of Iraqi Insurgency Mullen, Michael Glenn Salafism Iraqi Police Forces Multinational Force, Iraq Sanchez, Ricardo S. Iraq Liberation Act Myers, Richard Bowman SEAL Teams Iraq Sanctions Act of 1990 Najaf, First Battle of Shari a Iraq Study Group Najaf, Second Battle of Shia Islam Islamic Dawa Party Nasiriyah, Battle of Shia Uprising Islamic Radicalism National Intelligence Council Shinseki. Eric Ken IRAQI FREEDOM, Operation, Coalition Naval Forces IRAQI FREEDOM, Operation. Ground Campaign Fatwa Faw Peninsula IRAQI FREEDO:Vt, Fayyad. Muhammad Jshaq alFedayeen Feith, Douglas Franks, Tommy Ray Gamer, Jay Montgomery Gates, Robert Michael Golden Mosque Bombing Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act Guantanamo Bay Detainment Camp Haass. Richard Nathan Haditha, Battle of Haditha Incident Hakim, Abd al-Aziz alHalliburton High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle Hormuz, Strait of Husaybah, Battle of Hussein. Qusay Hussein. Saddam Hussein, Uday Intelligence Interceptor Body Armor Iraq, Air Force Iraq, Army Iraq. History of, 1990 to Present Iraq. Sanctions on IRAQI FREEDOM, IRAQI FREEDOM, Operation Operation, Air Campaign IRAQI FREEDOM, Operation, Casualties of IRAQI FREEDOM, Operation. Coalition Ground Operation, Planning for Jafari, Ibrahim al- National Security Agency Sistani, Sayyid Ali Husayn al- Jihad National Security Council Special Air Service. United Kingdom Karbala, First Battle of Negroponte, John Dimitri Special Republican Guards Karbala, Second Battle of Neoconservatism STEEL CuRTAIN, Kerry. John Night- Vision Imaging Systems Stryker Brigades Kirkuk No-Fly Zones Suicide Bombings Sunni Islam Kurds Nuclear Weapons, Iraq's Potential for Building Kurds. Massacres of Obama. Barack Hussein, lJ Libby, I. Lewis Odierno, Raymond Lynch, Jessica Oil M-1 A 1 and M-1 A2 Abrams Main Battle Tanks Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries Mahdi Army Pace, Peter Mahmudiyah Incident Perle, Richard Majid al Tikriti, Ali Hassan al- Petraeus, David Howell Maliki. Nuri Muhammed Kamil Hasan al- PHANTOM STRIKE, Marsh Arabs PHANTOM THUNDER, Martyrdom Private Security Firms McCain. John Sidney, Ill Putin, Vladimir Vladimirovich McKiernan. David Deglan Ramadi, First Battle of Military Strategic Tactical Relay Satellite Ramadi, Second Battle of Kurdistan Democratic Party Communications System Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicles j, I Sunni Triangle Supreme Iraqi Islamic Council Surge, U.S. Troop Deployment, Iraq War T-62 Main Battle Tank T-72 Main Battle Tank Terrorism Tigris and Euphrates Valley Operation Regime Change Forces Operation Republican Guard Operation Tikrit Topography, Kuwait and Iraq Torture of Prisoners Umm Qasr Umm Qasr, Battle of United Kingdom, Air Force, Iraq War United Kingdom, Army, Iraq War United Kingdom. Marines, Iraq War UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission I xi - xii I List of Entries UN Security Council Resolution 1284 Vehicles, Unarmored UN Special Commission VIKING HAMMER, UN Weapons Inspectors War Correspondents U.S. Agency for International Development, War Powers Act Iraq Preface Operation Weapons of Mass Destruction U.S. Air Force, Iraq War Wilson, Joseph Carter, IV U.S. Army, Iraq War Wilson, Valerie Plame U.S. Coast Guard, Iraq War Wolfowitz, Paul Dundes U.S. Middle East Policy, 1945 to Present Woodward, Robert Upshur U.S. National Elections of 2004 Zawahiri, Ayman ai- U.S. National Elections of 2008 Zinni, Anthony Charles The Iraq War was a watershed in modern U.S. military history. The army that invaded Iraq in March 2003 differed markedly from the one that left the country in December 20 II. The invading army's equipment, organization, and doctrine belonged to the era of the Cold War for which it had been redesigned in 1970s. Built around heavy armored divisions equipped with M-IA Abrams tanks, it had been created to fight the Warsaw Pact in Germany's Fulda Gap. Traumatized by the experience of Vietnam, that army wanted nothing to do with unconventional operations, which it gladly delegated to the Special Forces. Forced to engage in unwanted peace operations during the 1990s, it welcomed the election of a president who promised to eschew further adventures in nation building. Counterinsurgency (COIN) was the dirtiest word in its lexicon. The last war it wanted to fight was the one it got in the Tigris-Euphrates Valley. During the next eight years that army went through a profound transformation. Faced with a growing insurgency, it produced its first new COIN manual since the Vietnam War. It reorganized its cumbersome conventional divisions into smaller more ftexible units that could be assembled into brigade combat teams tailored to specific tasks. A U.S. Navy, Iraq War U.S. Special Operations Command I I I new generation of junior officers and senior noncommissioned officers (NCOs) gained ,. combat experience that far exceeded that of the generals who commanded them. Fortunately, those generals had the good sense to delegate responsibility to the young men and women in the field. A new strategy called the Anbar Awakening turned the tide of the insurgency as Americans trained Iraqi forces to handle their own security. The story of the Iraq War has been told and retold over the past decade by the men and women who fought there, by the reporters who covered the conflict, and by the analysts who tried to make sense of events. The process of analysis has, however, only begun. Much about the war has become clearer in the past couple of years; more will come into focus in the years and decades ahead. The process of understanding has been furthered by the many researchers and writers who have contributed to a growing body of literature on the subject. This volume of essays hopes to add to that literature by