Lecture+19+quiz

Lecture+19+quiz - The quiz will begin in: If you intend to...

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The quiz will begin in: If you intend to leave after the quiz: ± Please sit close to an exit, and ± Please leave quietly. Question 1: What is the name of the strategy most likely to succeed in maintaining cooperation in an infinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma? A. Hail-Mary Strategy. B. Grim-Reaper Strategy. C. Tit-for-Tat Strategy. D. Golden-Rule Strategy. E. Face-the-Music Strategy. Quiz:
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Question 2: What is the name for a strategy that is the best-response no matter what the other player does? A. Constant Strategy. B. Dominant Strategy. C. Unconditional Strategy. D. One-sided Strategy. Quiz: Question 3: In a repeated prisoner’s dilemma where the players know that they will meet one another a finite number of times, what is the subgame perfect equilibrium of the game? A. The players will always cooperate because they know they will meet again. B. The players will cooperate except in the last round, because they know they will not meet again after that. C. The players will never cooperate because they know that after the last round they will never meet again. Quiz:
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Lecture outline 1. Dynamic games (aka sequential move games). A. Strategies versus actions. B. Subgame perfect equilibrium. C. Backwards induction. D. Another example. 2. Best-response functions in static vs. dynamic games. 3. One-shot prisoner’s dilemma. A. Equilibrium in dominant strategies. (A peculiar subset of Nash Equilibrium.) B. The essence of the game. (Seeing a game as a generalizable model.) 4. Repeated prisoner’s dilemma. A. Unraveling of cooperation.
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Lecture+19+quiz - The quiz will begin in: If you intend to...

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