N27-oligopoly2 jpw - microL27-F2010-page

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Unformatted text preview: microL27-F2010-page http://www.arts.cornell.edu/econ/wissink/econ1110jpw/ Oligopoly & Game Theory Lecture 27 Dr. Jennifer P. Wissink 2009 John M. Abowd and Jennifer P. Wissink, all rights reserved. December 2, 2010 microL27-F2010-page http://www.arts.cornell.edu/econ/wissink/econ1110jpw/ Announcements MICRO F2010 MEL INFO: 4 more quizzes were posted BEFORE THANKSGIVING BREAK @ 50 points each, so there are still 200 more points to grab. All four remaining quizzes are due Sunday night Dec 5th. FINAL EXAM INFO: Please see class syllabus on the web. All information about the exam is posted there and will be updated as more information comes in. I will post a final exam info memo this week sometime. Review sessions are as follows Thu Dec 09, 12:00 PM to 01:15 PM in GSH132 (hec auditorium), TA : Ying Wu Tue Dec 14, 12:00 PM to 01:15 PM in GSH132 (hec auditorium), TA : Ying Wu Once this week is over ALL office hours will be reposted for who will do what over study and exam time. Check the ETC door for their office hours over study and exam time, they will be different and less frequent. Check your email in and junk folders for an email from me where you are directed to a survey to tell us when you plan to take the final. There are two options. Again, see the syllabus on the web page for details. PLEASE DO THE SURVEY SO THAT WE HAVE YOU ON THE LIST FOR THE CORRECT DATE, SINCE WE WILL CHECK EVERYONE IN BY THEIR ID AND TA SECTION. microL27-F2010-page http://www.arts.cornell.edu/econ/wissink/econ1110jpw/ #3 Edward Chamberlin : A Cooperative Oligopoly Outcome (Collusion) circa 1930s The duopolists can do better than the Nash Non-Cooperative Equilibrium Bertrand or Cournot. So far, because the equilibrium is non-cooperative, we have ruled out the possibility of collusion between the two firms. Collusion means that the firms explicitly and/or implicitly cooperate in choosing a market output and the division of output between them. (Note, if they set the output level, then the market sets the price.) If the duopolists collude and divide up the market privately, they can produce the monopoly quantity and divide the monopoly economic profits. Since the monopoly economic profits are more than the sum of the duopoly profits, the duopolists are better off if they collude. When we allow the possibility of collusion the game can turn out differently. No longer a NONcooperative game. microL27-F2010-page http://www.arts.cornell.edu/econ/wissink/econ1110jpw/ Chamberlinian Collusion With A Duopoly- mimic a multi-plant monopoly With only a couple/few identical firms, and homogeneous output, this might be expected....
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This note was uploaded on 01/27/2011 for the course ECON 1101 at Cornell University (Engineering School).

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N27-oligopoly2 jpw - microL27-F2010-page

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