Managing+in+the+Modular+Age

Managing+in+the+Modular+Age - INTRODUCTION MANAGING IN THE...

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Unformatted text preview: INTRODUCTION MANAGING IN THE MODULAR AGE: ARCHITECTURES, NETWORKS, AND ORGANIZATIONS RAGHU GARUD, ARUN KUMARASWAMY AND RICHARD N. LANGLOIS The world is full of complex systems. Nature provides an abundance of complex organisms and ecosystems, and humans have constructed complex mechanical, intel— lectual, organizational and social systems. But what exactly does it mean for a system to be complex? For Herbert Simon (in this volume), a complex system is “one made up ofa large number of parts that have many interactions ‘ . . Ii]n such systems the whole is more than the sum of the parts in the weak but important pragmatic sense that, given the properties of the parts and the laws of their interaction, it is not a trivial matter to infer the properties of the whole.” Complexity is thus a matter both of the sheer number of distinct parts the system comprises and otthe nature of interactions among those parts. DECOMPOSABILIT‘Y PRINCIPLE One way to manage complexity is to reduce the number of distinct elements in the system by grouping elements into u and therefore hiding the elements within — a smaller number of subsystems. T his is the basic idea of drrompnmbz’lz’ly that Simon Offers both a prescription for human designers and as a description of the systems we find ready‘made in nature. To establish the importance of decomposability, Simon offered the parable of the watchmalters. 'l‘empus and Hora both made watches from myriad parts, and both were interrupted frequently in their work. 'l‘empus organized his work in a manner that it he had “one [watch] partly assembled and 2 RAGHU GARUD, ARUN KUMARASWAMY, AND RICHARD N. LANGLOIS mwmwmmmamzmmma mamanVawammarwmgangwvsmmaw wmrarawuwzssmwmwxmmwmmwwgemm _ywamnmmmwkiaflwnmxamtmmmemmflem had to put it down — to answer the phone, say — it immediately fell to pieces and had to be reassembled from the elements” (Simon, in this volume). Consequently, every time Tempus was interrupted and forced to set aside his work, the entire unfinished assembly fell to pieces. In contrast, Hora first built stable subassemblies that he could then put together in a hierarchic fashion into larger stable subassemblies. Thus, when Hora was interrupted, only the last unfinished subassembly fell apart, preserving most of his earlier work. It is easy to appreciate the complexity that Tempus confronted due to the way he organized his work. Unlike Hora, who organized his work such that there was a one—to—one mapping between functions and subassemblies, there was no such one» to—one mapping for Tempus. For Tempus, the fimctioning of each part was depend- ent upon the functioning of other parts. The parts interacted with one another in non—linear ways, making it difficult to complete a watch ~ even without interrup- tions. Of course, interruptions made matters worse by compelling Tempus to retrace his steps (at least cognitively) to determine the point he had reached before the interruption. In the end, it was the “perpetual incompleteness” of the watchmaking process that doomed Tempus. Stated differently, the architecture that Tempus was working with did not possess a high degree of modularity. In contrast, Hora’s architecture was modular —— the successful operation of any given subassembly was not dependent upon the perform- ance of another. That is, there was a clear one-to—one mapping between functions and subassemblies (Ulrich, in this volume). Consequently, Hora’s approach preserved the subassemblies that he had finished between interruptions. In an evolutionary selection environment, such stability is rewarded with survival (Simon, in this volume; Loasby, 1976). And there are other benefits as well (see for example, Garud and Kumaraswamy, 1993; Langlois and Robertson, Sanchez and Mahoney, Baldwin and Clark, and Schilling, all in this volume). For example, modularity facilitates the retention and reuse of system parts and enhances the speed, scope and reach of innovation. in organizational and social systems — mid perhaps in mechanical ones as well ~ it is possible to think of interdependency and interaction among the parts as a matter of information transmission or mmmwnicm’im. Consider, with Eric yon Hippel (1990), the problem of organizing product innovation. Here, the issue is how to decompose the organization of a research and development project by partitioning tasks among development teams. As von Hippel pointed out, in order to solve this decomposition problem, one has to focus on the interdependencies among the vario ous tasks the project comprises.1 if the project is organized in a non‘decomposable manner, then interdependency will be high, meaning that each development team will need constantly to receive and use information about what all the other develop~ napnt' rpomc rim:- A Fire LvaLLL Lpullld (LLV um 115. For example, the development of the 08/360 operating system for the original TBM 360 line of computers was evidently organized in a relatively non‘decomposable way. The manager of the project, Frederick Brooks, insisted on a conscious attention to interdependencies