Biometrics_Privacy_Issues - THE PROFESSION Computer[IEEE...

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Unformatted text preview: THE PROFESSION Computer [IEEE], Vol. 37, Issue 4 (April 2004) Biometrics and the Threat to Civil Liberties Margaret L. Johnson, Stanford University based on that data only—which can require a search of the entire database. Performing this search takes a long time and even then will only rarely result in a single-record match. This means that the system must perform additional filtering. Keep in mind that these searches are not text-based. Because biometric data is pattern-based, finding a hit requires specialized algorithms that focus on finding specific patterns in certain aspects of the data. FACE-RECOGNITION SYSTEM Applying this background to some biometric systems examples makes it I n the post-9/11 world, various government agencies have proposed or built several data systems that significantly affect civil liberties. As system designers and developers, we might not be aware of how the decisions we make when implementing such systems could threaten civil liberties. Thus, we need mechanisms or procedures to help us make technical decisions that respect human rights. Biometrics is an area in which this need is especially important. Biometrics is an area in which having mechanisms for making decisions that respect human rights is especially important. using it to measure the distance and angle of various facial features relative to this reference. Templates are easier to process and store than the original raw data. Biometric systems fall into two categories: authentication and identification, with authentication systems being far more common. To be authenticated by a system, a subject presents a password or a token such as an ID card, along with a live biometric sample such as a fingerprint. The system accesses a record based on the token, then compares the sample’s biometric data with the record’s sample to authenticate the subject’s identity. Authentication systems are reliable and efficient if the subject base is small and the biometric readers are accurate and durable. Airports, prisons, and companies that need secure access use systems such as these. Implementing identification systems is more difficult. To be identified by a system, a subject provides biometric data, and the system must find a record easier to understand how implementation decisions can pose a threat to civil liberties. Consider the timely example of an airport passenger identification system containing a database that stores the facial data of known criminals and terrorists in a watch list. This system uses special cameras to scan the faces of passengers as it looks for individuals whose facial data match records in its database. If the system finds a match, it dispatches a security guard to bring the person to a security checkpoint for further investigation. Is such a system feasible? Experimental systems have been implemented, most notably in Boston’s Logan International Airport, but such systems do not yet meet expectations. At Logan, where 10 of the September 11th terrorists boarded flights that were subsequently hijacked, face-recognition systems exhibited a failure rate of 38.6 percent during testing. According to press reports, the systems failed to detect volunteers playing potential terrorists. Continued on page 90 WHAT IS BIOMETRICS? Biometrics refers to the automatic identification or verification of living persons using their enduring physical or behavioral characteristics. Many body parts, personal characteristics, and imaging methods have been suggested and used for biometric systems: fingers, hands, faces, eyes, voices, signatures, typing styles, DNA, and so on. The body parts most often used in current applications are fingerprints and facial characteristics. Biometric systems process raw data to extract a biometric template—a small set of data that can be uniquely derived given a biometric feature. Various algorithms process biometric data to produce a template. For example, in a face-recognition system, facialgeometry algorithms work by defining a reference line—for example, the line joining the pupils of the eyes—and 92 Computer The Profession Continued from page 92 Face-recognition technology is not yet robust enough to be used this way, but given the development rate in this area, identification systems using it will likely be implemented soon. Three primary impediments must, however, be overcome first: • Excessive false positive rate. A false positive occurs when a subject’s biometric data incorrectly matches that of a watch list member. • Uncontrolled environmental and subject conditions. Samples taken in an airport are noisy in that the light is uneven, shadows can partially cover the face, the image may not be frontal, the subject may be wearing a disguise, and so on. These variations make matching more difficult. • Watch list size. This factor poses an important limiting factor because every time database size doubles, accuracy decreases by two to three percentage points overall (P.J. Phillips et al., Face Recognition Vendor Test 2002, National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2003). tems to locate and physically track airline passengers. People being scanned and possibly tracked may not be aware of the system and thus cannot control it. The US Constitution’s Fourth Amendment guards against illegal searches and seizures by the government. Article 12 of the United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted in 1948, guards against interference with privacy, family, or home. Thus, a case could be made that if a government agency installs and maintains a face-recognition system at an airport, data collected and used without a subject’s consent could represent a civil liberties violation. A database with biometric data presents a natural target for theft and malicious and fraudulent use. sidering whether the camera is small and unobtrusive or large and obvious. This decision can affect the likelihood that subjects will be aware that the system is collecting their biometric data. Lack of consent implies lack of control in how a private company or a government agency might use a person’s biometric data. Finally, the question of how to store the collected biometric data arises. It’s common practice to store this data for an extended time after collection. If a disaster occurs, the data would be helpful in any ensuing investigation. A designer creating a database to store the biometric data makes decisions about accessibility, security, and data organization, all of which define who can access the data and how it can be used. The stored data provides a record of the subject’s location at a particular time and can be used for tracking. CRITICAL ISSUES More serious issues arise in the implementation of certain authentication systems. Consider another system that might be used in airports: To get past the security checkpoint, all passengers must provide a fingerprint. Each passenger also presents an ID such as a driver’s license. This data is entered into a system, which then searches a database of US citizens and their fingerprints against the passenger’s ID. If the data matches, the passenger is allowed to pass; if the data does not match, or if the person does not have a record in the database, officials detain the passenger for further investigation. This type of authentication system presumes a communication mechanism to a host computer and a central repository of biometric data. The implementation of such a system represents both the most serious technical challenges in biometrics and the most serious threats to civil liberties. A database with biometric data presents a natural target for theft and malicious and fraudulent use. If criminals intercept someone’s biometric WHO ARE THE DECISION MAKERS? Obviously, system designers and developers must be aware of their work’s civil liberty implications. In the example I’ve described, many technical decisions could, if made in ignorance of these issues, threaten civil liberties. For example, the securitylevel parameter that lets a user define the false-positive rate can be implemented in several ways. Internally, the parameter controls how closely biometric data must match to represent a hit. A system designer or developer will decide which aspects of the biometric data to use and establish the ranges of acceptability. Because each of these decisions affects the false-positive rate in ways the user cannot control, they affect the civil liberties of the subjects the system processes. The camera technology chosen provides another potential threat. Suppose a designer decides which camera the system should use based solely on the project’s requirements, without con- IMPACT ON CIVIL LIBERTIES An identification system based on face-recognition technology poses several threats to civil liberties. First, false positives must be investigated, which impinges on the privacy of innocent people. In biometric systems, the degree of similarity between templates required for a positive match depends on a decision threshold, a user-defined system parameter. The user can specify high security, in which case innocent subjects might be caught when the system casts a broader net. Alternatively, the user might specify low security, in which case terrorists could escape. Setting this parameter thus directly affects the false positive rate, which in turn directly affects subjects’ privacy. Another important civil liberty issue involves the potential for biometric sys90 Computer ...
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This note was uploaded on 02/16/2011 for the course INFO 200 taught by Professor N during the Spring '11 term at Pittsburgh.

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