modularitySept29 - Modularity and prosopagnosia Thursday,...

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Unformatted text preview: Modularity and prosopagnosia Thursday, September 30th 2010 Thursday, September 30, 2010 More like this? MIND Thursday, September 30, 2010 or like this? Thursday, September 30, 2010 motion perception disgusting smell native language musical harmony Higher cognition ... Modular: Thursday, September 30, 2010 education involved training in neuroanatomy, neurophysiology, biochemistry and molecular biology. At Trinity College in 1971 he received an MA (with distinction) in mathematics and a PhD in theoretical neurophysiology. After obtaining his PhD, he accepted a research appointment at the Medical Research Council (MRC) Laboratory of Molecular Biology under Sydney Brenner and Francis Crick, and he retained an affiliation with the MRC until 1976. CONTRIBUTIONS TO THEORETICAL NEUROSCIENCE: WHAT IS IT THAT THE BRAIN DOES? In three successive papers that combine high-level theoretical speculation with meticulous synthesis of the available neuroanatomical data, Marr proposed a definite answer to this question for the cerebellum, archicortex and neocortex. Common to these three studies is the idea that the central function of the brain is statistical pattern recognition Figure 1. David Marr (1945–1980). Downloaded from rstb.royalsocietypublishing.org on September 29, 2010 Early Processing of Visual Information D. Marr Phil. Trans. R. Soc. Lond. B 1976 275, 483-519 doi: 10.1098/rstb.1976.0090 Thursday, September 30, 2010 Respond to this article The mind, I claim, is not a single organ but a system of organs, which we can think of as psychological faculties or mental modules. The entities now commonly evoked to explain the mind — such as general intelligence, a capacity to form culture, and multipurpose learning strategies — will surely go the way of protoplasm in biology and of earth, air, fire, and water in physics. p27-28 Thursday, September 30, 2010 Primate electrophysiology Thursday, September 30, 2010 Alternatives to modularity ‣all of cognition is association between ideas ‣all of cognition is rule-following ‣the same Piagetian ‘knowing circle’ propels the child through all stages of development Thursday, September 30, 2010 Philosophy ahead Philosophy Psychology Mind Computer Science Neuroscience Linguistics Thursday, September 30, 2010 Today’s agenda 1. Fodorian modularity 2. cognitive neuropsychology as a way to search for modules Thursday, September 30, 2010 Cluster of properties 1. Input systems are domain-specific 2. The operation of inputs systems is mandatory 3. There is only limited central access to the mental representations that input systems compute 4. Input systems are fast 5. Input systems are informationally encapsulated 6. Input analyzers have ‘shallow’ outputs 7. Input systems exhibit characteristic breakdown patterns 8. Input systems are associated with a fixed neural architecture 9. The ontogeny of input systems exhibits a characteristic pace and sequencing Thursday, September 30, 2010 Fodor’s modularity Higher cognition motion perception musical harmony disgusting smell native language ... Thursday, September 30, 2010 Higher cognition ‣ slow ‣ deep ‣ global (vs local) ‣ voluntary ‣ associated with diffuse neurological structures ‣ not restricted to bottom up processing ‣ unencapsulated Thursday, September 30, 2010 Thursday, September 30, 2010 Thursday, September 30, 2010 Sentence interpretation “Marjorie told Reginald that the butler did it” Thursday, September 30, 2010 Sentence interpretation “Marjorie told Reginald that the butler did it” message recipient Thursday, September 30, 2010 ‘Christopher’ Thursday, September 30, 2010 Characteristic breakdown test Raven’s Matrices (nonverbal) Wechsler Scale nonverbal Wechsler Scale verbal Christopher 75 or 76 42,67, 52 89,102,98 average 100 100 100 Thursday, September 30, 2010 Characteristic breakdown test Raven’s Matrices (nonverbal) Wechsler Scale nonverbal Wechsler Scale verbal Christopher 75 or 76 42,67, 52 89,102,98 average 100 100 100 Thursday, September 30, 2010 Characteristic breakdown test Raven’s Matrices (nonverbal) Wechsler Scale nonverbal Wechsler Scale verbal Christopher 75 or 76 42,67, 52 89,102,98 average 100 100 100 Danish, Dutch, Finnish, French, German, Greek, Hindi, Italian, Norwegian, Polish, Portuguese, Russian, Spanish, Swedish, Turkish & Welsh