18 - The doctrine that the possibility of a thing requires...

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The doctrine that the possibility of a thing requires nothing more than the absence of contradiction from its concept was rejected by Kant. We will discuss it in detail later, but for now it is enough to say that the problem lies in the claim that we understand individuals through concepts alone. Kant held that for human knowledge, it is required that objects be given in a non-conceptual way, through what he called sensible intuition The understanding thinks through general concepts, while sensibility represents particular things which affect it. Thus for a thing to be possible, it must either be given or be capable of being given to sensibility. This theme will be developed more fully as we continue. The doctrine that an individual can be an object for the understanding through the use of concepts alone also supports the claim that the substances making up the world have properties which are purely internal. These internal peoperties "must be something which is either itself a thinking or analogous to thinking. For this reason Leibniz, regarding substances as noumena, took away from them by the manner in which he conceived them, whatever might signify outer relation, including also, therefor,
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This note was uploaded on 01/31/2011 for the course PHILOSOPHY 113 taught by Professor Gerogemattey during the Winter '10 term at UC Davis.

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18 - The doctrine that the possibility of a thing requires...

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