slides-chap6A-communication-soft

slides-chap6A-communication-soft - Transmission stratgique...

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Transmission strat´ egique de l’information / Information non certifiable Transmission strat´ egique de l’information et certification
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Transmission strat´ egique de l’information / Information non certifiable Transmission strat´ egique de l’information et certification Plan (20 novembre 2006) Information non certifiable : Jeux de “cheap talk” – Exemples introductifs – Caract´ erisation g´ eom´ etrique des ´ equilibres de Nash – Jeux monotones ´ Equilibres partitionnels : Le mod` ele de Crawford et Sobel (1982) – Quelques variantes et extensions
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Transmission strat´ egique de l’information / Information non certifiable Information certifiable : Jeux de persuasion – Exemples introductifs – Caract´ erisation g´ eom´ etrique des ´ equilibres de Nash – Raffinement d’´ equilibre lorsque l’information est certifiable – Jeux monotones et scepticisme ´ Equilibres compl` etement r´ ev´ elateurs dans les jeux non monotones : Le mod` ele de Seidmann et Winter (1997) – La certifiabilit´ e est-elle toujours favorable au d´ ecideur ? n joueurs inform´ es : Okuno-Fujiwara et al. (1990)
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Transmission strat´ egique de l’information / Information non certifiable Information certifiable : Jeux de persuasion – Exemples introductifs – Caract´ erisation g´ eom´ etrique des ´ equilibres de Nash – Raffinement d’´ equilibre lorsque l’information est certifiable – Jeux monotones et scepticisme ´ Equilibres compl` etement r´ ev´ elateurs dans les jeux non monotones : Le mod` ele de Seidmann et Winter (1997) – La certifiabilit´ e est-elle toujours favorable au d´ ecideur ? n joueurs inform´ es : Okuno-Fujiwara et al. (1990) Communication bilat´ erale r´ ep´ et´ ee – Exemples – Caract´ erisation g´ eom´ etrique des ´ equilibres de Nash – Le mod` ele de Crawford et Sobel (1982) revisit´ e : Krishna et Morgan (2004) – Communication bilat´ erale et certification retard´ ee
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Transmission strat´ egique de l’information / Information non certifiable Principales r´ ef´ erences : – Koessler et Forges (2006) : “Transmission strat´ egique de l’information et certification”, THEMA Working Paper 2006–04 http ://www.u-cergy.fr/IMG/2006-04.pdf – Okuno-Fujiwara, Postlewaite, et Suzumura (1990) : “Strategic Information Revelation”, Review of Economic Studies – Aumann et Hart (2003) : “Long Cheap Talk,” Econometrica – Forges et Koessler (2006) : “Long Persuasion Games”, THEMA Working Paper 2006–01 http ://www.u-cergy.fr/IMG/2006-01.pdf
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Transmission strat´ egique de l’information / Information non certifiable Autres revues de la litt´ erature : – Bolton et Dewatripont (2005, chap. 5) “Disclosure of Private Certifiable Information,” dans “Contract Theory” –Farrell et Rabin (1996) : “Cheap Talk,” Journal of Economic Perspectives – Forges (1994) : “Non-Zero Sum Repeated Games and Information Transmission,” dans Essays in Game Theory : In Honor of Michael Maschler – Kreps et Sobel (1994) : “Signalling,” dans “Handbook of Game Theory” vol. 2 – Myerson (1991, chap. 6) : “Games of communication,” dans “Game Theory, Analysis of Conflict”
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Transmission strat´ egique de l’information / Information non certifiable Cheap talk = communication
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