Bulliet_TheCrisisWithinIslam[1]

Bulliet_TheCrisisWithinIslam[1] - Article 18 ' The Crisis...

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Unformatted text preview: Article 18 ' The Crisis Within Islam Who speaks for Islam? The events of September 11, which left the world waiting for a decisive repudiation of terrorism by Islam’s leaders, give that question fresh urgency. Answering it will requirethe resolution of a century-old crisis that has silenced many of those who speak for the Muslim majority. by Richard W. Bulliet Islam is a religion of- peace, President George Bush has de- clared. The imam at the local mosque has likely offered the same ‘ assurance, as has your Muslim neighbor or coworker. Yet many in the West remain suspicions that Islam is not at all a peaceful faith, and that the cdsmmfianed‘bynéi‘septembén l. attacks ,_ is not just-a agifigi'iéfiufirisifi Etta “clash of civilizations.” It’s not-hard to assessment; 6mg bin Laden, v‘vho be- came the world’s best-known Mushm uring e s e- Tum-w»..— \ \vm-r-«u ,4; cltfitéfl’flfatflthegnis no path open to a believipwgpr‘sul‘im except ; . jifiigflflflfifsflgsaMLflEUuimgtates. Islamic authorities who refuse to join him, bin Laden said, are betraying the faith. At the same time, the few prominent Muslims who have dis- owned the terrorism perpetrated in Islam’s name on September 11 and actively affirmed its peaceful character have been drowned out by the silence of the many others who have not, or who have in their confusion failed to condemn unequivocally bin Laden’s acts. _, -/ This strange silence does not reflect theattitude of traditional ‘ .- Islam but is a painful manifestation of31_c_lis_is_9_f_anxho:ity that has been bu’ A ' within Islam furra century. It isthis crisis that allowed Laden, despite his lack of a formal religious educa-' tion or an authoritative religious position, to assume the role of lthe traditional leaders who should be in a position to disqualify Lor overrule a man who does not speak—or act+for Islam. Today‘s crisis grows in part out of the structure of Islam it- selftaufaith‘without denoniinations,\hierarchies, and central-‘ i195; mfigtpns. The absence of such structures he source of strength that has permitted the faith to adag conditions and win converts around the world. But it weakness that makes it difficult for Muslims to come and speak with one voice on important issues—to sa_ and what is not true Islam. Islam’s structural weakness has been immeasurabl fied by a series of historical forces that have gradually mised the authority of its-traditional religious leade Middle East and elsewhere. The imams and mufi scholars) who once shaped the Worldviews of ordinary and confidently articulated the meaning of the faith h overshadowed by more innovative and often radica with much shallower roots in tradition. Hundredsofrn /ordinary’_flMl_uslnnsieeL1haLthey~understantheirrelig ’\ spokesman forgthevworld’s Muslims. The crisis has Gh’d‘éfifii‘fied. i ization of traditional Muslim_authorities @L‘flfll» and__t.h§tj£ providesno justification for derous crashing of airlinersvingqathe Worldilfrade Cents Pentagoniliut until Islam’s crisis of authority is resolv people will have no voice, and public confusion ab« Islam really stands for will persist. ,5“ The crisis has three related historical causes: then over the past ana'a firifiéf‘r‘i‘se of new audléritieswifih. infsiior on but greater skill inuusingqprint and, more recently, e'. media; and” thee-spread of mass. literacy whichmade the challengers’ writings :accessiblegg “ Laudiences. #3., , 84 \’_H \ l t een a I local also a gether 'hat is tagni- mpro— in the (legal lslims .gures ms of 1 per- mur- 1d the these what The deepest roots of the crisis go back to the early 19th centu- ry, when the Muslim world was forced to begin coming to grips with the challenge of European imperialism. Governments in these countries responded by embracing a variety of reforms based on European models. This response began in Egypt and me Ottoman Empire (which both escaped the imperial yoke) in me early 19th century; spread to Iran, Tunisia, and Morocco by the end of the century; and was then embraced in many coun- tries during the era of decolonization after World War II. In sub- ject lands—including India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Algeria, and West Africa—European colonial governments imposed similar reforms from abdve. Strongly influenced by the example of European anticleri- (galism, which seemed to 19th-century leaders in Egypt and the Ottoman Empire to be an essential element in the making of Eu- ropean might, these leaders moved to strip traditional Muslim religious authorities of their institutional and financial power. Later, popular