providing a comprehensive overview of the war, valuable to scholars but comprehensible to ordinary readers. Its authors come from a variety of disciplines, each bringing a unique perspec- tive to the topic about which he or she writes. I hope that as much as it informs contemporary readers it will also inspire future analysts to delve more deeply into each of the topics it addresses and so further our understanding of this important conflict. L-----------------~---------xiii________ Overview The Iraq War was a decade in the making. The neoconservatives who entered the White House with George W. Bush had long considered eliminating President Saddam Hussein to be unfinished business from the 1991 Gulf War. In his debate with Vice President AI Gore, then governor Bush complained that the Iraqi dictator remained in power despite his defiance of numerous United Nations (UN) resolutions. As a new president put in office by the most controversial election in recent memory, however, he could not hope to take the United States to war with Iraq without some pretext. Containment kept Hussein in check, and as long as he posed no immediate threat to his neighbors, it would be difficult to garner sufficient public and political support for removing him from power. The September I I , 200 I , terrorist attacks changed the situation dramatically. Although few people believed that the Iraqi dictator had anything to do with al-Qaeda, arguments for removing him became much easier to sell in the paranoia of the postSeptember II world. The administration had first to deal with the Tali ban, but within a year of liberating Kabul they turned their attention to Baghdad. The White House played up a dubious terrorist threat posed by Iraq. Intelligence reports that have since been discredited raised the unlikely specter of a nuclear-armed Saddam XV Hussein. When critics challenged this conclusion, the administration warned of Iraq's alleged chemical and biological weapons programs, which, it claimed, might fall into the hands of terrorists. This threat too seemed dubious, so at the end of the day Washington invaded Iraq to liberate its people tfom tyranny and reinvent their country as a bastion of democracy in the Middle East. Like so many leaders before him, President Bush promised the American people that the war would be short. The ensuing conflict, in fact, lasted eight long years and cost the lives of more than 4,000 U.S. servicemen and women as well as untold billions of taxpayer dollars. The Iraqi dead have yet to be counted. The conflict unfolded in roughly four phases. From March to May 2003 coalition forces launched a conventional invasion of Iraq. During the spring and summer of that year the United States and its allies faced a growing insurgency that increased in intensity through June of 2007. The surge strategy and the Anbar Awakening took the next two years to defeat the insurgency. From then unti I the withdrawal in December 2011 U.S. and coalition forces concentrated on training Iraq's army and police in preparation for the transition to complete autonomy. Planning for invasion presumed a swift march to Baghdad followed by a brief period of transition to democracy and a prompt ~ ' xvi I Overview withdrawal of American troops. Because he did not wish to engage in a protracted nation-building operation requiring a large occupation force, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld kept the invasion force as small possible. Fewer than 150,000 troops made up the invasion force, more than enough to defeat Saddam Hussein's hollow military, but not nearly enough to occupy and stabilize a country the size of Iraq. The Pentagon also sorely neglected planning for phase four stability operations, which they did not want to undertake. As anticipated, the U.S. Army and Marine Corps supported by British troops easily defeated the Iraqi military following a brief but intense air campaign dubbed "shock and awe." As they advanced toward Baghdad, however, Iraqi Army units did not surrender en masse or return to barracks as requested. Many units simply melted away, their soldiers going home with their small arms. U.S. forces also encountered organ- ized guerrillas, the Fedayeen Saddam. trained and equipped by the dictator to impede the invasion. Unemployed soldiers and the regime's trained partisans would be a major source of insurgent recruitment during the occupation. This danger did not become immediately clear until much later. On April 5, 2003, U.S. forces entered Baghdad; two days later the British took Basra; and a week after that the Pentagon declared an end to major ground operations. On May I President Bush landed on the deck of the U.S.S. Abraham Lincoln and gave his famous "mission accomplished" speech. During the spring and summer of 2003 discontent among the Iraqi people intensified. Far from being prepared to run the country once Saddam was gone, the Iraqi government collapsed. Widespread looting and lawlessness resulted from the power vacuum. Iraq's already weakened infrastructure broke down Overview completely in many areas. High unemployment exacerbated by L. Paul Bremer III's de-Baathification and demobilization orders fueled resentment by dismissing without pay thousands of party officials and military personnel. At the same time a long oppressed Shia majority asserted itself against the Sunni minority. The Kurds in northern Iraq had even less love for the government in Baghdad, having suffered brutal repression by Hussein, including a poison gas attack in the 1980s. The U.S.