31 - O n the other hand, Kant frequently described things...

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On the other hand, Kant frequently described things in themselves using such language as "the real per se ." Decribed in this way, things in themselves would seem to have a higher degree of reality than appearances, especially since appearances are frequently characterized as "representations." Now representations are real (as Kant stated in the Aesthetic, we really represent things as in time). Still, we only represent things as in time if there are such things prior to the representation. Henry Allison has characterized interpretations of this sort as "ontological," and mistaken as well. He claims that the distinction is instead "methodological." That is, characterizing things apart from their relation to sensibility does not characterize them as they really are; it is only an abstraction from conditions of sensible representation. This explains their non- spatiality and non-temporality, since we are considering things explicity apart from space and from time. One reason for resisting this interpretation lies in Kant's account of the origin of sensible representation. The mind is affected by objects, which affection in turn triggers their
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This note was uploaded on 01/31/2011 for the course PHILOSOPHY 113 taught by Professor Gerogemattey during the Winter '10 term at UC Davis.

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31 - O n the other hand, Kant frequently described things...

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