plan-paris1 - (2006) : “Transmission strat´ egique de...

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Th´ eorie des incitations Fr´ ed´ eric KOESSLER Plan du cours (29 octobre 2006) Le cours s’appuie sur les cinq premiers chapitres de Bolton et Dewatripont (2005) et les quatre premiers chapitres de Laffont et Martimort (2002). 1. Introduction 2. Le mod` ele principal-agent : Connaissance priv´ ee et auto-s´ election 3. Le mod` ele principal-agent : Action cach´ ee et risque moral 4. Jeux de signaux et raffinement d’´ equilibre 5. Transmission strat´ egique de l’information et certification ef´ erences Bolton, P. et M. Dewatripont (2005) : Contract Theory , MIT Press. Fudenberg, D. et J. Tirole (1991) : Game Theory , MIT Press. Koessler, F. et F. Forges
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Unformatted text preview: (2006) : “Transmission strat´ egique de l’information et certification,” THEMA Working Paper 2006–04. Kreps, D. M. et J. Sobel (1994) : “Signalling,” dans Handbook of Game Theory , ed. par R. J. Aumann et S. Hart, Elsevier Science B. V., vol. 2, chap. 25, 849–867. Laffont, J.-J. et D. Martimort (2002) : The Theory of Incentives : The Principal-Agent Model , Princeton University Press. Okuno-Fujiwara, A., M. Postlewaite, et K. Suzumura (1990) : “Strategic Information Revelation,” Review of Economic Studies , 57, 25–47. Salani´e, B. (2005) : The Economics of Contracts , MIT Press. 1...
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This note was uploaded on 01/23/2011 for the course ECONOMICS gt512 taught by Professor Breviart during the Spring '10 term at Télécom Paris.

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