leaders such as Mustafa Kemal Ataturk (188 l— 1938) in Turkey and Hafez al—Assad (1928-2001) in Syria, con- tinued the attack in the name of secular nationalism. By secu: however,_ meant priot,.separation..of. chmchiafidlstat’e. L but supiiéis,iqn9ttflishu£9h bathe state~ For centuries, the traditional religious authorities had inter— preted and administered the law in Muslim lands. The reformers ' replaced Islamic sharia with legal codes of European inspira- tion, and lawyers trained in the new legal drinking took the place of religiously trained judges and jurisconsults in new Eu- ropean-style courts. The 19th-century Egyptian and Ottoman reformers also es- tablished new schools to train military officers and government officials. These elite institutions, which were to serve as models for most mass school systems in the Middle East after World War II, taught modern subjects such as science and foreign lan-_ guages—though, signicantly, little in the way of liberal arts— and worked to instill a secular outlook in their students. The tra- ditional Islamic schools were discontinued, downgraded, or stripped of funding. Another traditional element that lost prominence in 19th- Article 18. The Crisis Within lslarr centralizing its administration in a government ministry, the later Ottoman pragtiggputfmancialsgmmljnihe‘hands of the eligious institutions now were subject to government pressure (hate. Mosque off—191.31%. teachers...an€1 9therSEIPPi9¥in man) 1' i century Muslim society due to the opposition of refomiist gov- ' ernments was the ubiquitous Sufi brotherhoods—mass reli— gious organizations that held out the promise of a mystical union with God. The secular leaders of the modernizing nations feared that the Sufi sheiks, with their otherworldly perspectives and intellectual independence, might become a significant source of resistance to reform. But the decline of Sufism left a Spiritual vacuum-that nationalist zeal ultimately fell far short of filling. In many parts of the Islamic world after 1800, governments t00k control of the financial endowments that mosques,-semi— Hades, and other religious institutions had amassed over the Years from the contributions of the faithful. Many of these en- dOWments were considerable, and in Egypt, Iran, and other Fountries had had the effect of gradually concentrating a signif- lCant share of the national wealth under religious control. Con- flSeating this resource, as Egypt did early in the 19th century, or 85 This slow. but persistent assault on the foundations of reli~ gious authority diminished the stature and influence of tradi- tional religious leaders in public life. Many ordinary Muslim: grew. todistrustthe prOnouncements of “their-religious leaders Were their views. shaped by religious - conscience and learning or by the need to curry favor with the, govermnent officials wht controlled their purse strings? By the 1930s the sun clearly was setting on the old authorities. ‘qu Even as governments in the Middle East and elsewhere wen hammering at the sources of traditional religious authority, 1 powerful technological revolution struck a second blow. Print ing technology, which had begun to transform European societg in the 15th century, had its first impact in the Islamic religion: world only in the second half of the 19th century (though gov emment and the technical fields were affected somewhat earli er). For centuries, the lines of religious authority within Islan had been formed by personal links between teachers and thei disciples. Now this traditional mode of preserving, refining, ant transmitting ideas faced competition from writers, editors, am publishers with little or no formal religious training and few tie to established teachers. They became authorities simply by vir me of putting their words into print. A Muslim in Egypt COlllt become a devoted follower of a writer in Pakistan without eve meeting him or anyone else who had met him. Al-Manar (The Minaret), a magazine published in Cairo b; Rashid Rida between 1898 and 1935, provides a typical ex ample of how this new trade in religious ideas worked. Rida hat studied in both an Ottoman state school with a “modern” cunic ulurn and an Islamic school, but he wielded his influence as : writer and editor. In the pages of Al-Manar thousands of Mus lims around the world first encountered the modemist ideas 0 Rida’s mentor, Muhammad Abduh, an advocate of Islarn’ compatibility with modern science and of greater independenc- in Muslim thought. But Rida soon took the magazine in anothe direction, advocating Arab nationalism and eventually em bracing the religious conservatism of Saudi Arabia. By tradition, a Muslim teacher’s authority rested on his mas tery of many centuries of legal, theological, and ethical though! But as lawyers, doctors, economists, sociologists, engineers and educators spewed forth articles, pamphlets, and books 0 the Islamic condition, this ancient view lost force. After Worli War II, the most popular, innovative, and inspiring thinkers i the Islamic world boasted secular rather than religious educa tional backgrounds. (This is still the case. Bin Laden, for exam. ple, was trained as an engineer; his associate Ayman a] Zawahiri was a surgeon; and their ideological predecessc Sayyid Qutb was an Egyptian schoolteacher.) 