Thursday, September 30, 2010 a radio. Sigrid buys a lamp for her writing-table. epsakse ( f )Greek (The passage was in Greek script) Otan perase t’amaksi, ja tis pantufles tis, ala ena paljopedho ihe pari ti mja ki eferje jelontas. Fair translation: When the car passed, she looked for her slippers, but a naughty (lit: ‘old’) child had taken one and left laughing. When she passed the car . . . when the car passed, she was C’s translation: looking for her slippers was laughing. (g) Hindi but an old child had taken one away and left . . . and Ek nadi : ke kina: re, ek bare se per par, ek bandar rahta: tha: . . . Ek din ek magar tairta : hua: kina : re par a : ya : On the side of a river, on a large tree, lived a monkey . . . Fair translation: 321 N. Smith, I. M. Tsimpli / Linguistic modularity? One day a crocodile came swimming along to the side. On the side of a road, a big something, a man fell down C’s translation: dinner if you like. What if you had phoned beforehand - yes because we do (NS - do you know what ‘bandar’ is? - C - ‘monkey’) . . . One day, but one day (NS - OK ‘magar’ is crocodile), the crocodile came to edge . . . ‘When is Peter coming home?’ ‘Usually at midday, a little C’s translation. (This piece was translated aurally as one of us (NS) read a story from the over two. Ah Hjordis, you are well ~ an hour. You can stay till midday if you Panchatantra to him. The interpolations in angled brackets show where want to. Think that your phone [inaudible] beforehand. Yes on the telephone Christopher was interrupted.) have a phone, because of all the orders.’ we have, on the ground of all orders.’ Thursday, September 30, 2010 (h) Italian (j) Polish Per case in quella stessa mattina un’amica era venuta a trovare la signora ed Musialem go wrzucic do wozu silg. Poloiyl sic na podlodze i zamkngl oczy, era rimasta a farle compagnia mentre finiva di vestirsi. L’amica aveva notato nie chcgc widziec, co go jeszcze czeka. i cassetti aperti. Fair translation: I had to throw him into the car with force. He lay down on By chance, that very morning a woman friend had come to Fair translation: the floor and closed his eyes, not wishing to see what awaited him. visit the lady and had stayed to keep her company while she finished dressing. ‘I had to take him out of the car strongly and put - he put C’s translation. Her friend noticed the open drawers. himself on the floor and opened his eyes - and shut his eyes, not wishing to In case, just in case in this morning a friend came to find C’s translation: see what was waiting for him.’ the lady and she was stayed while she was dressing. Her friend had noted the o(k) Portuguese pen cassettes. 0 Go estava imovel no passeio, olhando fixamente a luz vermelha. De subito the lady and she was stayed while she was dressing. open cassettes. Her friend had noted the (i) Norwegian ‘Nar kommer Per hjem?’ ‘Vanligvis til middag, litt over to. A, Hjordis - du blir vel en stund? Du kan jo bli til middag hvis du vil. Tenk om du hadde ringt pa forhdnd - ja for telefon har vi da, pa grunn av alle bestillingene.’ ‘When does . Peter c/ome home? odularity? Fair translation: 321 N. Smith, I. M Tsimpli Linguistic m ‘Usually for dinner, just after two. Oh Hjordis - you will stay for a while I hope? You can stay for dinner if you like. What if you had phoned beforehand - yes because we do have a phone, because of all the orders.’ ‘When is Peter coming home?’ ‘Usually at midday, a little C’s translation. over two. Ah Hjordis, you are well ~ an hour. You can stay till midday if you want to. Think that your phone [inaudible] beforehand. Yes on the telephone we have, on the ground of all orders.’ (j) Polish Musialem go wrzucic do wozu silg. Poloiyl sic na podlodze i zamkngl oczy, nie chcgc widziec, co go jeszcze czeka. Fair translation: I had to throw him into the car with force. He lay down on the floor and closed his eyes, not wishing to see what awaited him. ‘I had to take him out of the car strongly and put - he put C’s translation. himself on the floor and opened his eyes - and shut his eyes, not wishing to see what was waiting for him.’ (k) Portuguese 0 Go estava imovel no passeio, olhando fixamente a luz vermelha. De subito Thursday, September 30, 2010 Today’s agenda 1. Fodorian modularity 2. cognitive neuropsychology as a way to search for modules Thursday, September 30, 2010 Cognitive neuropsychology understand neurological patients’ cognitive difficulties in terms of the functioning of the normal information-processing system Thursday, September 30, 2010 Cognitive neuropsychology understand neurological patients’ cognitive difficulties in terms of the functioning of the normal information-processing system ...with certain isolable subsystems or transmission routes operating in an impaired fashion Thursday, September 30, 2010 HJA’s performance identifying real objects visual tactile 28/45 (62%) 36/42 (85%) Thursday, September 30, 2010 HJA can copy what he cannot name Owl Bee FIG . 5. Examples of H .J.A.'s copying of objects he fails to identify. In each example, the original line drawing is shown on the left and H.J.A.'s copy is shown alongside it. He named the eagle as 'a cat sitting up", the guitar as ' som e kind of a machine, a press', the owl as 'a p attern' , and the bee as "an animal with h orn s and a tail, a rhino? ' Thursday, September 30, 2010 Thursday, September 30, 2010 What about recognizing faces? Probably my most embarrassing problem is not recognizing people. Since coming round I have never been able to recognize any person by sight alone. I cannot recognize my wife except by sound of her voice, nor my grandchildren, nor family nor friends. I also have great problems with animals, particularly if they are not moving. Friends and business acquaintances of long-standing, like the milkman and the GP, I recognize by sound.… I have learned that to recognize people it's often easiest to use non-facial clues--an obvious example is hair lengths and general pattern. My color problem can also cause extra difficulties as I don't differentiate between blondes and gray-haired ladies. I recall mannerisms shown by friends and family--the use of arms when speaking, ear scratching, ways of standing, all visual aids to identify them in parties and groups were the auditory clues are too confused or numerous for separation. Thursday, September 30, 2010 0028-3932(95)00002-X FACE PERCEPTION AND WITHIN-CATEGORY DISCRIMINATION IN PROSOPAGNOSIA MARTHA tuniversity J. FARAH,*t of Pennsylvania, KAREN L. LEVINSONt and KAREN L. KLEIN1 Mellon University. Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A.; and ICarnegie Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, U.S.A. (Receioed 23 October 1992; accepted I November 1994) Abstract-Prosopagnosics are impaired at face recognition, but unimpaired, or relatively less impaired, at common object recognition. It has been suggested that this dissociation results simply from the greater difficulty of face recognition compared to object recognition, or from the greater need to discriminate visually similar members of a single category in face recognition compared to object recognition. We tested these hypotheses using the performance of normal subjects in an ‘old/new’ recognition paradigm to establish the true relative difficulty of face and object recognition, and required both normal subjects and a prosopagnosic subject to discriminate both faces and visually similar exemplars of nonface object categories. In two different experiments, the prosopagnosic patient performed disproportionately poorly with faces. These results disconfirm the hypotheses described above, and imply that prosopagnosia is an impairment of a specialized form of visual recognition that is necessary for face recognition and is not necessary, or less necessary, for the recognition of common objects. Key Words: prosopagnosia; face recognition INTRODUCTION When Bodamer [3] introduced the term prosopagnosia (face agnosia) in reporting a series of patients with impaired recognition of faces, he was highlighting the selectivity of the disorder for faces as opposed to other types of object. Many other clinicians, working before and since Bodamer’s classic paper was published, have also been struck by the apparent selectivity of prosopagnosia for faces. Prosopagnosic patients may be unable to recognize even their closest family members by vision alone, and some anecdotes tell of patients who confuse their reflection in a mirror for another person [e.g. 191. Yet many such patients evince little or no difficulty with everyday object recognition, and may retain effectively normal visual word recognition ability. De Renzi [9] reported a severely prosopagnosic patient who easily performed a variety of subtle visual recognition tasks with objects such as wallets, neckties and photographs of cats. Despite these persuasive observations of prosopagnosics’ particular difficulty with face recognition, several leading neuropsychologists have questioned the selectivity of prosopagnosia [4,6,7, 16, 191. They have argued that face recognition is simply the most difficult or taxing perceptual task we routinely encounter, and a mild generalized disorder of object perception will therefore be manifest mainly during face recognition. A related account has been put forward by Damasia and co-workers [e.g. 6-81. According *Address Philadelphia. for correspondence: Department PA 19104-6196. U.S.A. of Psychology, Universtiy of Pennsylvania. 