Egos - Psych theory

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ALTER EGOS AND THEIR NAMES 531 * I have benefited in the writing of this paper from conversations with Robert M. Adams, Brad Armour-Garb, Andy Egan, Bob Fiengo, Fred Goldstein, Michael Huemer, Jerry Katz, Steve Leeds, Eric Saidel, Jennifer Saul, Virginia Valian and Mark van Roojen. Special thanks are due to Edward Becker and George Bealer, with whom I discussed the issues dealt with in this paper at length, and who offered penetrating criticism and helpful suggestions on earlier drafts. “Substitution and Simple Sentences,” Analysis , 57 (1997): 102-08; “Reply to Forbes,” Analysis , 57 (1997): 114-18; 1 “Substitution, Simple Sentences, and Sex Scandals,” Analysis, 59 (1999): 106-112. These examples are mine; (3) and (3') are Saul’s. Saul gives a number of examples, including 2 (i) Clark Kent went into the phone booth and Superman came out. (i') Clark Kent went into the phone booth and Clark Kent came out. and (ii) Superman leaps tall buildings more often than Clark Kent. (ii') Superman leaps tall buildings more often than Superman. ALTER EGOS AND THEIR NAMES * ailure of substitutivity of coreferential terms, one of the hallmarks of referential opacity, is standardly explained in terms of the presence of an expression (such as a verb of propositional attitude, a modal adverb or quotation marks) with opacity-inducing properties. It is thus assumed that any term in a complex expression for which substitutivity fails will be within the scope of an expression of one of these types, and that where there is an expression of one of these types there will be failure of substitutivity for terms within its scope. I shall discuss a series of examples that have been thought to challenge this explanation by exhibiting failure of substitutivity of coreferential terms for positions not within the scope of any of the standard opacity-inducing expressions. If these examples are genuine, then the usual explanations of opacity are either incomplete – because there are sources of opacity other than those standardly identified, or completely mistaken – because the standardly identified expressions are not causes of opacity. I will argue, however, that the examples only exhibit failure of substitutivity of non -coreferential terms, and, hence, do not present a challenge to standard explanations of opacity. I . SAUL S PUZZLE Jennifer Saul has drawn attention to sentences containing no propositional-attitude, modal or quotational 1 constructions that exhibit apparent failure of substitutivity of coreferential terms. For example, whereas (1) and (2) are true, (1') and (2') are not: 2 F
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THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY 532 “Substitution and Simple Sentences,” p. 104 3 Other solutions that Saul discusses and rejects will be discussed below. For further debate, see Graeme Forbes, “How 4 Much Substitutivity?” Analysis , LVII (1997): 109-13 and “Enlightened Semantics for Simple Sentences,” Analysis , LIX (1999): 86-91; Joseph G. Moore, “Saving Substitutivity in Simple Sentences,”
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This note was uploaded on 02/12/2011 for the course PSYC 345 taught by Professor V during the Spring '11 term at UMBC.

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Egos - Psych theory

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