Stone Sweet Judicialization and governance

Stone Sweet Judicialization and governance - COMPARATIVE...

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Stone Swe t / JUDICIALIZATION AND GOVERNANCE COMPARATIVE POLITICAL STUDIES / April 19 9 I present a theory of the emergence and evolution of governance, conceived as the process through which the rules systems in place in any social setting are adapted to the needs of those who live under them. The theory is composed of three elements: normative structure, dyadic contracting, and triadic dispute resolution. I demonstrate that a move to triadic dispute resolution leads the triadic dispute resolver to construct, and then to manage over time, specific causal rela- tionships between exchange, conflict, and rules. In this way, political life is judicialized. Under certain conditions, the triad will constitute a crucial mechanism of political change. I then ex- plain judicialization and the dynamics of change in two very different polities: the international trade regime and the French Fifth Republic. The conclusion draws out some of the implications of the theory and data for our understanding of the complex relationship between strategic be- havior and social structure. JUDICIALIZATION AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF GOVERNANCE ALEC STONE SWEET Nuffield College, Oxford T he triad—two contracting parties and a dispute resolver—constitutes a primal social institution, a microcosm of governance. If this is so, in uncovering the institutional dynamics of the triad, we uncover an essential logic of government itself. Broadly stated, my objectives are twofold: to defend the validity of these contentions and to demonstrate their centrality to the discipline. 147 COMPARATIVE POLITICAL STUDIES, Vol. 32 No. 2, April 1999 147-184 © 1999 Sage Publications, Inc. AUTHOR’S NOTE: For enormously helpful comments and criticisms, I am indebted to Christo- pher Ansell, James Caporaso, Harry Eckstein, Henry Farrell, Neil Fligstein, Ron Jepperson, Pe- ter Katzenstein, Robert Keohane, Nicholas Onuf, Paul Pierson, David Rowe, Wayne Sandholtz, Martin Shapiro, Anne-Marie Slaughter, Rogers Smith, and Susan Sterrett. Earlier versions of the article were presented at the Seminar on International Law and International Relations at Harvard Law School (organized by Anne-Marie Slaughter and Andrew Moravcsik, November 1995); the Legal Theory Workshop at the Yale Law School (organized by Bruce Ackerman and Owen Fiss, February 1996); two Workshops on International Law and International Relations Theory at Yale University (organized by Harold Koh and Alexander Wendt, February 1996, and
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The article proceeds as follows. After introducing key concepts, I present a model of a particular mode of governance. By mode of governance, I mean the social mechanism by which the rules in place in any given community are adapted to the experiences and exigencies of those who live under them. The theory integrates, as tightly interdependent factors, the evolution of strategic (utility-maximizing) behavior and normative (cultural or rule-based) struc- ture. It captures dynamics of change observable at both the micro level, by which I mean the behavior of individual actors, and the macro level, by which
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Stone Sweet Judicialization and governance - COMPARATIVE...

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