The Federalist No. 10
The Utility of the Union as a Safeguard Against
Domestic Faction and Insurrection (continued)
Daily Advertiser
Thursday, November 22, 1787
[James Madison]
To the People of the State of New York:
A
MONG
the numerous advantages promised by a well constructed Union, none
deserves to be more accurately developed than its tendency to break and control
the violence of faction. The friend of popular governments never finds himself so
much alarmed for their character and fate, as when he contemplates their
propensity to this dangerous vice. He will not fail, therefore, to set a due value on
any plan which, without violating the principles to which he is attached, provides
a proper cure for it. The instability, injustice, and confusion introduced into the
public councils, have, in truth, been the mortal diseases under which popular
governments have everywhere perished; as they continue to be the favorite and
fruitful topics from which the adversaries to liberty derive their most specious
declamations. The valuable improvements made by the American constitutions
on the popular models, both ancient and modern, cannot certainly be too much
admired; but it would be an unwarrantable partiality, to contend that they have as
effectually obviated the danger on this side, as was wished and expected.
Complaints are everywhere heard from our most considerate and virtuous
citizens, equally the friends of public and private faith, and of public and personal
liberty, that our governments are too unstable, that the public good is disregarded
in the conflicts of rival parties, and that measures are too often decided, not
according to the rules of justice and the rights of the minor party, but by the
superior force of an interested and overbearing majority. However anxiously we
may wish that these complaints had no foundation, the evidence, of known facts
will not permit us to deny that they are in some degree true. It will be found,
indeed, on a candid review of our situation, that some of the distresses under
which we labor have been erroneously charged on the operation of our
governments; but it will be found, at the same time, that other causes will not
alone account for many of our heaviest misfortunes; and, particularly, for that
prevailing and increasing distrust of public engagements, and alarm for private
rights, which are echoed from one end of the continent to the other. These must
be chiefly, if not wholly, effects of the unsteadiness and injustice with which a
factious spirit has tainted our public administrations.
By a faction, I understand a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority
or a minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common
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impulse of passion, or of interest, adversed to the rights of other citizens, or to
the permanent and aggregate interests of the community.

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- Spring '06
- taylor
- Government, Democracy, republican government
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