exam2_answer.pdf - \u7cfb\u7d1a\uff1a \u5b78\u865f\uff1a \u59d3\u540d\uff1a Microeconomics I Quiz \u2160\u3001Multiple choices(60

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1 Microeconomics I Quiz 12/21/2006 Multiple choices (60%) ሗ將答案ᄳ在本大ᕚ最後面的表格之中，否則不ၾ計分。 1. Suppose a football team is down 5 points and faces a 4th and goal with 1 second left in the “big game”. It can either run or pass. The defense can play for the run or play for the pass. Suppose the payoff matrix below exists and notes the probability of the offense scoring, given the offense’s and defense’s choices Offense Pass Run Defense Pass .2 .8 Run .8 .2 The offense’s dominant strategy is to a. run. b. pass. c. pick at random with equal probability. 2. Suppose teen A and teen B are smitten with each other but neither knows of the other’s feelings. Suppose the teachers at their school organize a dance. The “payoff” is based on whether their advances are rebuffed or accepted. If they both “declare” they get positive utility but if they are rebuffed they face humiliation (significantly negative payoff) As teens are, they mildly enjoy humiliating others. Finally, suppose both choose the outcome that maximizes their worst outcome, that is they want to avoid the humiliation. (A’s Payoff, B’s Payoff) A Declare Ignore/Rebuff B Declare 10,10 1,-10 Ignore/Rebuff -10,1 0,0 Teen A’s dominant strategy is to a. declare. c. choose at random. b. rebuff/ignore. 系級： ኪ號： 姓名：