defcon-17-barisani-bianco-sniff_keystrokes-wp

defcon-17-barisani-bianco-sniff_keystrokes-wp - |=-=| |=-=[...

Info iconThis preview shows pages 1–3. Sign up to view the full content.

View Full Document Right Arrow Icon
|=-----------------------------------------------------------------------=| |=----------------------=[ Sniffing Keystrokes With ]=------------------=| |=----------------------=[ Lasers and Voltmeters ]=------------------=| |=-----------------------------------------------------------------------=| |=-----------------------------------------------------------------------=| |=-----------------=[ By Andrea "lcars" Barisani ]=--------------=| |=-----------------=[ <lcars_at_inversepath_dot_com> ]=--------------=| |=-----------------=[ ]=--------------=| |=-----------------=[ Daniele "danbia" Bianco ]=--------------=| |=-----------------=[ <danbia_at_inversepath_dot_com> ]=--------------=| |=-----------------------------------------------------------------------=| --[ Contents 0. DISCLAIMER 1. Introduction 2. Motivation 3. First Attack: Theory 4. The PS/2 Signal 5. Implementation 6. Data Analysis 7. Results 8. Attack Scenario and Workarounds 9. Second Attack: Theory 10. Implementation 11. Data Analysis 12. Results 13. Attack Scenario and Workarounds I. FAQ II. References III. Links --[ 0. DISCLAIMER All the equipment and/or circuits and/or schematics provided in the presentation must be treated as examples, use the presented information at your own risk, remember safety first. --[ 1. Introduction The exploitation of Electromagnetic Emanations and similar Side Channels has always been one of the most interesting and "exotic" areas of attack in the security field. In the late 60's and early 70's the term TEMPEST[1] was coined to title an NSA operation which aimed to secure electronic equipment from leakage of compromising emanations. Well known TEMPEST research describes remote eavesdropping of CRT displays and most recently LCD displays, as well as optical emanations from appliances LED indicators. Our research details two attacks, one against wired PS/2 keyboards, the other against laptop keyboards using respectively power line leakage and optical sampling of mechanical energy. We describe how using relatively cheap homemade hardware we can implement basic but powerful techniques for remotely eavesdropping keystrokes.
Background image of page 1

Info iconThis preview has intentionally blurred sections. Sign up to view the full version.

View Full DocumentRight Arrow Icon
--[ 2. Motivation The two presented attacks partially builds upon existing concepts and techniques, but while some of the ideas might have been publicly hinted, no clear analysis and demonstration has ever been presented as far as we know. Our goal is to show that information leaks in the most unexpected ways and can be indeed retrieved. If our small research was able to accomplish acceptable results in a brief development time (approximately a week of work) and with cheap hardware, consider what a dedicated team or government agency can accomplish with more expensive equipment and effort. We think it is important to raise the awareness about these unconventional
Background image of page 2
Image of page 3
This is the end of the preview. Sign up to access the rest of the document.

This note was uploaded on 02/02/2011 for the course SECURITY 2354 taught by Professor Morganjones during the Spring '11 term at Ucla Venezuela.

Page1 / 11

defcon-17-barisani-bianco-sniff_keystrokes-wp - |=-=| |=-=[...

This preview shows document pages 1 - 3. Sign up to view the full document.

View Full Document Right Arrow Icon
Ask a homework question - tutors are online