Learning-from-trumans-decision-the-atomic-bomb-and-japans-surrender.pdf

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DUCATION
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BOUT
ASIA
Volume 11, Number 1 Spring 2006
A
ugust 6 through 9 of 2005 marked the sixtieth anniversary of
the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. These
bombings stand as a watershed event in modern history
because they brought to a decisive conclusion the greatest and most
devastating conflict in human history, and because they ushered in a
new age, the era of nuclear weapons and
the policies of “massive retaliation” and
“mutual assured destruction”—which at
the height of the cold war brought with
them the very real potential for the destruc-
tion of modern civilization in a large-scale
nuclear war. The decision to use the bomb
has generated profound and continuing
controversy among historians, military
analysts, scientists, educators, and con-
cerned citizens. Some have justified the
bombings on the basis of military need or
the imperatives of global power politics,
while others condemn them as at best
unnecessary and therefore tragic, and at
worst as a wartime atrocity. The controver-
sy ultimately hinges on whether the deci-
sion to use atomic weapons on Hiroshima
and Nagasaki was based on military neces-
sity or on political expedience. Like many
important historical controversies, the
analysis of the decision is complex and
multifaceted, and requires a historical
review of the situation in the summer of
1945.
Germany surrendered on May 8, 1945
leaving Japan alone in an increasingly
hopeless war against the United States and
its allies. By the summer of 1945, most of
Japan’s navy was lying on the bottom of
the Pacific Ocean, and its armies were
scattered throughout the remnants of the
country’s short-lived empire. The Japan-
ese army was bogged down in China, had
been defeated in numerous costly island
battles, and American forces were now
aiming directly for the Japanese homeland.
Okinawa had been lost to Japan in an
enormously bloody battle in April, May,
and June, and since March, waves of
American bombers had relentlessly pound-
ed and incinerated much of urban Japan.
Deprived of overseas sources of oil, iron, coal, and even food,
Japan’s wartime economy was grinding to a halt: it could no longer
produce ships or airplanes, and there was almost no aviation fuel left
for the 6,000 to 8,000 airplanes that were held in reserve for final
kamikaze attacks in defense of Japan’s home islands.
1
By August,
the Japanese people were reduced to near
starvation, over 330,000 civilians had been
killed in the air raids since March, with
over 500,000 additional casualties, and mil-
lions more were made homeless by the fire
bombings. The United States Strategic
Bombing Survey Report revealed that from
March through August, 104,000 tons of
bombs had been dropped on sixty-six urban
areas, destroying approximately forty per-
cent of Japan’s urban infrastructure.
2
Despite the overwhelming evidence
that defeat was inevitable, Japan’s Prime
Minister Suzuki apparently rejected the
Potsdam Declaration, an ultimatum calling
for Japan’s unconditional surrender issued
on July 26, 1945,
3
with the phrase
mokusatsu , which could be interpreted