Document_about_Declaration - he Declaration made a simple...

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he Declaration made a simple and straightforward affirmation, namely, that coercion in religious matters—worship, observance, practice, witness—is, n principle, to be repudiated as offensive to the dignity of man. Primarily in view was legal coercion exercised by government; also in view were other orms of compulsion, direct or indirect, brought to bear by institutions or forces within society. In positive terms, the Declaration affirmed the free xercise of religion in society to be a basic human right that, in any society pretending to be well-ordered, should be furnished with a juridical guarantee o as to become a civil or constitutional right. Religious freedom, therefore, was clearly stated to be a juridical notion. Moreover, freedom here has the ense of "freedom from." It is an immunity in a twofold sense. First, no man is to be forcibly constrained to act against his conscience. Second, no man is o be forcibly restrained from acting according to his conscience. rom the historical point of view, religious freedom in the sense of immunity from coercive constraints came to be recognized as a human right even uring the post-Reformation era of confessional absolutism, as it is called. The principle was gradually established that even the absolutist prince may not ompel a man to act against his conscience or punish him for reasons of conscience. The doctrine of religious freedom as an immunity from coercive estraints was, however, first effectively proclaimed in the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. It was considered to be an integral lement of the doctrine of limited constitutional government. The Declaration affirmed religious freedom in both of these senses. The affirmation was octrinal. t the same time, the Declaration recognized that religious freedom, like other human and civil freedoms, is exercised within society and may therefore e subject to limitation. Two principles of limitation were stated. The first was the general moral principle of personal responsibility, which requires that ll civil rights be exercised with a sense of responsibility toward society and its common good, toward the state and its just laws and authority, and oward one's fellow men, who are equally persons and citizens: The second principle was that the exercise of religious freedom may in particular cases be ubject to restraint by state intervention. As the criterion for this intervention, the Declaration posits the traditional jurisprudential norm, the necessities of he public order. he public order is that limited segment of the common good which is committed to the state to be protected and maintained by the coercive force that is vailable to the state—the force of law and of administrative or police action. The public order thus comprises a threefold good—the political good, hich is the public peace; the moral good, which is proper custody of public morality as determined by minimal and generally accepted standards; and he juridical good, which is harmony among citizens in the exercise of their civil rights. By this criterion, the exercise of religion is to be free unless, in
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Document_about_Declaration - he Declaration made a simple...

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