Unformatted text preview: credible threats). 3. Let v be the outcome from part (b) in the previous question and let T be the set of outcomes W v ={u: u ≥ A v} (note that one should use the “squiggly” ≥ sign for preferences, but it doesn’t seem to exist in word, so we will use the ordinary ≥ with the proviso that it should be read as “weakly preferred to” meaning, “preferred or indifferent to”.) a. Describe T explicitly. b. Can A force T or can B or C force ~T. c. What does your answer say about extending Zermelo’s theorem (Theorem 2.1 in the text by Binmore) to games with more than 2 players. 4. Binmore, Section 2.12, Number 22. (Note: to say that something is now a Nash Equilibrium with respect to mixed strategies means that when viewing a “best response” that is the best response among all possible mixed strategies.)...
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 '08
 SHMOYS
 Game Theory, Binmore, Game Theory Spring, perfect Nash Equilibrium.

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