This preview has intentionally blurred sections. Sign up to view the full version.View Full Document
Unformatted text preview: that we should the DS theory to say that: If something has fulfilled our informed, self-regarding desires that thing is good for us. 48 The Disappointment objection p. 49 * S-L this refutes the DS Theory my mini editorial it doesnt refute the theory in these cases one isnt fully informed. Problem for me full info requires superhuman knowledge Desires rational desires to harm punish oneself Self . 51 Objective Values Objection to the DS theory Some things are good or independently pf our desiring them, independently of our taking pleasure pain in them and independently of facts about what we would desire were we fully informed and rational, e.g., moral virtue courage honesty knowledge love Beauty. Question: are these things good because it is rational to desire them, or is it rational to desire them because they are good?...
View Full Document
This note was uploaded on 02/13/2011 for the course PHIL 181 taught by Professor Thomascarson during the Spring '10 term at Loyola Chicago.
- Spring '10