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Unformatted text preview: Experience, according to Kant, is restricted to things in time, some of which are in space. Psychological states (imagining I am in Hawaii, feeling a pain, falling in love) are in time alone, and physical objects are in space and time. Kant calls these things "appearances," and sometimes speaks of a "sensible world" consisting of appearances. By contrast, my immortal soul (if there be such a thing), God, the unmoved mover, etc. would belong to an intelligible world. Sometimes Kant refers to these as things in themselves. So any metaphysical concepts or principles are restricted to appearances, and the attempt to extend them to things in themselves is the fundamental source of the woes of metaphysics. To place Kant's system in context, I will contrast three different approaches to the following question: how can we gain knowledge of metaphysical t ruths? (Recall that for Kant, a metaphysical proposition is one which goes beyond the information provided by experience.) The first appeals to intellectual intuition, the second to inference from experience to something beyond experience, the third to the analysis of concepts....
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- Winter '10