7 Because radio and television were under strict ghve’mmer control in most Muslim countries, these new thinkers ex ANNUAL EDITIONS pounded their ideas in print—at least until the advent of audio- withm‘ the Muslim world. While the new authoritic and Videocassettes made other mediums possible. The Islamic fer to the old, the old feel compelled to endorse 2 Revolution of 1979 in Iran brought worldwide prominence not rivals’ ideas in order to seem up to date and reta only to Ayatollah Khomeini, an authority of the old type who The locus of debate thus has been steadily shiftin used books and audiotapes to spread his views, but also to the the new authorities. sociologist Ali Shariati, whose'writings and spellbinding ora- Local imams and other religious officials are a]: tory galvanized Iran’s university students, and the economist (in a way their rivals usually are not) on their nati Abolhasan Bani Sadr, who was elected president of the new 15- [merit They are caught in a three-way squeeze betv lamic Republic in 1981. In Sudan, lawyers Mahmoud Mu- ment interests, their religious training, and . hammad Taha and Hasan Turabi gained large followings; the [teachings of their rivals. This helps explain the str philosophers Hasan Hanafi in Egypt, and Muhammad Arkoun that has prevailed since September 11. Some tra in Algeria both propounded influential interpretations of Islam. gious figures have chosen to say nothing. Some ha‘ ' ' mitted the evil of terrorism while denying tha Muslims had anything to do with the attacks. So The new thinkers of the past half-century have offered a wide sorted to anti~American rhetoric. And some have variety of ideas. Some have called for a return to life as it was the terrorist acts but stopped short of recognizir lived in Muhammad’s time (though they often disagree about demning the instigators. what seventh-century life was like) and disparaged the teach— This failure of the traditional leadership has left ings of scholars from later centuries. Others have joined bin erywhere in a quandary. They know what their fa Laden in preaching terrorist violence as the solution to Islam’s them, and they think this meaning should be ob" problems. Still others, such as Rashid Ghannushi in Tunisia and eryone. They do not pray five times a day, fast durir. Abbassi al-Madani in Algeria, have called for the creation of 13— make the pilgrimage to Mecca, and live modest, pe; lamic political parties and for their open competition ,with other working lives for the secret purpose of destroying ‘ parties in free and democratic elections. In'Iran, President Mu— ilization and slaughtering Americans. They find the hammad Khatarni leads a powerful, democratically oriented re- of such violent ideas with ‘their religion odious form movement. g ' terous-and threatening if they happen to live in It is also true, however, that some of the leaders who capital- States. Yet nobody seems to speak for them. ized on the new media to build large followings were both ex- This is not to suggest that giving voice to the fe tremists and formally trained religious figures. Khomeini is the dinary Muslims would somehow release a hidden most obvious example; Egypt’s Sheik Umar Abdur-rahman, support for America’s global preeminence and its pt who is languishing in an American prison since being con- Middle East and other regions. Many, if not most,l victed for his role in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, is highly critical of these policies. Those with the st: ‘ another. American feelings applauded the events of Septen The final element in the making of today’s crisis was the de- praised bin Laden for launching them——even, in : cision by the newly independent states of the post-World War II while shuddering at the thought of living in a wori era to pursue compulsory education and mass literacy. The by his religious vision. But these supporters of ten young Muslims who came of age in the developing world prominently featured on television, do not represent during the 1960s thus had the tools to read what the new author- majority. Indeed, a good number of the Muslim wo it'es were writing. Because their schooling