and a high level of communication among all participants. This included the creation and maintenance of a formal project workbook that docu— mented every aspect of the system so that, in principle at least, every worker could l i ! e1!warmunwflfi»Mawmzaxwwaafieia;finiawsmmxwéx determine how changes elsewhere would affect his or her part of the project. Brooks decided “that each programmer should see all the material, that is, should have a copy of the workbook in his own office” (Brooks, 1975: 76). But, there was one small problem. Within six months The workbook was about five feet thick! If we had stacked up the 100 copies serving programmers in our offices in Manhattan’s Time—Life Building, they would have towered above the building itself. Furthermore, the daily change distributions averaged two inches, some 150 pages to be interfiled in the whole. Maintenance of the workbook began to take a significant time from each workday (Brooks, 1975: 77). The team soon switched to microfiche. And, clearly, with modern technology, the workbook could reside online and be updated rapidly. But the point remains that a non»decomposable system incurs high communication cost. Indeed, it is for this insight that Brooks is well known: in the design of complex systems, the costs of communication among workers will eventually outweigh the benefits of the division of labor as more and more workers are added to a project (Brooks, 1975: 1849). At one point, Brooks briefly considered a “radical” alternative proposed by D. L. Parnas, whose “thesis is that the programmer is most effective if shielded from, rather than exposed to the details of construction of system parts other than his own” (Brooks, 1975: 78). This radical alternative is in fact the strategy of seek— ing decomposability in the design of the development project and of the underlying software. Parnas (1972) is the inventor of the notion of infiirmntion hiding, a key concept in the modern object—oriented approach to computer programming. Pros grammers had long understood the importance of modularity, that is, of breaking programs into manageable pieces. But not all modular systems are automatically. decomposable, since we can break the systems into modules whose internal work- ings remain highly interdependent on one another. Parnas argued that, especially in large projects, programmers should abandon modularization based on simple flow charts and pay attention instead to minimizing interdependencies. If knowledge is hidden or encapsulated within a module, that knowledge cannot affect, and therefore need not be communicated to, other modules ofa system. Under this scheme, every module “is characterized by its knowledge of a design decision which it hides from all others. Its interface or definition was chosen to reveal as little as possible about its inner workings” (Parnas, 1972: 1056). MODULAR SYSTEMS AND STANDARDS Baldwin and Clark (in this volume and 2000) have drawn on similar ideas from computer science to formulate some general principles of modular systems design. The decomposition of a system into modules, they argue, should involve the parti— tioning of information into visible design rules and hidden design parameters. The visible design rules (or visible informatian) consist of three parts: 0 An architecture specifies what modules will be part of the system and what their functions will be. 4 RAGHU GARUD, ARUN KUMARASWAMY, AND RICHARD N. LANGLOIS maxi/em:yfiwaefiwnmhwfimtfie‘vxfid a» wammumamn 0 Interface; describe in detail how the modules will interact, including how they fit together and communicate. 0 And standard; test a module’s conformity to design rules and measure the module’s performance relative to other modules. These visible pieces of information need to be widely shared and communicated. (In contrast, the hidden design parameters are encapsulated within the modules, and they need not be communicated beyond the boundaries of the module.) As Baldwin and Clark pointed out, the literature on modular systems tends to collapse the three kinds of visible information together, calling them all either “the architecture,” “the interfaces,” or “the standards.” Clearly, there is much to be gained by pursuing each of these design rules in greater depth. In economics, it has been the word “standards” that has caught on, and indeed the economics of standards and standard setting has grown to con— siderable prominence in the last few years. Economides (in this volume) provides a thorough survey. At the center of this literature is a series of influential models of “network effects” (see Katz and Shapiro, 1985; Farrell and Saloner, 1986). Network effects occur when the value to an individual of adopting a standard depends on the number of others who have already adopted it or who can be expected eventually to adopt it. There are basically two types of networks. In physical connection networks, users are literally connected to one another. For example, the value to a person of being connected to a telephone system (in the late nineteenth century, let us say) depends on how many friends and business associates are connected to the system (rather than to a rival system, perhaps)? Standards also play a