Plan Cours Dynamic Methods in Economics and Management 2006-2007 Koessler

Plan Cours Dynamic Methods in Economics and Management 2006-2007 Koessler

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Dynamic Methods in Economics and Management 2006/2007 Dynamic Methods in Economics and Management Part 2 2006/2007 Frederic KOESSLER Objective The second part of the course follows the course “Game Theory” by focusing on the dynamic and informational aspects of non-cooperative game theory. While relatively abstract and general, the various theoretical models are very helpful to explain the strategic aspects of information in negotiation, regulation, inter and intra firm organization, business strategies, and many other real life situations. First, it is shown how cooperation can emerge in repeated interactions with complete information and how information should be used and revealed in repeated games with incomplete information. Then, the theory is extended to more general dynamic settings with incomplete information, and appropriate solution concepts (like Bayesian perfection) are introduced. The case of contractual relationship is analysed with the principal-agent model under moral hazard or adverse selection. Finally,
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This note was uploaded on 01/23/2011 for the course ECONOMICS gt512 taught by Professor Breviart during the Spring '10 term at Télécom Paris.

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Plan Cours Dynamic Methods in Economics and Management 2006-2007 Koessler

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