included minimum gists for terror are not themselves religious people. Fr‘rposure to the traditional religious'curriculum and texts—and In any event, opposition to US. policies is hard in many cases admonitions by their government teachers not to to the Islamic world. No one should mistake politic put too much stock in religious scholarship—they did not feel religious ones—millions of non-Muslims (inclu obliged to follow the dictates of the old authorities. And they Americans) voice similar criticisms of. the United appreciated the contemporary vocabulary and viewpoints of the. Americans to want Muslims to repudiate terrorism new Islamic writers. So long as nationalism offered them the its authors is reasonable. To want them to agree whc promise of- a better fixture, they remained loyal to their political with everything America does in the world is unrea leaders and governments. But when the nationalists’ dreams What MuslimsJack-invthis'moment‘of'crisisis ‘a failed and the future dimmed, as it did in most Muslim countries -sive‘,‘ anggnequivocal.religiousauthorityabb to .dec during the 19708, people looked elsewhere. for hope and inspi—. killing of inn‘ocentnsbypterrwqr‘isft‘guttacks $ngng t ration, and they didn’t have to look far. 0 eip‘tai'fi' Show Muslims can stand firmly agains Wfifiéfif'éééfnifiéitb srfir‘Esiand authority itself is in question, the middle give L. [Traditional Islam is far from dead. Many Muslims Still stand firmly by the legal opinions atwas) and moral guidance of tra- ditionally educated muftis and the orthodox teachings of the History suggests that Islam will overcome its cum ..-...,._.. .. .... ..~...,_.._.,..w,__‘_~~_ “hm “‘vw mamséf'ifiéifia‘ésr mosques. Butflthgtrtomenmmwsgems to be authority, just as it has overcome a number of other . with the newsrng an unusual dynami past. The first of these arose soon after the proph 86 mad’s death in AD. 632. Later in the seventh century, as the generation that had personally known Muhammad died off, the Muslim community split over several issues, particularly the proper line of succession to the caliphate that had been estab- lished after Muhammad’s death. (It was from this crisis that the Sunni-Shiite split grew.) Civil wars erupted. The crisis of au- thority was temporarily resolved by the consolidation of a mil- itary state, the Umayyad Caliphate, and the suppression of dissent. The caliphate shifted the seat of power from Medina, in Arabia, to Damascus, and quickly extended its rule over a vast empire that stretched from Spain in the west to what is now Pa- kistan in the east In the middle of the ninth century, as the conversion of non- Arab peoples brought into Islam people bearing the traditions of Christianity, Judaism, Zoroastrianism, Buddhism, and Greek . philosophy, Islam again entered a period of uncertainty. The ca— liphate had passed into the hands of the Abbasids, so named be- cause they claimed descent from the Prophet’s uncle Abbas. The caliphate, its seat now in Baghdad, flourished—this period was in many ways the apex of Arab civilization. But when a new religious challenge arose, the caliph’s resort to force failed. Against him was arrayed a new class of religious scholars who maintained that Muslims should follow the tradition of the prophet Muhammad, as preserved in a multitude of sayings and anecdotes, ' rather than the dictates of a caliph in Baghdad. Today’s declining Islamic authorities date the beginnings of their power to this confrontation. Under the leadership of the scholar Ahmad ibn Hanbal and others who followed him, it was eventually agreed that Muslims would look to a consensus of scholars—in theory, throughout the Muslim lands, but in prac— tice within each locality—for guidance on how to live moral lives. (Ahmad ibn Hanbal himself was founder of one of the four main schools of Islamic law within the Sunni tradition.) A fresh crisis of authority arose, however, as it became evi— dent that the sayings of the Prophet were too numerous and in— ternally contradictory for all of them to be true. 'A new group of i scholars set'out to establish rules for determining which sayings ,5 were most likely tgubgntrire, and they gradually Collected the most reliable of them into books. Nevertheless, several centu- ries__el_apsed before thesebooks of “stimuli traditions won rec- ognition as the sole authoritative guides to Muslim behavior. Thegkey to this recognitignwas the spreadigigizrhand 13th centuries of?“"‘“ar¢agigiamc seminarresrthat had ap— Peared in Iran in the 10(1) Ettamry: Institutions such as al-AZhar ' Cairo, the Zaituna Mosque in Tunis, the Qarawiyin Madrasa In Fez, and clusters of seminaries in Mecca and in Ottoman Istanbul and Bursa gained particular eminence. The madrasas adapted the, authoritative compilations ofpgplfirentic as r»-- new... P._.»"», .. .. __.......