-led coalition lacked the requisite number of troops, the experience, and the training to police a country of 26 million people. To make matters worse, foreign mujahideen entered the country to fight the invaders. The country slid rapidly and inexorably into a toxic a blend of insurgency, civil war, and terrorism. The United States took a long time to identify the problem and even longer to develop an appropriate strategy for dealing with it. For most of the first year in Iraq, the White House insisted that regime holdouts were responsible for the escalating violence. In keeping with this mistaken conclusion, U.S. forces concentrated on rounding up regime leaders, the famous deck of cards with pictures of the fugitives. The futility of this approach soon became clear. On December 13, 2003. they captured Saddam Hussein. His arrest, trial, and execution had no effect on the insurgency, which continued to grow. Far from withdrawing troops, Washington had to deploy more of them along with thousands of private contractors to provide secu- rity and rebuild the country. In 2006 the situation began to change, though few at the time recognized it. That year the Pentagon released its first new counterinsurgency manual since the Vietnam War. On the ground, American units began working with Sunni sheiks to rid the country of the hated mujahideen, particularly the forces of al-Qaeda in the Land of the Two Rivers (generally called al-Qaeda in Iraq). These measures notwithstanding. The Report of the Iraq Study Group released in the fall of 2006 painted a grim picture of the situation in Iraq. In response to this study President Bush announced a "surge" of some 30,000 combat troops to defeat the insurgency. In January 2007 he appointed General David Petraeus to command coalition land forces in Iraq. As commander of the JOist Airborne Division north of Baghdad, Petraeus had enjoyed considerable success countering the insurgents. He was also involved in producing the new counterinsurgency manual. By early 2009 the United States had decisively turned the corner on the insurgency. U.S. advisers could now devote the bulk of their effort to preparing Iraqi forces to assume full responsibility for the security of their country. In February 2009 newly elected president Barack Obama announced that combat operations in Iraq would end by August 31, 2010. The Pentagon withdrew units specifically designated for combat by the stipulated withdrawal date. By agreement with the Iraqi government, the remaining U.S. forces were to be withdrawn by December 18, 2011. Iraqi prime minister Nuri alMaliki and President Obama wanted to extend the deadline, but the idea met with too much opposition to be implemented. Iraq remains a fragile state but, contrary to worstcase fears, the country has not degenerated into renewed civil war. The complex political system created by its new constitution allows provinces and regions sufficient autonomy to allay the fears of ethnic persecution. The United States continues to provide aid and support to the Baghdad government, and maintains a large military presence in the Persian Gulf that could intervene should the security situation in the country deteriorate. I xvii While it is difficult to assess the consequences of such a recent conflict, some con- clusions can be drawn. The war lasted much longer and cost considerably more in blood and treasure than the White House anticipated. According to the Department of Defense, 4,485 servicemen and women lost their lives in Iraq.' Estimates of civilian deaths related to the war range from Ill ,000 to over 121,000 2 The economic cost of the war was also high. The Congressional Budget Office put the total spent at $806 billion, while President Obama maintains the war cost over $1 trillion-' The indirect costs of the war are harder to gauge hut no less significant. The money spent on the war, which the Bush administration kept out of the budget during its time in office, contributed significantly to the burgeoning U.S. national debt. Removing Saddam Hussein from power eliminated the threat he posed to his neighbors. but it also eliminated the principal means of holding Iran in check. It will be years before the balance of power in the region is restored. The impact of the war on the U.S. military continues to unfold. The re-election of President Obama in November 2012 will prevent the expansion of conventional forces promised by the Republicans. At the same time the administration has already begun the "pivot to Asia" designed to counter Chinese dominance of the region. These factors suggest that the U.S. military will continue to evolve as a hybrid force, more capable of waging war across the conflict spectrum than it was in 2003. There will be more Special Operations forces and more unmanned aircraft. These changes derive in part from experience gained in Iraq and should make America's armed forces better suited to the contingencies of the contemporary world. r I. I ' xviii I Overview Notes 1. Iraq War Casualty Database, available at http:/I nrcdata. ap. org/casualties/default. aspx '?user name=casualty&password=2005battle, accessed December 24, 2012. 2. Iraq Body Count, available at 3. Daniel Kurtzleben, "What did the Iraq War cost? More than you think?." USA News. December 15, 2011, available at Causes of the Iraq War .com/news/articles/20 11/12/15/what-did-the-iraq accessed -war-cost-more-than- you-th ink. December 24. 2012. .iraqbodycount.org/, accessed December 24, 2012. In the year and half between the September II, 2001, terrorist attacks and the invasion of Iraq, President George W. Bush argued persistently for war. The president and administrative officials trotted out an array of justifications for war. Some of their reasons had been presented before, but the terrorist attacks on Washington. DC, and New York City gave them new urgency. The claim t...
View Full Document

  • Left Quote Icon

    Student Picture

  • Left Quote Icon

    Student Picture

  • Left Quote Icon

    Student Picture