CVPRnotes111710

CVPRnotes111710 - Ragan, 1949: FRCP 4 v. KA law. Yes,...

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Ragan, 1949 : FRCP 4 v. KA law. Yes, outcome determinative, but isn’t there a federal interest in applying FRCP 4? REA—“federal rule cannot enlarge, abridge, or modify a state right.” Looks like FRCP 4 would enlarge the right to sue here. BUT, Supreme Court accepted KA statute. Federal rule doesn’t govern—it only governs commencement of actions in federal court for purpose of running of time to answer and serve, but not statute of limitations. NOT A PERSUASIVE ARGUMENT (they do this b/c if FRCP 4 applies, it would be invalidated here, don’t want to invalidate a FRCP). Hanna v. Plumer, 1965 ISSUE: Service of process as per FRCP v. MA law, which requires in-hand notice. Under Ragan , MA Δ should win. HOLDING: Rules Enabling Act “prescribing the manner in which a Δ is to be notified that a suit has been instituted against him relates to the “practice and procedure of the district courts.” Long- recognized power of Congress to prescribe housekeeping rules for federal courts even though some of them will inevitably differ from comparable state rules. Uniformity in federal courts. It’s outcome determinative, but, only in a limited sense. Twin aims of Erie : avoidance of forum shopping, and protecting against inequitable administration of the laws. o Not the kind of thing that πs care about in bringing suit. Doesn’t affect the underlying rights, unless you mess up. In that sense, every procedural rule is outcome determinative, if you mess it up. Hanna II : But, there is a FRCP that covers the issue here, as per RDA. End of inquiry. Test is: 1. Does the Federal Rule cover the case? Regarding service of process, here, it does. 2. Does it conflict w/ the state rule? Here it does. If it didn’t, you’d apply both. 3. Is the rule proper under the Rules Enabling Act? a. Arguably procedural? Then, it’s procedural. Sibbech v. Wilson . Heavy presumption of validity—FRCP have been vetted extensively. b. §2072 (b) Does it enlarge, modify, abridge a right? Court here said it didn’t enlarge the right (though it kind of did) and enforced it. What’s left of Byrd ? Weighing of federal interest. The poetic concurring opinion of Harlan in Hanna He would have overruled Ragan because he focussed on the traditional view that a statute of limitations is by definition procedural He is focussed on the idea of "Federal Creep"
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Walker v. Armco This case is on all fours with Ragan It construes Rule 3 very narrowly in order to avoid collision between the state and federal rules In the absence of a Federal rule on point, we apply state law This approach raises the spectre of Byrd Hanna has not overruled Walker (which follows Ragan) Why? The statutes of limitations is substantive on these facts for the purposes of 2072(b) Federal rule doesn’t govern—it only governs commencement of actions in federal court for purpose of running of time to answer and serve, but not statute of limitations. NOT A PERSUASIVE ARGUMENT (they do this b/c if FRCP 4 applies, it would be invalidated here,
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CVPRnotes111710 - Ragan, 1949: FRCP 4 v. KA law. Yes,...

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