-._... ~a filndamental part omen curricula, along with instruction in the Koran and the Agabrg'lgrjrgjgage. “outer” smearing were gradually forgotten. ~The Muslim religious schools of today, Whether grand edifices like al-Azhar and the Shiite seminarics at Qum in Iran, or the myriad humble madrasas of Pakistan and Pfsantrens of Indonesia, have roots in the resolution of this cri— SFSQf aumgntythatarose mgrethaniéQdfliéégééoT Article 18..The Crisis Within Islam Even as the madrasas were being established, a new up- rm-..” hwmmnmg. It grew out of the facing of many common people—including those in late—converting rural areas of the Middle East and more recently Islamized lands in West Africa, the Balkans, and Central, South, and Southeast Asia—— that Islam had become too legalistic and impersonal_under the guidance of the scholars and madrasas. Religious practice, mese~Mhshrns felt, had become-ailinatter of obeying the sharia and little else. The rise of Sufi brotherhoods beginning in the ' 13th century was a response to this popular demand for a more intense spiritual and communal life. Born in the Middle East, Sufism spread quickly throughout the Muslim world. The Sufis made room for music, dancing: chanting, and other manifesta- tions of devotion that were not permitted in the mosque. But Sufi practices did not supersede conventional worship; the sheiks who led the Sufi brotherhoods provided religious guid- ance that paralleled rather than opposed the authority exercised by the established scholars and seminaries. One can see in this capsule history of Islamic religious devel- pment a demonstration of the fact that a faith with no central I institution for determining what is good or bad practice is bound to experience periodic crises of authority. Buthistoryalaso demonstrates that the Muslim religious commurntyligsmer- come every crisis it has . a: x. ' Houflmmfi§£n§llh§reis.no.wayto rebuild—re- ligious authority on “1%. The modern state, the magi—{media and the modern citizenmrnnst be part of 3111391?- tion. Islani’s history suggests that any new institutions that grow out of the current crisis will not supplant those already in place. Seminaries will continue to impart to their students a mastery of fundamental legal and interpretive texts, and their graduates will continue to issue weighty legal opinions. Because Muslims re— tain a historical memory of being unified under a caliphate—a powerful state predicated on Islamic teachings—the dream of Is- lamic political unity will not disappear. Any response to the current crisis must appeal to the many Muslims an mammal-seeders; not been met'by she. violgrwiffitalitariann philosophy of bin Laden and his auras? ‘resents onlyuone of possible responsestthei-sar—e inore promising. Throughout the Muslim world organizations modeled (con- sciously or unconsciously) on the ancient Sufi brotherhoods but expounding this-worldly interpretations of Islam have been able to attract thousands of members. (A revival of Sufism itself seems to be underway in Iran, Central Asia, and other areas.) In some ways resembling political parties, but dedicated as well to the pursuit of social welfare programs, these fraternal organiza- tions often present themselves as prototypes of a modern, non- clerical form of Islamic government. The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, the Islamic Salvation Front in Algeria, and the Hezbollah (Party of God) in Lebanon differ widely in their in— terpretations of Islam, but they share a willingness to eitist in a modern political world of participatory institutions. The Islarhic Salvation Front actually triumphed in the first round of _A1— -.:\—...v ‘13:. gram .t. ANNUAL EDITIONS a; geria’s 1991 parliamentary elections and failed to take power Finally, another source of innovation may be the su only because the Algerian military stepped in. The country has numbers of secular__Muslims who —— contrary to the been convulsed by violence ever since. —liye_not onlypllgidethelraditimalhoun No one can safely predict whether the participation of such the Islamic world but withinqthcflm. Secular Muslim groups in an electoral system would further the spread, of de- hEi/Teheeii'EieBB‘Eitiiig'EEEEa of turath (heritage) as a mocracy or simply give them a platform for preaching noxious intersection between the past and a present in which tl doctrines. Hezbollah leader Sheik Muhammad Fadlallah, for ulars of religious law and practice seem irrelevant. In t example, has embraced the concept of a secular, multiparty po- the “modern” Muslim intellectuals, these secularists art litical system in Lebanon, even at the cost of alienating