38 I5 Walnut St.. 661 Thursday, September 30, 2010 Thursday, September 30, 2010 Thursday, September 30, 2010 0028-3932(95)00002-X FACE PERCEPTION AND WITHIN-CATEGORY DISCRIMINATION IN PROSOPAGNOSIA MARTHA tuniversity J. FARAH,*t of Pennsylvania, KAREN L. LEVINSONt and KAREN L. KLEIN1 Mellon University. Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A.; and ICarnegie Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, U.S.A. (Receioed 23 October 1992; accepted I November 1994) Abstract-Prosopagnosics are impaired at face recognition, but unimpaired, or relatively less impaired, at common object recognition. It has been suggested that this dissociation results simply from the greater difficulty of face recognition compared to object recognition, or from the greater need to discriminate visually similar members of a single category in face recognition compared to object recognition. We tested these hypotheses using the performance of normal subjects in an ‘old/new’ recognition paradigm to establish the true relative difficulty of face and object recognition, and required both normal subjects and a prosopagnosic subject to discriminate both faces and visually similar exemplars of nonface object categories. In two different experiments, the prosopagnosic patient performed disproportionately poorly with faces. These results disconfirm the hypotheses described above, and imply that prosopagnosia is an impairment of a specialized form of visual recognition that is necessary for face recognition and is not necessary, or less necessary, for the recognition of common objects. Key Words: prosopagnosia; face recognition INTRODUCTION “normal” undergraduates age,education-matched controls When Bodamer [3] introduced the term prosopagnosia (face agnosia) in reporting a series of patients with impaired recognition of faces, he was highlighting the selectivity of the disorder for faces as opposed to other types of object. Many other clinicians, working before and since Bodamer’s classic paper was published, have also been struck by the apparent selectivity of prosopagnosia for faces. Prosopagnosic patients may be unable to recognize even their closest family members by vision alone, and some anecdotes tell of patients who confuse their reflection in a mirror for another person [e.g. 191. Yet many such patients evince little or no difficulty with everyday object recognition, and may retain effectively normal visual word recognition ability. De Renzi [9] reported a severely prosopagnosic patient who easily performed a variety of subtle visual recognition tasks with objects such as wallets, neckties and photographs of cats. Despite these persuasive observations of prosopagnosics’ particular difficulty with face recognition, several leading neuropsychologists have questioned the selectivity of prosopagnosia [4,6,7, 16, 191. They have argued that face recognition is simply the most difficult or taxing perceptual task we routinely encounter, and a mild generalized disorder of object perception will therefore be manifest mainly during face recognition. A related account has been put forward by Damasia and co-workers [e.g. 6-81. According faces eyeglasses faces eyeglasses of Psychology, Universtiy 87% 69% 85% 69% prosopagnosic L.H. *Address Philadelphia. for correspondence: Department PA 19104-6196. U.S.A. faces eyeglasses 661 of Pennsylvania. 64% 63% 38 I5 Walnut St.. Thursday, September 30, 2010 0028-3932(95)00002-X FACE PERCEPTION AND WITHIN-CATEGORY DISCRIMINATION IN PROSOPAGNOSIA MARTHA tuniversity J. FARAH,*t of Pennsylvania, KAREN L. LEVINSONt and KAREN L. KLEIN1 Mellon University. Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A.; and ICarnegie Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, U.S.A. (Receioed 23 October 1992; accepted I November 1994) Abstract-Prosopagnosics are impaired at face recognition, but unimpaired, or relatively less impaired, at common object recognition. It has been suggested that this dissociation results simply from the greater difficulty of face recognition compared to object recognition, or from the greater need to discriminate visually similar members of a single category in face recognition compared to object recognition. We tested these hypotheses using the performance of normal subjects in an ‘old/new’ recognition paradigm to establish the true relative difficulty of face and object recognition, and required both normal subjects and a prosopagnosic subject to discriminate both faces and visually similar exemplars of nonface object categories. In two different experiments, the prosopagnosic patient performed disproportionately poorly with faces. These results disconfirm the hypotheses described above, and imply that prosopagnosia is an impairment of a specialized form of visual recognition that is necessary for face recognition and is not necessary, or less necessary, for the recognition of common objects. Key Words: prosopagnosia; face recognition INTRODUCTION “normal” undergraduates age,education-matched controls When Bodamer [3] introduced the term prosopagnosia (face agnosia) in reporting a series of patients with impaired recognition of faces, he was highlighting the selectivity of the disorder for faces as opposed to other types of object. Many other clinicians, working before and since Bodamer’s classic paper was published, have also been struck by the apparent selectivity of prosopagnosia for faces. Prosopagnosic patients may be unable to recognize even their closest family members by vision alone, and some anecdotes tell of patients who confuse their reflection in a mirror for another person [e.g. 191. Yet many such patients evince little or no difficulty with everyday object recognition, and may retain effectively normal visual word recognition ability. De Renzi [9] reported a severely prosopagnosic patient who easily performed a variety of subtle visual recognition tasks with objects such as wallets, neckties and photographs of cats. Despite these persuasive observations of prosopagnosics’ particular difficulty with face recognition, several leading neuropsychologists have questioned the selectivity of prosopagnosia [4,6,7, 16, 191. They have argued that face recognition is simply the most difficult or taxing perceptual task we routinely encounter, and a mild generalized disorder of object perception will therefore be manifest mainly during face recognition. A related account has been put forward by Damasia and co-workers [e.g. 6-81. According faces eyeglasses faces eyeglasses of Psychology, Universtiy 87% 69% 85% 69% prosopagnosic L.H. *Address Philadelphia. for correspondence: Department PA 19104-6196. U.S.A. faces eyeglasses 661 of Pennsylvania. 64% 63% 38 I5 Walnut St.. } no face superiority effect Thursday, September 30, 2010 d to process obeclfy which face mechanisms and ecial about face f t have b CK knowsaces ohatress andeenoiffure. by age and changes in celebritytransformed style f d c when he sees Titinvestigate this issue, we obtained a book Method. o of photographs of famous people at different ages. Prior to testing, we had other individuals order the faces in terms of how closely they resembled the target face that a tching, and 1 through 5 hs of ed him 17 photoin nonprototypientlfy them a l l erformance surl group. To deterndeed normal or trol participants , most of them in ect if the particiTable 1. Mean Number of Famous People Recognized from Photos. Mean Set A ( n = 12) Set B (n = 12) Controls CK SD 12 Range 54 3 4-69 3 3-68 66 54 53 Moscovitcb e t al. 561 Controls CK 13 Thursday, September 30, 2010 CK is now at chance Thursday, September 30, 2010 Double dissociation Patient 1 task A Thursday, September 30, 2010 Patient 2 task B Thursday, September 30, 2010 { Thursday, September 30, 2010 declarative remembering that.... non-declarative remembering how.... do the Coglab levels-ofprocessing experiment Thursday, September 30, 2010 do the Coglab levels-ofprocessing experiment Thursday, September 30, 2010 ...
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This note was uploaded on 01/30/2011 for the course COGST 1101 taught by Professor Spivey,m during the Fall '07 term at Cornell University (Engineering School).

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