role in the second type, virtual networks, sometimes also called hardwaresoftware networks. Here there is no literal connection; instead, users are con lCCt‘Cd by their adherence to the same set of standards. For example, the value to a person ofa piece of hardware (a personal computer in the late twentieth century, let us say) depends on the availability of complementary hard‘: software, which in turn typically depends on the number of others who have chosen or will choose the standard of compatibility embodied in the hardware (rather than a rival standard). These networks effects generate positive feedback. As a result, a single standard is likely to win out and become dominant under most circumstances (Shapiro and Varian, in this volume). A firm whose technology defines the industry-wide standard is the Winner who “takes most.” It is to realize such a competitive advantage that firms attempt to sponsor their proprietary technologies as standards (Garud and Kurnaraswamy, 1993). In this regard, issues such as first and second movement, alliances, dynamic appropriability and managing expectations all take on great strategic significance. Yet, the sponsorship of standards is not straightforward. Standardization is always contested and fragility is inherent in the apparent stability of standards (Garud, Iain, and Kumaraswamy, 2002, Wade, 199(1). Many are required to subscribe to a new standard before a winner can take most. To the extent that the new standard is an architectural innovation, it may attract sufficient organizational support to challenge an existing dominant standard (Wade, in this volume). Still, stitching together a coalition to support a standard is a difficult sociopolitical process (Tushman and Jfit the ed. ind vin ree the in yht )n- s a of )rk he [0 “g ds Let )6 is Kit 1211 of ARCHITECTURES, NETWORKS, AND ORGANIZATIONS 5 Murmann, in this volume). As many begin subscribing to a standard, competitive pressures to innovate increases, thereby increasing the likelihood that the standard itself may fragment. In an environment where advantages are transient, it is not clear that the first mover, even with a significant market lead, always wins. PATH DEPENDENCE AND CREATION Underlying these political and strategic dynamics are path dependencies that stand- ards generate. Paul David (1985) set the tone here with his now legendary account of how the QWERTY keyboard came to be the dominant layout of typewriter keys. Other favorite examples have included computers, telecommunications systems, and various kinds of home entertainment systems such as stereos (Langlois and Robertson, in this volume), VCRs (Cusumano, Mylonadis, and Rosenbloom, 1992), or high» definition television (Farrell and Shapiro, 1992). In most of these cases, the issue is one of the compatibility of physical components or electronic signals. Besides technical standards, behavioral standards are another important class of standards that generates path dependencies. In the QWERTY case, human touch— typing skills were part of the technological system QWERTY standardized. Indeed, David (1987) distinguishes between standard; aftechm‘rral drug/m and standards of [re/’mvioml psrfbrmame. The two are closely related, of course: standards are at base a kind of social institution; and social institutions are recurrent patterns of behavior that help to coordinate human activity (Langlois, 1986; North 1990). Much of the allure of Paul David’s keyboard story comes from the contention that QWERTY is not the best of all possible configurations and that “lock’in” has prevented change to a better keyboard.3 This same logic is true of social institutions more generally The convention that we all drive on the same side of the road is a standard that brings order out of disorder and increases the efficiency of driving; but to change such a convention can be difficult, as places such as Sweden and Okinawa discovered when they switched sides of the road. 'l’hese behavioral or technical standards are anchors to the past, encapsulating learning and network effects that make it all the more difficult for a new technology to emerge. in this regard, a key issue is to understand how firms might break away from standards even while building upon them. The essential tension between flex— ibility and commitment is perhaps the most intriguing aspect ofstandard setting that underlies path creation (Garud and Karnoe, 2001; Langlois and Savage, 2001). To use the language of Garud and Iain (1996), standards can be at once enabling and amrrrzrz'm'fifl. When there are no standards, there is complete flexibility, but very little enablement, as “customers and vendors might be prone to wait for the emergence of a dominant design before they are induced to make significant investments” (Garud and Iain, 1996: 393). But when standards are too tight, they can suffocate progress, leading to a “stuck” technology with little innovation ofany kind. Only when the institutional environment (the standards) “just embeds” the technological matrix do those standards most fully enable, and not constrain, technological development. In such a “just—embedded” world, technology and standards co—evolve, “each of these reciprocally and continually shaping the other” (Garud and Iain, 1996: 393). ha. . 