philostudyguide - 1 Henson 1 Descartes first argument for...

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1 Descartes first argument for mind/body distinction (6 th med): Descartes uses rationalist approach to knowledge (source of knowledge acquired other than with senses) as opposed to empiricist approach (through senses) Certain to have thoughts, uncertain about a body (doubtable)…limit of the senses… Faculty of judgment - pure, non-sensory thought Cogito argument - “I am, I exist” “I think, therefore I am” mind > body because body gives sensory perception that mind uses to make judgments Nature of mind/cogito is clear and distinct un-extended mind is distinct from brain 1 st argument = Real mind/body distinction: P(1)- everything clearly/distinctly perceived can be created by God P(2)- if 2 things can exist separately, then they are really distinct PC1- If I clearly/distinctly perceive 2 things to exist separately, then they are distinct P(3)- clear/distinctly perceive that mind can exist with thought but without extension PC2- clearly/distinct that mind and body can exist separately CONCLUSION - mind and body are distinct and intellectual mind can exist without body! NOT arguing that mind is immortal… Substance dualism with emphasis on pure intellect… body still needed for sensations Body is extended, non thinking thing closely linked to mind Mind is non-extended…   since extension is the nature of body , is a necessary feature of body, it follows that the mind is by its nature not a body but an immaterial thing. Therefore, what I am is an immaterial thinking thing with the faculties of intellect&will. Gertler’s Disembodiment argument: Defense of mind/body dualism emphasis on consciousness Thought experiment - can conceive of a non-physical mental state (i.e. pain) while disembodied (naturalistic dualism) Conscious mental states can exist without physical states (body) Response to Carruther’s identity thesis (physicalist objection) Disembodiment argument: P1- I can conceive of pain while disembodied P2- If I can conceive of P1, then P1 is actually possible PC- disembodied pain is possible P3- If the identity theory is true, then disembodied theory is impossible…yet PC says it IS possible… 1
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CONCLSUION- Identity theory is false WRONG to identify non-mental with mental (i.e. pain=c-fiber stimulation) Carruther’s Identity-thesis: Identity theory- all mental states are physical states (i.e. pain=c-fiber) Pain identical to physical brain-state (type identity) P1- mental causation P2- physical causation (causal closure of physical states) CONCLUSION- identity theory P1 - “some conscious states and events are causally necessary for the occurrence of some physical ones.” Conscious states are physical because “some particular bodily movement would not have taken places if: I had not made a particular decision; I had not thought of a particular thought…etc” (302) P2- In a completed neuro-physiological science there will be no need to advert to anything other than physical-physical causality .”
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This note was uploaded on 02/06/2011 for the course PHILOSOPHY 297 taught by Professor Schmaltz during the Fall '10 term at University of Michigan.

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philostudyguide - 1 Henson 1 Descartes first argument for...

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