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Unformatted text preview: STRATEGIC INFORMATION TRANSMISSION Professor: Fr´ ed´ eric Koessler * Academic Year 2008/2009 Description This course presents basic models and economic applications of strategic information trans- mission in games. The first part of the course is dedicated to “cheap talk games”, in which communication is costless and non binding, and information is not certifiable. In the second part we study “persuasion games”, in which information becomes certifiable. Applications in- clude biased expertise, delegation, lobbying with several audiences and information sharing in seller-buyer relationships and oligopolies. Ce cours pr´ esente les mod` eles de base de transmission strat´ egique d’information dans les jeux. Les deux premi` eres s´ eances du cours sont consacr´ ees aux jeux dits de “cheap talk”, dans lesquels la communication est gratuite et sans engagement, et o`u l’information n’est pas certifiable. Dans les deux s´ eances suivantes nous ´ etudions les jeux dits de “persuasion”, dans lesquels l’information devient certifiable. Parmi les applications ´ economiques ´ etudi´ ees, nous verrons des probl` emes d’expertise, de d´ el´ egation, de lobbying ` a plusieurs d´ ecideurs, et de partage d’information dans des situations d’oligopole. General Bibliography Forges (1994), Farrell and Rabin (1996), Koessler and Forges (2008a,b), Myerson (1994), Sobel (2007). Organization Session 1. Cheap Talk Games • Remainder: Equilibrium refinement and signaling games • Credible information under cheap talk: Examples • Geometric characterization of Nash equilibrium payoffs...
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This note was uploaded on 01/23/2011 for the course ECONOMICS gt512 taught by Professor Breviart during the Spring '10 term at Télécom Paris.

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