6 RAGHU GARUD, ARUN KUMARASWAMY, AND RICHARD N. LANGLOlS ~ mmmemmammiwwm vawmwxwflamflw‘fiflvJose/7th «assiswmuwxwwwa wvwvmaismw . ECONOMICS OF STANDARDS Charles Kindleberger (1983) pointed out that standards serve to create economies of scale and to lower transactions costs. Economies of scale arise from the increase in the extent of the market that results from reduced variety. For example, in the 1910s, the Society of Automotive Engineers set standards for automobile parts that winnowed the kinds of steel tubing in use from 1,600 to 210 and the types of lock—washers from 800 to 16 (Epstein, 1928: 41—3)‘ Independent parts suppliers could then take advantage of longer production runs to reduce costs, which especially helped the smaller car companies who did not have high internal demands for parts. Standards help reduce transactions costs by acting as mechanisms for coordina- tion and by helping align expectations. In the classic case, for example, the conven— tion that we all drive on the same side of the road is a standard that reduces the “transaction” costs of ascertaining the intentions of each oncoming driver, not to mention the resource costs of failed coordination. As David (1987) points out, behavioral standards of this kind can be thought of as ensuring “interface com- patibility” much as do standards of technical design, since such standards help to coordinate the way individuals “connect together.” Standards can also reduce transactions costs (and agency costs) by facilitating measurement and by reducing monitoring costs. A single standard of weights and measures, for example, makes easier the comparison of goods in exchange and increases the cost of cheating. More generally, normative standards can reduce costs of monitoring by providing a benchmark against which quality or performance can be judged. In a sense, standards are always normative in that they take the form: “do it this way.” This is true whether the standard is an injunction to drive on the right or a technical specification constraining design choices“ Conformance to a standard also generates economies of scope and substitution (Garud and Kumaraswamy, in this volume). For instance, economies of scope are realized to the extent that a common technological platform is used for a variety of product classes.5 Economies of substitution can be realized to the extent that sub» systems at lower levels of the system hierarchy are mixed and matched to generate different combinations.6 Degrees of freedom available at the platform level deter- mine the range of possibilities that are available at a lower level of system hierarchy. URGANlZATlONAL issues These economies are manifest and realized in the ways we organize. For instance, with the advent of the lnternet, there has been a disaggregation of the traditional value chain into value nets. A reduction in transactions costs made possible by standards makes it possible for firms in the value net to specialize just in the develop— ment of some components of the larger technological system and to build upon external economies, that is upon the strength of others (Langlois and Robertson, in this volume). Such specialization enables each firm in the value net to derive eco— nomies of scale from the aggregation of demand. To the extent that firms in the value net adopt the same technological platform across their different product classes, they raw ARCHITECTURES, NETWORKS, AND ORGANIZATIONS 7 owns.“ 37% A derive economies of scope, They also derive economies of substitution when they mix and match standardized components available within the value net to offer diiTerent new products and services (Garud and Kotha, 1994). Indeed, standards, as coordination mechanisms, make it possible for firms in a value net to operate in a distributed and parallel manner. There are critical differ- ences in the functioning of such value nets when compared to traditional mass production chains. Value nets are hetrarchical whereas traditional mass production chains are hierarchical. Coordination of value nets is not in the form of boss— subordinate relationships, but rather in the form ofpeermo-peer relationships. Such coordination is accomplished by a “shared” rather than a “clean” division of labor (Imai, Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1985), a second difference between value nets and mass production chains. In other words, each “module” in the value net has specialized capabilities, and, yet, has other inbuilt capabilities. Such a redundancy in functions within each “module” ensures that the net, pos- sesses emergent properties. The interlaced structure also reduces network vulnerabil— ity to which a sequentially interdependent system is susceptible when any module fails (Morgan, 1986; Garud and Kotha, 1994). Indeed, these interlaced structures enable modules to combine and split apart to generate new functionality (Fleming and Sorenson, 2001). Moreover, such an interlaced structure is critical for dealing with changes in standards even as they are applied, As may be apparent, the design of such an ultra-modular system violates the near decomposability principle suggested by Simon. However, the