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Unformatted text preview: credible threats). 3. Let v be the outcome from part (b) in the previous question and let T be the set of outcomes W v ={u: u A v} (note that one should use the squiggly sign for preferences, but it doesnt seem to exist in word, so we will use the ordinary with the proviso that it should be read as weakly preferred to meaning, preferred or indifferent to.) a. Describe T explicitly. b. Can A force T or can B or C force ~T. c. What does your answer say about extending Zermelos theorem (Theorem 2.1 in the text by Binmore) to games with more than 2 players. 4. Binmore, Section 2.12, Number 22. (Note: to say that something is now a Nash Equilibrium with respect to mixed strategies means that when viewing a best response that is the best response among all possible mixed strategies.)...
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