some of to create legitimacy for nonobservant forms of Islam. the support within Iran for his Shiite group. But Hezbollah orig- inally rose to prominence in Lebanon through violence during the country’s years of civil war (and it has continued its cam— paign against Israel). Still, the fact‘that such groups formally ad- re S 01 vi n g today, s crisis of authority. There is little p( vocate paIfiCipatm-y governing institutions—and that the that nonobservant Muslim intellectuals ideolo ; . . . . . , gues o. Islarmc Repubhc of Iran has developed such Insututlons—does Political P .65, thinkers attached to centers and inst“ Although these modemizers within contemporai seem to work at cross purposes as much as they work in some sort of fusion among them seems the most likely gwe reason for hope‘ teachers in government-sponsored religious schools ' see eye to eye on everything. But in the past, discor Islam was often resolved when Muslim leaders agre W‘ spect divergent views while recognizing a common it y “ca ona mvigwc s at must m c n" the welfare of the global Muslim community. Muhamr denfly of 56th “ad‘gfletLaififithl—HWCS .and formal government self declared, in one of his most often-cited sayings, ‘ ,.- Viv-emuvhu- F! M immuemm-Nwmxghh , L These institutions provide venues “for modern Muslim intellectuals to develop new ideas about con- temporary issues. They are as likely to be found in London, Par- Bht mole immediate aetiOh is heeded than the deVeto is, and Washington as in Cairo and Istanbu1_uhd0hvs long-term concord within Islam. The ugly alternative is Institute of Islamic Political Thought and the Institute of Islamic of eiyilizationsj’ like the one erfvisioned by Hawafd U and Arabic Sciences in America, outside Washington, DC, are I’Olltleal SelehtlSt samuel HuntlhgtOh hhd eehoed_1h leading examples—and the thinkers they host often provide . gahda 0f hlh Laden and other ethemlSt-S- Pelaflzmg t valuable guidance for the growing population of Muslims living hetweeh [Slam ahd the weSt would sehve the thtete outside the Muslim world _ people who fly airliners into skyscrapers; it would spe] for everybody else. Even if Islam’s uncertain authori= and old, cannot agree on issues that might imply su; 'In some Muslim countries, governments now sponsor educa- . American foreign POhCYa they Shoutd be able to recoghi r tional institutions devoted to teaching about Islam from the per— Coming eataStIOPhe and take measures to aVOid it- ; I spective of the contemporary world. The Institutes of Higher ' {swam‘flach The headS of Islamic cente, , Islamic Studies in Indonesia are a notable example. Some of shtutes around the world, along with leading Muslim these institutes may soon become full—fledged universities of- thals of every persuasion, must clarify the meaning ference of opinion in my community is a divine mercy 72:: g a fel‘hlg hOth religious and lseelflal' COUISCS- _ faith. Non—Muslims in the United States and other com ‘ than may seem an hhhkely quarter 1“ Whleh to 100k for eh‘ eager for signs of leadership in the Muslim world. Tl. Couragemehti but it too may PIOVide some Clues to the fume di‘ an affinnation that the vision of a peaceful, fraternal “ : rection of Islam. There, an avowedly Islamic state is pursuing a bodied in Islam’s past and in the hearts of most ordin; 3% ' hhique experiment integrating elections and Other medem POht‘ lims still guides the people who claim to speak in Islarr ‘ - lcal elements into h an Islamic framework of government. The crisis of September 11 can be the crucible in whic Though Iran they Prove to he the Em and only enduring [Stamie for resolving Islam’ s own crisis of authority are forg l'ePhhhei the lhtellecmal IIends that have developed there: sons of the past encourage hope that Islam will find a sometimes to the dismay of conservative religious leaders with of its confusion of voices_ We listen With hope in our] seminary backgrounds, encourage Muslims to thinkthat a lively ‘ intellectual life and engagement with worldwide currents of thou ' ‘ ‘ ' ' ' ght can survrve and flourish In a religious env1ronment. RICHARD W‘ BULUH is a professor of M. L a Eastern :mWWWt—himt Columbia University and directed Columbia 's Middle Eas as taken it fromheflang a counthbent 0“ the “2mm far 12 years. He is the author ofIslarn: The View from the E6 tieh‘thane “(mtg $izale§16Ctdml mfifili¥§$0ting Hbelaliza— and editor of The Columbia History of the Twentieth Centu Copyright (c) 2002 by Richard W. Bulliet. "‘"‘""""‘ ' . """vm Hamvrfivz-mmmtum‘g Mum “99.‘_§.E!E9.‘!¥?glng- ' " ‘ ,_v .-*an_.-w..\. From The Mfr/son Quarterly, Winter 2002, pp. ll-l9. O 2002 by Richard W. Bulliet. Reprinted by permission. ...
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