reason that such a structure possesses evolutionary capabilities is that the whole, to some extent, is contained in the parts. Consequently, intermediate states provide the architectural genetic codes for larger structures to emerge. Such is the design of the human brain and of the Internet. These designs are very difierent from the nonedecomposable design adopted by Tempus. They are also different from the one adopted by Hora, whose watches were subassemblies of stable parts clumped and nested together in a hierarchical fashion. RESEARCH DIRECTIONS As we can see from these discussions, modularity is a rich entry point to a broader set of issues cutting across technological, organizational and strategic domains. For instance, we cannot talk about the benefits of modularity without acknowledging the sociopolitical processes involved in the shaping ofindustry~wide standards. Or, we cannot talk about ctrevolutionary dynamics associated with the disaggregatitm of technical and organizational forms without reflecting upon the transaction costs and translations costs involved. There is exciting research being and to be conducted in this regard. For instance, an important line of inquiry is to understand the underpinnings, scope and limits of modularity. Gaining such an understanding accords greater explanatory power to a concept that is increasingly being used by many with respect to both products and services markets. For instance, it would be useful to understand different types of modularity and the costs and benefits associated with each. An understanding of .i l . 8 RAGHU GARUD, ARUN KUMARASWAMY AND RlCHARD N. LANGLOIS «swammmmemaws mmmwmsrmmewwzmzemweammzzmmwvaammw Wuympmtumfiwwfm waaammmammwmwwawarm/sqa nMflVMXM different types of modularity may result in directing our attention to other less studied system attributes such as integrity and upgradability and the tradeoffs that we may have to make among them. Another fruitful avenue for exploration is the relationship between standards (including architectures and interfaces) and modularity. After all, standards provide the “vanishing hand” which enables the decentralized design and production of modular systems (Langlois, 2001; see also Garud and Kumaraswamy, in this volume). But, how do these standards emerge? Once they emerge, how extensible are these standards? To the extent that standards themselves continue to change (Iain, 2001), is it possible to modularize components of a technological system into neatly decomposable elements? We know that standards enable and constrain at the same time and that these properties generate path dependencies In this regard, how should standards be articulated to allow for the emergence of new paths? These issues hint at the many organizational and strategic issues associated with modularity and standards. For instance, we know that standards require collective action and that the outcomes of these collective initiatives often provide private benefits. In this regard, how are property rights and apprOpriability issues to be sorted out Within the collective? Given the winner~takes—all dynamics and lock—in associated network industries? From the perspective of a firm sponsoring an open standard, how much of its own technology should it place in the public or collective domain to mobilize support? Under what conditions would a sponsor be able to mobilize sufi’icient organizational support to displace a dominant design? If modularity allows firms to be a part of a value net, what are the governance processes most appropriate for harnessing distributed and parallel development? What are the ti w transaction modes involved and how do these transactions evolve over time? A relatively understudied issue is the role of organizational arrangements to bene t from modularity. For instance) many have noted the importance of building rec--— nological platforms as the base on which modular forms might emerge (Kogut and Kulatilaka, 1994), How do organizations justify the investments of building a plat» form that mil be used in the future? (see Baldwin and Clark, 2000). What incentives are required to develop and use platforms and modules across generations? What capabilities and organizational infrastructure should a firm possess to gain the options value inherent in technological platforms? How does a shift in industry~wide standard change the options value inherent in platforms and modules? And coming full circle once again to the relationship between modularity and standards) what actions should a firm undertake to shape emerging standards so as to gain the economies associated with the investments it has made in a technological trajectory? “m Corietusaoms There is no doubt that we are living in a modular age. Even as we embrace modularity and its virtues, we are also gaining an understanding of systems such as the brain that depart from “near decomposability.” We are also beginning to appreciate broader issues related to the harnessing and exploitation of modularity. And, as we have “Rug 3( It i per 1110 COf qut intt pre: inte ix) U1 2‘ 6C REFl Baldv Cal Bresn GR B tool- MIA Clark ital :88 at ds ie of SC ), IC ’6 CLO-‘0' (TIC/:0" ha ARCHITECTURES, NETWORKS, AND ORGANIZATIONS 9 suggested in our indicative list of research questions, these issues are not “nearly decomposable” in the Simon sense. This is the larger message that this edited volume attempts to communicate. It includes seminal articles that address modularity issues from diflferent disciplinary perspectives and from different levels of analysis. As readers navigate through this mosaic ofideas, it is our hope that they will encounter beneficial spillovers and rich connections among the different domains and, in the process, formulate new research questions and hypotheses. We have designed this volume to be modular, but with overlaps to highlight key interdependencies among the concepts of modularity, networks and architectures. We have also included commentaries by the authors that “upgrade” the insights present in their original articles It is our hope that readers will find sufficient integrity in the set of articles and commentaries we have included in this volume. NOTES )_4 von Hippel delines “the interdependence between any two innovation project tasks with respect to problemvsolving as the probability that eiiorts to perform one of the tasks to specification will require related problem~solving in the other. The higher this probability in a given instance, the greater the problenrsolving interdependence” (von Hippcl I990: 409). 2 lf‘you visit the Mark Twain House in Hartford, Connecticut, you will discover that Samuel Clemens was among the first: users of a telephone in the city. Although he couldn’t call many people, he could communicate with his editors. It is a comment on Twain’s ambigu~ ous attitude toward technology, however, that he kept the phone in a closet in the foyer. Liebowitz and Margolis (1990, 1995) have, however, challenged David’s specific conten- tion about QWERTY and have engendered debate about the extent to which lockvin situations can be considered to be suboptimal 4 A useful distinction is whether a standard is seliieni‘orcing or it requires some other enforcement mechanism. For example, the standards of cleanliness and eliiciency that McDonald’s sets for its franchise holders require monitoring by company inspectors in contrast, network eflects can instill selflregulative characteristics to compatibility standards once they have become widely accepted. 5 In language now popular in economics, a common technological platform of this type would be called a generaipurpose technology (GPT). Such technologies are an important engine of economic growth (Bresnahan and (llrajtenberg, 1995). 6 On the hierarchy of designs in technological systems, see Clark (1985). Lu REFERENCES Baldwin, C. Y. and Clark, K. B. (2000). 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Lorenz (eds), The Uneasy Alliance: Managing the Productivity Technology Dilemma, Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business School. Iain, S. (2001). “A process framework of collective standards emergence,” Unpublished doctoral dissertation, New York, NY: New York University. Katz, M. L. and Shapiro, C. (1985). “Network externalities, competition, and compatibility,” American Economic Review, 75: 424~40 Kindlebergcr, C. P. (1983). “Standards as Public, Collective and Private Goods,” Kylelos, 36(3): 377~96. " ixogut, B. and Kulatilaka, (1994). “Options thinking and platform investments: Investing in opportunity,” California Management Review, 36(2): 52—71. Langlois, R. N. (1986). “Rationality, Institutions, and Explanation,” in R. N. Langlois (ed), Economics a; a Process: Essay: in the New Institutional Economics, New York: Cambridge University Press, 225—55. Langlois, R. N. (2001). “The Vanishing Hand: The Changing Dynamics of Industrial capital- ism,” working paper, Center for institutions, Organizations and Markets, Storrs, CT: University of. Connecticut. 7 ’7’ WWW: and 66 27— the ino - ings 55w , ind ‘ __ the 73 in 103 OH 18- Hit ARCHITECTURES, NETWORKS, AND ORGANIZATIONS 11 Langlois, R. N. and Savage, D. A. (2001). “Standards, Modularity and Innovation: The Case of Medical Practice,” in R. Garud and P. Kamoe (eds), Path a’cpena’cncc anal creation, Mahwah, N): Lawrence Earlbaum Associates, 149—68. Liebowitz, S. I. and Margolis, S. E. (1990). “The fable of the keys,” journal ofLaw and Economics, 22: l~26. Liebowitz, I. and Margolis, E. (1995). “Path dependence, lock-in, and history,” journal ofLaw, Economic; and Organization, 11, 205—26. Loasby, B. J. (1976), Choice, Complexity and Ignorance, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univer~ sity Press, Morgan, G. (1986). Images of Organization, Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications. North, D. C. (19.90). Innitatz'onal, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, Cam- bridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Parnas, D. L. (1972). “On the Criteria To Be Used in Decomposing Systems Into Modules,” Communication: oft/46 ACM, 15: 105343. Von Hippel, E. (1990). “Task Partitioning: An Innovation Process Variable,” Rctcarck’ Policy, l9:4()7»18. Wade, 1. (1996). “A Community—Level Analysis of Sources and Rates of Technological Variation in the Microprocessor Market,” Acaa'cmy ofManaaomrntjoaz/nal, 39: 1218A44. ...
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